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Book Reviews

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Published continuously since 1886.

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, New York 10115-1274. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to the Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Science Index*. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Urban Affairs Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index to Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue. University Microfilms Inc. has PSQ on optical disc dating from 1989 in their General Periodicals on Disc collection. Information Access Company produces issues of PSQ full-text from their computer databank. University Publications of America make PSQ book reviews published since 1988 available in their Scholarly Book Reviews on CD-ROM series.

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Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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Political Science Quarterly

Volume 107
Number 4
Winter 1992–93

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RITA JALALI and SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET examine the timing and nature of modern ethnic conflicts and how they are managed in multiethnic polities. They argue that the same conditions in different countries produce different results.

JAMES M. LINDSAY discusses the role Congress plays in the making of American foreign policy. He argues that while Congress seldom enacts its own substantive preferences into law, it exercises considerable, if often unnoticed, influence over U.S. foreign policy.

SHIBLEY TELHAMI analyzes how the form of government and the personal styles of leaders affected the bargaining performance of Israel, Egypt, and the United States in the Camp David negotiations. He then shows the relevance of these findings for the Arab-Israeli negotiations in the Madrid process.

ANTHONY W. MARX looks at the causes of recent shifts in opposition ideology and strategy in South Africa, as shown in responses to economic change, state policy, and deliberations within the opposition. His discussion of the interaction of these processes highlights the significance of the black opposition in determining past and possible future conflict in South Africa.

SCOTT MAINWARING argues that Brazilian political parties are exceptionally underdeveloped and explores the causes and implications of this problem.

CHRISTIAN JOPPKE examines some trends toward decentralized control in United States nuclear energy policy. He suggests that the conflict-oriented and fragmented American polity cannot provide the stable environment required for the successful implementation of a highly complex and inflexible technology.

FRED THOMPSON gives an overview of proposals to reform the federal defense acquisitions process.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective

RITA JALALI
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

Race and ethnicity provide the most striking example of a general failure among experts to anticipate social developments in varying types of societies. Until recently, there was considerable consensus among many Marxist and non-Marxist scholars that ethnicity reflected the conditions of traditional society, in which people lived in small communities isolated from one another and in which mass communications and transportation were limited. Many expected that industrialization, urbanization, and the spread of education would reduce ethnic consciousness, and that universalism would replace particularism. Marxists were certain that socialism would mean the end of the ethnic tension and consciousness that exited in pre-socialist societies. Non-Marxists sociologists in western countries assumed that industialization and modernization would do the same. Assimilation of minorities into a large integrated whole was viewed as the inevitable future.

It is now clearly established that the assimilationist assumptions are not valid. Most parts of the globe have been touched by ethnic conflict. While the postcolonial countries continue to experience the effects of ethnic polarization, ethnic passions have now engulfed regions of the world that until recently were thought to have solved the "nationality" problem. Ethnic conflict now threatens most

RITA JALALI, sociologist, teaches at Franklin and Marshall College and shortly will be moving to Michigan State University. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET is the Hazel Chair of Public Policy at George Mason University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is the current president of the American Sociological Association. His most recent book is *Continental Divide: the Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada.*

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former communist countries and has led to the political fragmentation of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. From the movements for autonomy in Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, and France to the strivings for a more formally pluralistic society in the United States, ethnic and racial cleavages have become a part of the political landscape of many of the western industrialized countries.

Ethnic movements have emerged under a variety of circumstance and encompassed many forms. They have emerged among large minority groups (Quebec and East Pakistan), and among small ones (Frisians in Holland, Jurassians in Switzerland, and Gorkhas in India). They encompass both cultural and economic components. For example, in Wales and Scotland the issues are more economic, while in the Basque country and Quebec they are more cultural. Within the same country, for example, India, ethnic protest has emerged in backward, poor regions as in Nagaland and in the advanced regions like Punjab. Ethnic political mobilization has occurred in democracies (India and Belgium) and in authoritarian systems (Franco's Spain and Uganda); in centralized states (France and Senegal) and in federal systems (the former Yugoslavia and India).

A variety of cultural markers have provided the basis for ethnic mobilization: the use of skin color in the United States, language in Canada, tribal loyalties in much of Africa, religion in Sudan and Northern Ireland. Some movements demand outright secession, others aim for cultural autonomy, while still others pursue equal rights within the prevailing political system. In all instances, the movements are powerful expressions of group identity and a desire for a more equitable distribution of political and economic resources.

The problems that ethnic diversity pose for efforts at nation-building have, as Walker Connor points out, been largely ignored by social scientists concerned with the topic. The territorial boundaries of states rarely coincide with ethnic boundaries. "Of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 percent) can be described as essentially homogenous from an ethnic viewpoint. . . . In some instances, the number of groups within a state runs into the hundreds, and in 53 states (40.2 percent of the total), the population is divided into more than five significant groups."[1]

Conversely, there are ethnic groups widely dispersed over various states. Thus, although there is a Jewish state, Israeli Jews form only 16 percent of all Jews. They are dispersed over thirty-nine other countries, with the largest number (44 percent of all Jews) residing in the United States.[2] There are other examples, including the Arabs who may be found in more than thirty-seven states, Malays in over seven, and Kurds in over six.[3] In Europe, 40 percent of Albanians live outside of Albania, and 23 percent of Hungarians reside outside Hungary.[4]

[1] Walker Connor, "Nation-building or Nation-destroying?" *World Politics* 24 (April 1972): 320.

[2] Gunnar Nielsson, "States and 'Nation-Groups' a Global Taxonomy" in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., *New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 35.

[3] Ibid., 37.

[4] Jaroslav Krejci and Vitezslav Velimsky, *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 79.

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The interaction of groups from diverse ethnic backgrounds often is accompanied by intolerance and conflict. The costs to society of such conflicts are enormous: denial of human rights, breakdown of political order, decline of economic performance, and escalation into civil and regional wars. Ethnically driven violence has ravaged many regions of the Third World and created an exodus of refugees. By one estimate, "more than half the world's thirty million refugees at the beginning of 1990 were fleeing from civil wars and repression which were the result of communally-based conflicts."[5]

Such tensions have also had an enormous impact on the economic development of countries. The poor performance of the Sri Lankan economy since the mid-1980s can be traced largely to ethnically driven conflicts.[6] They have created famine conditions in African counties like Ethiopia and Sudan, where millions have faced starvation as interethnic warfare has prevented farmers from growing food.

Ethnic conflicts also entail international complications as they repeatedly provoke military intervention by outside powers. Libya, for example, was in part motivated by ethnic considerations when it got involved in the Chadian civil war, as was India in Bangladesh (earlier East Pakistan) and in Sri Lanka.

The political instability prevailing in many parts of the Third World can also be traced in large part to interethnic conflict. In Sri Lanka, for example, there was a deterioration of democracy mainly because of an "explosion of ethnic conflict into violent insurgency, which . . . polarized the polity, embittered all groups, and provided an excuse for increasingly authoritarian measures."[7]

The effects of ethnic cleavages on prospects for peace and democracy, however, vary with the pattern of cleavage and the way they articulate with political structures. Where ethnic identities are crosscutting, they are less likely to threaten political stability. In India, because "major religious communities are split into many language communities which in turn are stratified into caste and class formations . . . an eagerness to utilize one affinity by a political leadership that seeks an easy constituency of popular support may encourage other leaders to exploit the other affinities of the same individual. Thus, for example, the easier course of exclusive Hindu mobilization, by seizing upon the Hindi language loyalty in northern India, created negative political reactions among Hindus who spoke other languages."[8] On the other hand, ethnic cleavages in Sri Lanka and

[5] Ted Robert Gurr, "Third World Minorities at Risk Since 1945" (Background paper prepared for the Conference on Conflict Resolution in Post-Cold War Third World, U.S. Institute of Peace, October 1990), 7.

[6] L. Kenneth Hubbell, "Political and Economic Discrimination in Sri Lanka" in Michael L. Wyzan, ed., *The Political Economy of Ethnic Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1990).

[7] Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1990).

[8] Jyotirindra Das Gupta, "India: Democratic Becoming and Combined Development" in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries.*

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Malaysia are cumulative (with linguistic, religious, regional, racial, and class cleavages overlapping) and thus a threat to democracy. In this article, we seek to deal with some of the causes of interethnic conflict and the strategies adopted by countries to manage such conflict.

The Third World

Latin American scholars have argued that their societies are not racist and that class rather than ethnic cleavages predominate. Yet in spite of racial and ethnic pluralism, stratification correlates with racial ancestry in almost all of the nations of the region. The privileged classes are largely of European background and/or are lighter skin-colored than the less affluent strata. "Money whitens" in these societies, in that those darker-skinned persons who manage to succeed economically do not face overt social discrimination, and they and their offspring frequently marry whites. In general though, "the closer the relationship to European stock, the more apt a population cohort is to have a high income level, land, and education; the closer the relationship to indigenous [Indian] or African stock, the more apt the group is to lack land, to have a low income level and little schooling, and to suffer discrimination in the workplace, in schools, and at sites where public services are dispensed."[9] A 1989 U.S. State Department report states that racial minorities suffer from discrimination in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In Brazil, where the government denies the existence of prejudice, the report notes that blacks and mulattos receive less income and education than whites and encounter discrimination in housing and services.[10] The 1980s have exacerbated the conditions of these racial groups as the countries have had to reduce public budgets for health and other social services in order to repay the foreign debt.

Ethnic-based antagonisms have severely disrupted many African and Asian polities. Most of the countries in these two regions are multiethnic societies, many of which do not even have one numerically dominant ethnic group. According to one study, of the 230 minorities at risk globally, 72 groups were found to inhabit Africa south of the Sahara, forming about 41 percent of the region's total population and 49 groups were in Asia, estimated to constitute nearly 12 percent of the continent's population.[11]

Tensions stemming from this situation add considerably to the task of creating and maintaining democratic, or at least noncoercive, politics. Not only must these countries seek to allocate resources and foster policies seen as equitable by diverse social strata, they must also find ways of securing the loyalty of ethnic groupings that constitute sub or embryonic nations whose initial loyalties and

[9] William C. Thiesenhussen, "Human Rights, Affirmative Action, and Land Reforms in Latin America," in Wyzan ed., *The Political Economy*, 26.

[10] Ibid., 28.

[11] Gurr, "Third World Minorities at Risk," 8.

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sense of group consciousness, of "we versus them," is to themselves rather than to the nation-state. And since the economic resources of these countries are low, it is not surprising that ethnic conflict often bodes to tear them asunder, to produce outcomes in which dominant groups and sometimes minorities discriminate against others in the pursuit of access to political power and economic and social advantages.[12]

A proper understanding of ethnic politics in the regions of the Third World also requires an examination of the role the colonial powers played in shaping interethnic relations. Ethnic heterogeneity in the countries of Africa, for example, is often the result of national boundaries drawn by foreign powers, which for the most part ignored tribal cultural patterns in the subjugated societies:

> The vagaries of European diplomacy and military campaigns, possibly influenced by alliance with local African political forces, determined the boundary outcomes. A particular precolonial African state might by treaty or alliance, or by calculation (or miscalculation) of advantage, assign itself to a given colonial domain. However, almost no one on the European side cared whether a particular language group was united or divided by colonial partition.[13]

The need to institutionalize dominance also required counting and classifying peoples into discrete, bounded groups whereas before, as Aidan Southall observes, the cultural identities were only "interlocking, overlapping, multiple."[14] In extreme cases, this created new categories of identity, particularly in Anglophone Africa. "Ethnonyms in East Africa such as Teso, Gisu, Acholi, Kiga, Sukuma, or Luhya would hardly have been encountered at all a century ago."[15]

Ethnic relations were also profoundly affected by colonial state policies, which actively promoted differential treatment of ethnic groups. Over time such policies created widespread economic and social disparities between ethnic groups.[16] Certain ethnic groups were selected as collaborators or channels for the transmission of government patronage. In Sudan, as A. E. A. Abdallah notes, the long-standing feud between the North and the South can be traced, among other factors, to "the British conception of a future for the South separate from the North. Systematic policies of divide-and-rule were instituted, ensuring very little

[12] S. M. Lipset, "Racial and Ethnic Tensions in the Third World" in W. Scott Thompson, ed., *The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy* (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1978), 123–148.

[13] Crawford Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity," *Daedalus* 111 (Spring 1982): 75.

[14] Aidan Southall, "The Illusion of Tribe," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 5 (January-April 1970): 36.

[15] Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict," 79.

[16] Michael L. Wyzan, "Introduction" in Wyzan, ed., *The Political Economy*; Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy, "The Analysis of Policies of Ethnic Preference in Developing States" in Nevitte and Kennedy, eds., *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict"; Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

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interaction between ethnic groups."[17] Economic development in the South was neglected. During negotiations over independence, Southerners were not included in the discussions, prompting the creation of a southern Sudanese political movement. Other examples include the British preference for northern Nigerians in Nigeria and Tamils in Sri Lanka. The British also pursued different policies toward Malays and non-Malays in Malaysia. The Malays were accorded a special position when land rights were granted to them, and a separate college was granted for their aristocratic sons, who were later recruited into public service positions.[18] After independence the system of quotas and privileged access was continued, creating severe ethnic conflicts. As Neil Nevitte and Charles Kennedy note, "the selection of one group over others . . . in effect constituted an incipient policy of preference during the colonial phase,"[19] setting a precedent for ethnic preference policies in the post-colonial period.

Modernization under colonialism also exacerbated interethnic tensions as it widened ethnic group disparities. It upset traditional relationships between groups as some groups more than others were able to utilize the opportunities for social mobility.[20]

Western Europe

Asia and Africa are ethnically more heterogeneous than Europe, because much of Europe's nationality problem was "solved" by wars and population transfers over the span of several centuries. Nationalism, an ideological movement for self-determination, emerged with the French revolution and spread over the whole of Europe. As Walker Connor has pointed out, the dogma that "alien rule is illegitimate rule" proved to be a potent challenge to the legitimacy of multinational structures and ultimately led to their disintegration.[21]

The peace settlements that followed World War I brought about an extensive redrawing of boundaries in favor of ethnically homogenous nations leading to a decrease in the percentage of population belonging to ethnic peoples without a state or self-government – by one count, from about 26 percent in 1910 to only about 7 percent in 1930.[22] Adjustments after World War II further reduced the problem of ethnic minorities throughout Europe. Both benign (assimilation, voluntary, or otherwise) and brutal methods (forcible transfer of population and

[17] A. E. A. Abdallah, "Ethnic Conflict in Sudan" in Wyzan, ed., *The Political Economy*, 145.

[18] Horowtiz, *Ethnic Groups*; Michael L. Wyzan, "Ethnic Relations and the New Economic Policy in Malaysia" in Wyzan, ed., *The Political Economy*.

[19] Nevitte and Kennedy, "The Analysis of Policies," 10.

[20] Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict." Also see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*.

[21] Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Perspective" in Milton J. Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 19-45.

[22] Krejci and Velimsky, *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe*, 63.

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genocide) were used to achieve the nationalist principle. Jaroslav Krejci and Vitezslav Velimsky estimate that about 20 million people moved and permanently settled in new homelands.[23]

The changes in the ethnopolitical relationships over a century and a half are striking.

> In 1820 more than half the population of Europe belonged to ethnic nations who either lacked a territorial political status of their own (state or autonomy) or [who] were scattered amongst several dynastic states uninterested in their national aspirations. By 1920, the share of such ethnic groups (whole nations or their fragments) declined to about 7 percent. As result of the Second World War, the share of ethnic minorities without an autonomy status dropped to 3 percent only.[24]

However, as the prevalence of numerous ethnic movements in Western Europe illustrate, not all ethnic aspirations were satisfied. Especially notable are the problems in the United Kingdom with Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales; in Spain with the Basques and Catalans; and in France with Bretons, Corsicans, and also with the Basques. While such ethnonational aspirations continue to dominate the political arena, new sources of interethnic conflict have also emerged in Europe. One has to do with the rise in the guest-worker and immigrant populations in Western Europe and the other with the breakdown of Soviet and Yugoslav polities.

The large scale migration of guest-workers who come from countries not sharing the predominant cultures or language has created new ethnic tensions in Western Europe. They constitute about 5 to 15 percent of the total population of most Western European countries.[25] Over half of the foreign workers and their dependents are located in France, Switzerland, and West Germany. Rising unemployment in host countries has heightened tensions between the local and foreign populations, particularly in Germany, where the problem has reached explosive levels. Racist attacks on foreign workers occur every day in the country with over 600 attacks reported in one year, 1989. Fully half of these attacks have taken place in western Germany, although the reincorporated eastern section is now the center of the most vicious ones. There is increased support for extreme right-wing political groups campaigning on anti-immigrant platforms.[26] In France, the National Front Party has increased its standing by basing its campaigns on fears about North African immigration.

In Britain, the dissolution of the empire created an inflow of migrants from former colonies. The country now has immigrants from diverse religious, lan-

[23] Ibid., 64.

[24] Ibid., 69–70.

[25] Mark J. Miller, *Foreign Workers in Western Europe: An Emerging Political Force* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

[26] Philip N. Jones, "West Germany's Declining Guestworker Population: Spatial Change and Economic Trends in the 1980s," *Regional Studies: Journal of the Regional Studies Association* 24 (Spring 1990): 223–233.

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guage, and regional backgrounds. There are, for example, about one million Muslims who have migrated from South Asia and Middle Eastern countries. In recent years they have become organized, insisting that they be subject to Islamic rather than British family law.

Ethnic Conflict in the former Soviet Union

The dismemberment of the last of the great multinational empires also threatens to create chaos and disorder in Eastern Europe and beyond. Starting with the conquest of Kazan in 1552, the growth of the Russian empire took place over 360 years.[27] As a result of this expansion, the empire dominated over people from several different language, religious, and ethnic backgrounds.[28] During this period Russian treatment of the minorities changed frequently—from tolerance to forced assimilation and discrimination. By the late nineteenth century, Orthodoxy had become the state religion. Other non-Christian and non-Orthodox religions were discriminated against, particularly if their spiritual centers were located outside the territory of the empire like the Catholic and Muslim faiths.[29]

Before the revolution, conversion to Orthodoxy was the chief means for assimilating minorities. Later, Marxism became the instrument of fusion. The original Marxist theory considered ethnic minorities an unnecessary distraction, if not inhibitors, to economic and political progress. Classic Marxist reasoning justified historically the ethnic domination over economically less productive peoples by developed groups because it was considered to be a historically useful mission: the integration of less productive cultures—such as Mexicans, Algerians, and Asian Indians—into industrially advanced ones helped to produce capitalism in stable agrarian societies. As Carlos Moore points out, Marx's systematic condemnation of "inferior races" included a belief that their nationalist movements could easily become obstacles for agrarian societies in the process of becoming industrialized.[30] To Marx and Engels the struggles of the then politically op-

[27] Alexander Bennigsen, "Soviet Minority Nationalism in Historical Perspective" in Robert Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 133.

[28] The 1979 Census identified 104 nationalities. Prior to its dissolution, ethnic Rusians had ceased to form the majority of Soviet Union's population. By one estimate Russians probably did not exceed 48.5 percent of the Soviet population. See Mikhail S. Bernstam, "The Demography of Soviet Ethnic Groups in World Perspective" in Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire*, 320. In the USSR one was required to choose an official nationality at the age of 16, (Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975], 17). Because choosing Russian as a nationality had long-lasting economic and political benefits, it is estimated that four million people reidentified themselves as Russians in the census of 1979.

[29] Bennigsen, "Soviet Minority Nationalism." 136. For more information about the Russian empire's treatment of minorities also see V. Kozlov, *The Peoples of Soviet Union* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).

[30] Carlos Moore, "Were Marx and Engels Racists?: The Prolet-Aryan Outlook of Marxism," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 19 (1974–75): 125–156.

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pressed blacks, Asians, Slavs, and Latins were distractions from the "real" issue of class struggle.[31]

Marx and Engels lashed out against Bohemia and Croatia for seeking freedom from German (Austrian) imperialism. Writing about the situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Engels recognized three of its peoples as destined for a progressive role—Germans, Poles, and Magyars. Then, in an unfortunate turn of phrase, he emphasized "the chief vocation of all the other races and peoples, great and small, is to perish in the revolutionary holocaust."[32]

On the formal ideological level, the communist regimes that had come to power since 1917 rejected Marx's and Engel's idea of absorbing minority and backward peoples into the cultures of more advanced societies. Lenin proposed that national minorities in the Soviet Union should have as much autonomy as possible and the right to secede. Lenin suffered a disabling stroke before he could elaborate on the "nationality" policy. When Stalin came to power, he ignored Lenins' views on this subject.[33] Although he claimed to support the development of cultures that were "national in form, socialist in content," under his rule the rights of the national minorities, guaranteed under the Soviet constitution, were frequently violated.

While the nationalism of the majority with its state-building and unifying potential was treated with empathy, the nationalisms of the minorities were considered divisive and, therefore, suppressed.[34] The republics were subjected to brutal, colonial Russification. Linguistic and cultural assimilation were promoted through Russian schools. Whole ethnic groups were deported—the Tatars of the Crimea, the Germans of the Volga, the Chechentsy of the Caucasus.[35] Terror managed to keep the lid on ethnic aspirations for several decades. Under Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, Stalin's nationality policy was implicitly dropped. "The live-and-let-live practices placated many officials of non-Russian ethnic groups. Lobbies representing native interests became increasingly entrenched."[36]

The advent of *glasnost* under Mikhail Gorbachev unleashed movements for secession. The Union of Soviet Republics is dead and the fourteen non-Russian republics are now independent, although most have joined a loose commonwealth. However, since many of the republics contain ethnic minorities, independence has not ended ethnic tensions in the region.

[31] Lipset, "Racial and Ethnic Tensions," 138.

[32] Quoted in Helen d'Encausse and Stuart Schram, *Marxism and Asia* (London: Allen Lane Penguin Press, 1969), 10.

[33] Teodar Shanin, "Ethnicity in the Soviet Union: Analytical Perceptions and Political Strategies," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (July 1989): 409–424; Martha B. Olcott, "Official Soviet Policy and the 'National Problem' " in Olcott, ed., *The Soviet Multinational State: Readings and Documents* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990).

[34] Shanin, "Ethnicity in the Soviet Union."

[35] Ibid., 419.

[36] Ibid., 421.

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Eastern Europe

Ethnic problems have reached explosive levels in other previously socialist countries of Europe, particularly the former Yugoslavia. No single group formed a majority within it, although Serbian influence tended to predominate. Four of the country's republics have so far declared independence (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia). Croatia's declaration in June 1991 sparked an uprising by the republic's minority Serbs, who constitute about 11 percent of Croatia's population. Serbian insurgents have since seized about one-third of the territory of Croatia and about two-thirds of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with help from the Republic of Serbia and the Serb-dominated federal army.

Czechs and Slovaks have agreed to partition the former Czechoslovakia into its respective parts; the Hungarian minority in Romania faces discrimination, as does the one-million Turkish minority in Bulgaria, who until recently was not allowed to keep Turkish names, speak its language, or practice its Muslim faith; and there is an increased persecution in Eastern Europe against Jews and Gypsies and other foreigners, such as refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

The resurgence of ethnicity worldwide raises several important questions. What factors explain the timing and nature of modern ethnic conflicts? Why do some cases of interethnic contact generate conflict and others do not? For instance, while the presence of many foreigners has created ethnic tensions in France and Germany, in Luxembourg and Sweden large numbers of immigrants have resulted in only a few cases of interethnic hostility. Luxembourg has the largest proportion of semisettled aliens in Europe (out of 370,000 people, 100,000 are foreigners, most of whom are culturally and racially different from the locals.)[37] Similarly, Sweden in recent decades has incorporated more than 400,000 foreign-born immigrants without much difficulty. In the developing world, Tanzania has a large number of relatively small tribal groups but little intertribal conflict.[38] In societies where ethnic tensions are high, what can be done to minimize these conflicts? How have countries like Switzerland or Papua New Guinea (with 700 different language groups) managed relatively peaceful ethnic relations in a culturally heterogeneous environment?[39] What is the consequence of ethnic fragmentation for the stability of nation-states? Is the next century going to witness a Balkanization of large states or will the move be in the other direction toward integration of ethnic units into suprastate governments? Will it be a world of ECs (European

[37] Martin O. Heisler, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in the Modern West" in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), 22.

[38] Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security," *Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues* 1 (Winter 1990): 82–98.

[39] The latter have problems in the offshore Solomon Islands.

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Communities), OASs (Organizations of American States), ASEANs (Association of South East Asian Nations), UNs (United Nations), or one of Latvias, Croatias, Kashmirs, and Eritreas?

Ethnic Mobilization

Contrary to the expectations of many Marxist and non-Marxist scholars, the process of modernization itself brought about an increase in ethnic consciousness. As Connor has pointed out, while the notion of popular sovereignty legitimated demands for national self-determination, modernization acted as a catalyst for ethnonationally inspired demands. In Europe, prior to World War II, when there were fewer roads and cars, local radio rather than state-wide television was in operation, and income and education levels were much lower than today. "Brittany's culture appeared safe from French encroachment. . . . [M]ost Walloons and Flemings seldom came into contact . . . with members of the other group."[40] With substantial increases in communication and intergroup contact the divisive sense of ethnonational uniqueness has been reinforced rather than dissipated.

Most theories of ethnic mobilization assume that modernization has played an important role in stimulating the ethnic movements of recent times. They diverge in the factors they identify as causally more significant in the development and persistence of ethnically based movements. Thus Michael Hechter, puzzled with the rise of nationalist movements in the industrialized West, argues that capitalist forms of development create economic disparities between core and peripheral regions and produce ". . . a cultural division of labor: a system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines. High status occupations tend to be reserved for those of metropolitan culture; while those of indigenous culture cluster at the bottom of the stratification system."[41] This type of a stratification system ultimately gives rise to nationalist movements in the periphery. However, the evidence of stronger nationalist movements in relatively prosperous, peripheral regions of some countries, like Quebec, the Basque region, Catalonia, Flanders, and to a lesser extent, Estonia and Slovenia, casts serious doubts on Hechter's internal colonial thesis.[42]

A model of ethnic mobilization that has enjoyed much popularity in recent years is economic competition. The basic arguments are derived from the ecolog-

[40] Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World," 330–331.

[41] Michael Hecher, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536–1966* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 30.

[42] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Ken Medurst, "Basques and Basque Nationalism" in Colin H. Williams, ed., *National Separatism* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982). Hechter later recognized this problem in his theory. See his "Internal Colonialism Revisited" in Tiryakian and Rogowski, eds., *New Nationalisms*, 17–26.

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ical theories of Frederick Barth and his associates[43] and Michael Hannan.[44] Proponents of the economic competition model argue that "modernization increases levels of competition for jobs, housing, and other valued resources among ethnic groups" and that "*ethnic conflict and social movements based on ethnic (rather than some other) boundaries occur when ethnic competition increases.*"[45] Studies using this approach have found that ethnic party support is much higher in developed, urbanized, and industrial regions than in underdeveloped ones.[46] Development leads to a rise rather than a decline in ethnic mobilization, because it provides resources to ethnic groups in the periphery, increasing their bargaining position and organizational capacity for action. The literature on the class basis of ethnic movements is also supportive of the theory, for it shows that movement activists tend to be more educated, are more well-to-do, and have higher occupational status than others among their ethnic groups.[47]

The economic competition model has also been applied to explain the rise of national consciousness in the Ukraine. In a book written before the ethnic turmoil of the Gorbachev era, Bohdan Krawchenko notes "the question of competition is crucial in explaining the rise of national consciousness" in Ukraine following the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s. "With mobilized individuals, expectations race ahead of the real possibilities. These were the same people who had to compete with Russians for employment, and the rivalry led to an exacerbation of ethnic tensions."[48]

Similarly, Teodar Shanin in a more recent article implies that economic growth in the Soviet Union's ethnic peripheries created more opportunity to amass individual fortunes, both legally and through corruption. All this facilitated the

[43] Frederick Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

[44] Michael T. Hannan, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries in Modern States" in J. Meyer and M. T. Hannan, eds., *National Development and the World System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 253-275.

[45] Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel, "Introduction" in Olzak and Nagel, eds., *Competitive Ethnic Relations* (Boston: Academic Press, 1986), 2. (Emphasis in original.)

[46] Susan Olzak, "Ethnic Mobilization in Quebec," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5 (July 1982): 253-297; Eric Leifer, "Competing Models of Political Mobilization: The Role of Ethnic Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 87 (July 1981): 23-47; Francois Nielsen, "The Flemish Movement in Belgium After World War II: A Dynamic Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 45 (February 1980): 76-94; Charles Ragin, "Ethnic Political Mobilization: The Welsh Case," *American Sociological Review* 44 (August 1979): 619-635.

[47] William R. Beer, "The Social Class of Ethnic Activists in Contemporary France" in Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict*; William R. Beer, *The Unexpected Rebellion: Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France* (New York: New York University Press, 1980); Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 11 (December 1978): 739-775; Ragin, "Ethnic Political Mobilization"; Nielsen, "The Flemish Movement"; Olzak, "Ethnic Mobilization in Quebec"; S. M. Lipset, "The Revolt Against Modernity" in Per Torsvik, ed., *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation Building* (Bergen, Norway: Universitet Forlaget, 1981), 451-500.

[48] Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 184-85, 198.

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formation of ethnic lobbies in the post-Stalin era. Industrialization and urbanization led to an increase in the number of local non-Russian cadres and intelligentsia who had to compete with the Russian workers. "As a result nationalist tensions were building up."[49]

The economic competition model is, however, not without its weaknesses. First, as Sarah Belanger and Maurice Pinard point out, theories with this perspective "fail to compare countries experiencing conflict with others experiencing accommodation."[50] They cannot explain why Switzerland, a highly developed country, has little ethnic tension between the French and German-speaking Swiss, although the competition between these two groups should be very high as their socioeconomic positions are equal. It also cannot explain the escalation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and its decline in Malaysia. Cases like these bring up the most prominent defect in all models of ethnic processes that focus primarily on economic explanations—their neglect of political variables.[51] In many ethnic movements, institutional structures and state policies play a major role in shaping and conditioning the emergence of such movements.

In the case of Ukrainian dissent, for example, Alexander Motyl argues that the rise of nationalist sentiments in the pre-*glasnost* era was primarily the product of political circumstances, foremost of them being Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and Brezhnev's partial re-Stalinization of Soviet state and society.[52] Others have similarly observed that by implementing policies that recognized and institutionalized ethnic differences—"creating administrative units along national lines, giving national languages official status, and recruiting local political elites from the indigenous populations"—the Soviet authorities unwittingly helped to establish the infrastructure for nationalism during the post-Stalinist era.[53]

The cases of Switzerland, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia also illustrate that specific political mechanisms chosen to regulate ethnic conflict can often affect the likelihood and intensity of such conflicts. Before the nineteenth century the relations among the three major language groups in Switzerland (German, French, and Italian) were characterized by conflict.[54] If ethnic tension is now muted, this may be because the Swiss have a political system that has institutionalized ethnic pluralism, allowing each of the three major language groups proportional equiva-

[49] Shanin, "Ethnicity in the Soviet Union," 420.

[50] Sarah Belanger and Maurice Pinard, "Ethnic Movements and the Competition Model," *Working Papers on Social Behavior* (Department of Sociology, McGill University, Montreal, 1989), 7.

[51] For an attempt to introduce political variables into an ethnic competition model see François Nielsen, "Structural Conduciveness and Ethnic Mobilization: The Flemish Movement in Belgium" in Olzak and Nagel, eds., *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, 173–198.

[52] Alexander J. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[53] Michael Mandelbaum and Christian A. Herter, "The Roots of Nationalism in the Soviet Union," *Council Briefings* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, no. 21, May 1991), 2.

[54] Jaroslav and Velimsky, *Ethnic and Political Nations*, 91.

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lence in power sharing extending from the Federal Council to the bureaucracy and the armed forces.[55]

Before the period of ethnic violence began in Sri Lanka, interethnic relations appeared far more tolerant there than in Malaysia. Malaysia has so far succeeded where Sri Lanka failed, partly because of the differences in political structures. In Malaysia, these structures provided incentives for parties to seek multiethnic bases.[56] Malaysia has a simple majority voting system, and voting districts are drawn so that no ethnic group has a majority. In contrast, in most of the voting districts of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese have an automatic majority so that their parties do not need to seek Tamil support. Incentives to form interethnic coalitions are now also built into the Sri Lankan electoral arrangements, but as Donald Horowitz argues, "in the formative period of Sinhalese exclusiveness and Tamil separatism, all of the incentives were the other way."[57]

The political system, however, not only responds to existing ethnic differences but often creates "new ethnic groups out of extant, . . . unorganized ethnocultural categories, . . . and [promotes] ethnic awareness and action among formerly mobilized, recently inactive, ethnic groups."[58] It does so in several different ways. First, the expansion of political authority over a long list of functions creates a competitive arena for distribution of state resources; moreover, in developing countries the state itself is a resource over which ethnic groups engage in a continuous struggle.[59] Second, when the state's administrative structures and legal institutions distribute resources based on ethnicity, they further encourage political mobilization linked to ethnic differences.[60] Scheduled Castes, a histori-

[55] Jurg Steiner, "Power-sharing: Another Swiss 'Export Product'?" in Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking*, 107–114.

[56] Donald Horowtiz, "Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers" in Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking*, 115–130.

[57] Donald Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management" in Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking*, 465. In presidential elections now the entire country has become one large heterogeneous constituency and "Sinhalese divisions make it likely that the election will be decided on second preferences, including Tamil second preferences." In parliamentary elections the change was made from first-past-the-post in mostly single-member constituencies to a party list sytem of proportional representation in multimember constituencies. According to Horowitz these changes in the electoral system came too late to foster interethnic accommodation (ibid., 463, 465).

[58] Joane Nagel, "The Ethnic Revolution: Emergence of Ethnic Nationalism" in Leo Driedger, ed., *Ethnic Canada: Identities and Inequalities* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987), 40.

[59] Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change" in N. Glazer and D. P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 141–166; Anthony Smith, "The Diffusion of Nationalism: Some Historical and Sociological Perspectives," *British Journal of Sociology* 29 (June 1978): 234–48; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul R. Brass, *Ethnic Groups and the State* (Totawa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985); Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict."

[60] Cynthia Enloe, "The Growth of the State and Ethnic Mobilization: The American Experience," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4 (April 1981): 123–36; Joane Nagel, "The Political Construction of Ethnicity," in Olzak and Nagel, eds., *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, 93–112.

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cally disadvantaged group in India, has been given special encouragement for political participation and other benefits in education and government service. Although they are diverse culturally, linguistically, and geographically, such benefits have created a common sense of identity and increased their political mobilization.[61]

In the United States, where the preference for individual rights as opposed to group rights made demands based on ethnicity less legitimate, in recent years affirmative action policies have legitimized and encouraged such claims. A study of Latino mobilization in the city of Chicago found that affirmative action policy provided the critical base for the organizational development and growth of a Latino identity and agenda.[62]

Census categories have facilitated this process by redrawing ethnic boundaries. For example, the U.S. census puts diverse ethnic groups like Koreans, Chinese, Japanese, and Asian Indians under the broader category of "Asian and Pacific Islanders." Similarly, since 1980, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other Spanish speaking groups have been classified as Hispanics. Because the government uses these artificial categories as units in allocating political and economic resources, over time such diverse groups begin to act collectively as they see themselves sharing common interests and experiences of oppression and also benefits.[63] As William Petersen has argued, few things facilitate a category to coalesce into a group as readily as its designation as such by an official body.[64]

Third, the state, for its own administrative convenience and in order to improve control over local elites, may select certain ethnic elites and organizations as collaborators or channels for the transmission of government patronage. This situation is common in many colonized countries (British preference for Tamils in Sri Lanka and Sikhs in India) and now also frequently occurs in many developing countries engaged in the task of nation-building, thereby affecting the identity and political mobilization of particular ethnic groups.[65] The late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in order to undermine the ruling Communist party in West Bengal, expressed his sympathy for the demand of the Nepalis to form a separate state in the northern part of West Bengal.

Fourth, ethnic processes are also often shaped by state policies with regard to

[61] Rita Jalali, "Preferential Policies and The Movement of The Disadvantaged: The Case of the Scheduled Caste in India," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (forthcoming issue).

[62] Felix and Padilla, "Latino Ethnicity in the City of Chicago" in Olzak and Nagel, eds., *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, 153–172.

[63] Enloe, "The Growth of the State," 123–136; Espiritu, "The Census and Ethnic Enumeration: Playing the Numbers Game" (Paper presented at the 84th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 9–13 August 1989).

[64] William Petersen, "Politics and the Measurement of Ethnicity" in William Alonso and Paul Starr, eds., *The Politics of Numbers* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986), 187–234.

[65] David D. Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict" in Peter Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 285–316; Brass, *Ethnic Groups and the State*.

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military recruitment. "Military and police forces are rarely neutral actors in ethnic conflicts. They are typically ethnically imbalanced as a result of both historical socioeconomic maldistribution of opportunities and of deliberate recruitment strategies pursued by central governmentalities."[66] Thus, Yugoslavia's army, whose officer corps is 85 percent Serbian, has openly supported Serb guerrillas in the civil war in Croatia.

Given the variety of ethnic conflicts and their dynamic and fluid qualities, no one factor can provide a comprehensive explanation. What has been clearly established, however, is that ethnicity derives its strength not only from the symbolic and affective aspects of primordial ties but also from its use as an instrument for economic and political advantage.[67]

Multiethnicity and Forms of Government

The proposition that no nation in the world is free from some form of violation of human rights in the form of ethnic, religious, or racial discrimination (unless it is one of the few totally homogeneous in these terms, such as Iceland) is by now accepted as a fact. Much more often than not, people resist and resent those who differ from themselves in race, culture, and religion. Many have sought to institutionalize privileges for members of their groups. In modern times, both rulers and the masses have turned to virulent expressions of bigotry in response to social tensions, to threats perceived by those in power, and to insecurity stemming from economic or status uncertainty. The most extreme racist effort, the Holocaust of European Jewry, occurred in modern times. Anti-Semitism was also the policy of some communist states which, like the former Soviet Union, restricted the rights of Jewish citizens. Racism still prevails in many African states, where the politics of ethnicity continue to determine who rules. Uganda eliminated East Indian minorities, among others.

The white-dominated society of South Africa began to dismantle its segregation and other discrimination policies against the majority black population only after international pressure was brought to bear on it. Ethnic divisions have also undermined the apparent unity of countries as diverse as Belgium, Canada, the

[66] Cynthia Enloe, "Police and Military in the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 433 (1977): 137; also see W. L. Young, *Minorities and the Military: A Cross-National Study in World Perspective*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982).

[67] For example, the decision of the Indian government to have elections in 1983 changed the Assamese movement from a language-based unity that was supposed to be shared by Hindu and Muslim members of the same speech community to a movement that excluded many Muslim speakers of the language on the grounds that they were illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh. (See Das Gupta, "India; Democratic Becoming and Combined Development," 241). In Eritrea, as Ted Gurr notes, "nearly three decades of rebellion and repression have by now formed a viable sense of national identity that cuts across historically divisive lines of tribal, linguistic, and Christian-Muslim cleavage." See his "Ethnic Warfare," 86.

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United Kingdom, Spain, Cyprus, Pakistan, Malaysia, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Zaire.

What steps have proved effective in containing these divisive forces? How has ethnic conflict been managed in multiethnic polities? Some scholars have argued that consociational democracies provide a model of conflict management for segmented societies. In such democracies the political leaders of the major subcultures "cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country."[68] Such coalitions have been successfully formed in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

Dependence on elite conciliation makes consociationalism less effective in Third World countries.[69] Federalism, on the other hand, has proved to be a useful device to reduce ethnic conflicts in many countries – from economically advanced countries like Switzerland to developing ones like India. Federalism works because it transfers the target of political mobilization from the national to the provincial centers, shifts conflicts in homogenous provinces to intraethnic divisions, and gives ethnic groups local autonomy. Papua New Guinea managed to resolve its most serious conflict arising out of secessionist-based demands by decentralization of power and the establishment of nineteen provincial governments.[70]

For federalism to work, however, it must be properly balanced with the pattern of ethnic cleavages. In Nigeria, the original division of the country in 1960 into three tribally distinctive regions – with their own parliaments, police forces, universities, and budgets derived from local revenues – failed to prevent serious tribal conflict. By creating a nineteen-state federal structure, Nigeria's Second Republic crosscut ethnicity to some extent and dispersed the stakes in electoral competition.[71]

In India, a federal system gives control over cultural, educational, and linguistic policies to state governments whose boundary lines were drawn largely to correspond to ethnic variations in response to collective protest. But federalism also works in India because the social system is highly segmented, "enabling the center to intervene in crisis situation in individual states without necessarily

[68] The other three basic elements of consociational democracy according to Lijphart are "(1) the mutual veto or 'concurrent majority rule,' which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests, (2) proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointment, and allocation of public funds, and (3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs." Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 25.

[69] Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict Management," 115–130.

[70] David M. Lipset, "Papua New Guinea: the Melanisian Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" in Larry Diamond, J. Linz, and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* III (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 383–422.

[71] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Larry Diamond, "Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggles for Democracy" in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa* II (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 65.

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creating a national issue."[72] Electoral reforms (like heterogenous constituencies and incentives to pool votes across ethnic lines) that force ethnic parties to form coalitions with rival groups are also techniques that help to maintain peace between ethnic groups as the earlier discussion of Malaysia and Sri Lanka illustrated. In India, ethnically based parties have difficulty winning elections at the national level because many of the country's electoral constituencies are heterogenous. The key, as Donald Horowitz notes, is to have institutional arrangements that provide political incentives for accommodation and that penalize extremism.[73]

Secession or partition is rarely an adequate solution, because most regions of a country are ethnically heterogenous and partition can involve a costly process of exchanging populations and dividing land and natural resources, often resulting in loss of many human lives and continuing border conflicts. The partition of British India illustrated that separation can lead to an orgy of interethnic violence, even when carried out under peaceful conditions. Secession also introduces ethnic problems in a "sharper form on a narrower scale, with smaller and smaller nationalisms oppressing smaller and smaller minorities."[74] Serbs in an independent Croatia, as Mihajlo Mihajlov points out, would be an even more vulnerable minority than Croats in Yugoslavia. The problem is further complicated by the fluid quality of ethnic identities. When Pakistan was founded, the Muslim religion formed the base of ethnic solidarity that united Muslims in the eastern regions with those in the western parts. Several decades later the eastern region demanded and secured a separate state, Bangladesh, on grounds of language discrimination. Now the Pakistan government faces secessionist demands from Pathans and Baluchs.

In the former Soviet Union, where deportations, industrialization, and Moscow's settlement policies made most republics ethnically mixed, secession and independence may not be the solution to the ethnic problems. The ethnic and national groups in the Soviet Union were not always confined to the titular political administrative unit. Nor was the titular nationality necessarily a majority in its administrative unit, a fact that creates major tensions in the newly independent republics.[75]

In Georgia, the first non-Baltic Soviet republic to formally declare independence, 30 percent of the population belong to a wide variety of minorities. In recent years conflicts have developed with Abkazians and Ossetians.[76] The dispute with the Ossetian minority has often turned violent. In 1990, the Georgian legisla-

[72] Myron Weiner, *The Indian Paradox* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), 36.

[73] Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay."

[74] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Can Yugoslavia Survive," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Spring 1991): 90.

[75] In two out of fifteen republics the nationals form less than 50 percent of the population; in Kazakstan the nationals are 36 percent and in Kirghizia they form 48 percent.

[76] For conflict with Abkazians see Ernest Gellner, "Ethnicity and Faith in Eastern Europe," *Daedalus* 119 (Winter 1990): 286.

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ture formally declared an end to the longstanding local autonomy of South Ossetia after the Ossetian assembly voted to remain part of the former Soviet Union.

In the Moldavian republic (where only 64 percent of the population is Moldavian), the Turkic-speaking Gagauz proclaimed independence, claiming they were being discriminated against by the Romanian speaking Moldavian majority. In Azerbaijan, Armenians want the Nagorna-Karabakh region to be united with Armenia. Since some of these republics are now under the control of authoritarian leaders, minorities are likely to encounter further repression.

The independence of the Baltic republics could not result in a clean ethnic break. With Moscow's encouragement many Russians settled in the Baltic areas, altering their ethnic makeup. Russian minorities usually occupied a disproportionate number of the better jobs and housing, creating resentment among the indigenous population. In Estonia, 61 percent of the population is Estonian. In Latvia, only 52 percent of the population is Latvian.[77]

Except for Slovenia in the northwest, most republics in the former Yugoslavia are ethnically mixed. Over a third of all Serbs and 22 percent of all Croatians live outside their republics. Even if the Croatian republic is able to resolve the dispute with its Serbian minorities, the problem of the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina looks insoluble. This republic is 40 percent Muslim, 32 percent Serbian, and 18 percent Croatian. Since it lies between Serbia and Croatia, both lay claims to portions of it and "there is no way to partition it."[78]

Many countries have adopted preferential or affirmative action policies to reduce ethnic conflict arising out of economic disparities between groups. Preferences are granted most often in education, employment, and land. Malaysia, Fiji, and Indonesia have policies that favor their indigenous populations. Many nations in Africa have adopted regional equalization, policies which in reality favor the ethnic groups concentrated in some regions and not others (some examples are Zaire, Tanzania, and Nigeria). India has fixed quotas in education and civil service and reserved seats in the legislature for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, who together form 22 percent of the population. Many Indian states have also extended preferential treatment to other lower status castes and to the indigenous populations.

Preferential programs are sometimes instituted by politically dominant groups against another ethnic group—usually an immigrant minority—which holds a disproportionate share of economic power. Preferential policies in such cases are designed to enhance the economic position of those who govern the polity. Currently, this pattern exists in Malaysia, Indonesia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, several African countries, and many states in India.

In some countries, preferential policies have been instituted by the ethnic groups in power for the benefit of historically disadvantaged minority groups.

[77] *A Map of Ethnicity and Political Boundaries in the Soviet Union* (Washington, DC: Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, 1990).

[78] Mihajlov, "Can Yugoslavia Survive?" 84.

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The most notable cases are India's preferential programs for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes mentioned earlier and the affirmative action quota programs for blacks in the United States. Other examples, all from democratic countries, include benefits for Maoris in New Zealand, aborigines in Australia, Sephardim in Israel, and some minority groups in Canada.

In countries like Malaysia, India, and the United States such policies have been vigorously pursued and have provided educational and job opportunities to some in the targeted groups.[79] However, such policies have also created a wave of resentment among the privileged groups. It is easier to measure progress towards interethnic equality than it is to assess improvements in ethnic harmony. Have preferential policies accentuated ethnic conflict or have they helped to reduce it? While sweeping statements on this issue are abundant, more studies are needed to carefully evaluate the policies' impact on interethnic relations before a definite answer can be reached.[80]

Is democracy viable in a multiethnic society? There is plenty of evidence from African and Asian countries that demonstrates that intense ethnic loyalties endanger democracy. Yet many ethnically heterogenous societies have succeeded in managing conflict within a democratic framework. Ethnic cleavages do not necessarily lead to violence. Indeed, one could argue that they can be a source of democratic strength and renewal, for "ethnic peace may require greater decentralization, distribution, rotation, and representation of power than authoritarian regimes have been able to provide."[81] Masipula Sithole notes that the heterogeneity of the Zimbabwean social milieu is one factor that has helped to sustain pluralist democracy in that country. "In a real sense, continued Ndebele [tribal] support for Nkomo's ZAPU [opposition] has slowed down ZANU's [government party] speed toward countryside hegemony and the one-party state."[82]

[79] For Malaysia see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Also see Milton Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," *Comparative Politics* 19 (July 1987): 395–418. For India see Jalali, "Preferential Policies and the Movement of the Disadvantaged." For the United States see Lawrence Fuchs, *The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity and the Civic Culture* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1990).

[80] Horowitz's comparative study of such policies in developing countries concludes that in the short run preferential policies tend to accentuate ethnic conflict (see his *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*). On the other hand, Fuchs in a book that examines race relations in the United States reports that after several years of affirmative action programs "whites who worked directly with blacks were significantly freer of prejudice than those who did not. Overall, the percentage of whites who indicated strong personal antagonisms to having black neighbors dropped from 47 to 14 between 1963 and 1978, and the percentage of those who said they were either already living in proximity to black neighbors or would have no objection to doing so rose from 36 to 60 percent." See Fuchs, *The American Kaleidoscope*, 444. Also see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Equal Chances Versus Equal Results," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 523 (September 1992): 63–74.

[81] Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Persistence, Failure, and Renewal* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, forthcoming).

[82] Masipula Sithole, "Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy" in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*, 243.

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Similarly in Nigeria, Larry Diamond argues that although democratic stability has often been threatened by ethnic divisions, authoritarian systems also have been hamstrung in managing ethnic conflicts.[83]

As a comparative study of the democratic experience in twenty-six developing nations concludes, "when ethnic leaders are allowed to share power, they generally act according to the rules of the game, but when the state responds to ethnic mobilization with exclusion and repression, violence festers."[84] Indeed, the fact that interethnic relations are more peaceful in the West than in the Third World does not result from differences in ethnic groups in the different regions. The differences appear to rest in the nature of the western political structures, which have incorporated multiple ethnic expressions and channeled ethnic conflict into more peaceful and constructive directions.[85]

Conclusion

Does the drive toward supranational organizations and the economic and political integration of European countries signify a trend away from ethnic fragmentation? There are several reasons why this is unlikely. First, the principle of self-determination is now viewed the world over as one of the basic rights of all peoples and as a legitimate basis for governance. Second, with a myriad of human rights organizations (Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, the Minority Rights Group, America Watch, Asia Watch, and Cultural Survival) monitoring discriminatory and repressive practices of regimes, it is likely that the problems of minorities will receive greater world attention and support, encouraging ethnic mobilization by previously quiescent minorities.

Third, the independence movements in the former Soviet regions also provides precedents for other parts of the world. As John Lewis Gaddis points out, "If the boundaries of the dying Soviet empire are to be revised, then why should boundaries established by empires long since dead be preserved?"[86]

Recent world reaction to the Kurdish massacres and the Yugoslav internationality conflicts suggests that there is now greater support than at any time since World War II for international intervention to aid movements for autonomy. In the words of French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, "This break in the longstanding and rigid doctrine (of noninterference in the internal affairs of states) permits the hope today that the international community will find the means to intervene in similar cases, and first of all the Kurds."[87] Under the threat

[83] Diamond, "Nigeria" in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*. Ethnic homogeneity does not necessarily produce democratic societies. Countries like North Korea and Haiti have homogenous populations and yet were nondemocratic.

[84] Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries*, 29.

[85] Heisler, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations," 21–52.0

[86] John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Spring 1991): 110.

[87] Jim Hoagland, "What Price Unity?" *Washington Post*, 14 May 1991.

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of international economic sanctions, Iraq finally agreed to the presence of UN peacekeeping forces for the protection of Kurds, and the Yugoslavs (Serbs) have accepted a peacekeeping role for the UN forces.

However, if history is any guide, it is unlikely that international bodies can offer effective protection to minorities. In 1919, the League of Nations adopted treaties to protect minorities in new states against nationalist forces. The treaties guaranteed traditional minority rights dealing with religion, language, and cultural activities. But the treaties were imposed only on weak or defeated states and were largely ignored after they regained their legitimacy. Similarly, now the world bodies have imposed minority protection conditions only on Iraq and Yugoslavia, while Turkey's treatment of Kurds, Indonesia's of the peoples of East Timor and Irian Jaya, or China's repressive practices toward Tibetans receive little attention. In the past, as now, almost all countries including the Great Powers and the former colonies are afraid that international recognition of minority rights will encourage separatism and lead to interference in the internal affairs of states. A memorandum prepared for the British government during the Paris Peace treaty negotiations after World War I warned:

> efforts will doubtless be made to embody provisions in the [Paris Peace] treaty safeguarding the rights of racial, religious and other minorities and further, to interpret the doctrine of "national self-determination" as entitling such minorities, if they can claim to be nations, to present their case to the Peace Conference and to subsequent Inter-State Conferences. On both these points the best course would seem to be to leave as much discretion as possible in the hands of each of the Associated Powers. It would clearly be inadvisable to go even the smallest distance in the direction of admitting the claim of the American negroes, or the Southern Irish, or the Flemings or Catalans, to appeal to an Inter-State Conference over the head of their own Government. Yet if a right of appeal is granted to the Macedonians or the German Bohemians it will be difficult to refuse it in the case of other nationalist movements.[88]

Such concerns have also dictated the U.S. and E.C. reactions to nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union. Interethnic tensions are, however, moving far beyond the ability of the world bodies to contain them. Threats to withdraw aid, imposing an oil and arms embargo, and suspending trade preferences have had little effect on multiethnic republics in the former Soviet empire. Whether other countries in Central and Eastern Europe go the way of Yugoslavia will be determined more by the political beliefs and attitudes of the popularly elected leadership than by any pressure the world bodies can bring to bear on the nationalists.

[88] Hurst Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 52. The author has reprinted the quote from L. C. Green, "Protection of Minorities in the League of Nations and the United Nations" in Allan Gotlieb, ed., *Human Rights, Federalism and Minorities* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1970), 193.

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Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters

JAMES M. LINDSAY

In 1983 William Bundy called for increased study of Congress and foreign policy:

> There is a marked deficiency in serious study on how the executive and Congress interact in an era when the range of issues requiring congressional approval has expanded way beyond the classic cases of treaties and foreign trade, when consensus on foreign policy has disappeared perhaps beyond recall, and when the practical need for congressional understanding and acceptance extends to almost every important step, however labeled or described.[1]

We have made little progress over the past decade in answering his call. To be sure, we have witnessed the publication of a dizzying array of books and articles exploring the legal and normative aspects of Congress's role in foreign policy.[2]

[1] William P. Bundy, "The National Security Process: *Plus Ça Change . . .*?" *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982/1983): 94.

[2] Among others, see Michael Barnhart, ed., *Congress and United States Foreign Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987); L. Gordon Crovitz and Jeremy A. Rabkin, eds., *The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989); Robert A. Goldwin and Robert A. Licht, eds., *Foreign Policy and the Constitution* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990); Gordon S. Jones and John A. Marini, eds., *The Imperial Congress: Crisis in the Separation of Powers* (New York: Pharos Books, 1988); and Harold Hongju Koh, *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

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But with a few exceptions, we have seen relatively little systematic, empirical research on congressional decision making on foreign policy.[3] The lack of recent research means that most of the major studies of Congress and foreign policy are now more than two decades old.[4] Relying on these studies to explain Congress today is problematic: by all accounts Congress's behavior changed dramatically following the Vietnam war. The deference Congress once accorded the president gave way to active questioning of presidential initiatives. Bipartisanship vanished, replaced instead by a substantial degree of partisanship. And the inside game, where a handful of senior legislators spoke for Congress on major issues, gave way to an outside game, where many legislators influenced policy.[5] It would seem, then, that the time for systematic study of Congress and foreign policy is long overdue.

Or is it? One explanation for the dearth of research on Congress and foreign policy is that political scientists have neglected a pressing research topic. Another explanation, one more charitable to scholars, argues that the topic attracts little attention because it does not raise interesting substantive or theoretical questions. Pessimists argue that the executive dominates agenda setting and decision making on foreign policy; Congress plays at best a subsidiary role. As a result, studying congressional involvement in foreign policy represents "a Ptolemaic view of a Copernican universe."[6]

These conflicting explanations for the lack of research on Congress and foreign policy raise a simple question: Does Congress matter? Pessimists are undeniably right that the White House matters more than Congress. The president enjoys inherent advantages over Congress in foreign policy, advantages that have been reinforced by various Supreme Court rulings. At the same time, the nature and structure of Congress frustrate congressional attempts to lead on foreign policy. But recognizing that Congress is a junior partner in policy making does not warrant the conclusion it is irrelevant. Even a subordinate Congress may influence foreign policy in important ways.

Most efforts to assess congressional influence look at the ability of Congress

[3] For a review of the literature, see James M. Lindsay and Randall B. Ripley, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17 (August 1992): 417–447.

[4] Among others, see Holbert N. Carroll, *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Robert Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950); Malcolm E. Jewell, *Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962); Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Leroy N. Reiselbach, *The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); and James Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy Making* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1962).

[5] James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961 to 1986," *Armed Forces and Society* 13 (Spring 1987): 371–401.

[6] Jonathan Eliot Medalia, *The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Limitation Policymaking, 1963–1972* (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University Press, 1975), 8.

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to generate and pass its own substantive policy proposals. Using legislative success as the benchmark, Congress does not appear to matter much. Despite the many changes in American politics over the past two decades, Congress generates relatively few of its own foreign policy proposals; the initiative on foreign policy continues to reside in the White House. Congress's influence over decisions appears no better. Although congressional foreign policy debates are more fractious than they were twenty-five years ago, the House and Senate remain reluctant to deny a president's foreign policy requests or to pass alternative policies of their own.

If Congress's influence over foreign policy resided solely in its ability to legislate its own policy preferences, then we would have our answer. But focusing on the legislative track record captures only part of the story. Congress influences policy through several indirect means: anticipated reactions, changes in the decision-making process in the executive branch, and political grandstanding. Indeed, the same factors that frustrate congressional attempts to lead on foreign affairs encourage legislators to use indirect means to influence policy. Attention to these indirect means suggests, contrary to the argument made by pessimists, that Congress often exercises considerable influence over the substance of U.S. foreign policy.

The significant indirect impact Congress has on foreign policy makes it imperative to take up William Bundy's challenge. We simply do not understand congressional behavior on foreign policy. The study of Congress and foreign policy gains additional importance because Congress's influence is likely to grow in the 1990s. Of course, the Gulf war produced a rally-round-the-president response in Congress, but that rally has crumbled in the face of other events. The end of the cold war is lowering the electoral costs to legislators who oppose the president on foreign policy. The ever-rising federal debt is forcing Congress to make hard choices about U.S. commitments abroad. Finally, with perceptions of a Soviet threat receding, national security policy is losing its privileged place on the policy agenda. As new types of issues move onto the agenda, congressional activism and influence on foreign policy will increase.

The Legislative Record

What does Congress's legislative track record on foreign policy look like? In the 1950s and 1960s, Congress seldom overruled the president. In the 1980s, however, things changed. On a variety of issues, Congress passed legislation that contradicted the preferences of the administration. In defense policy, Congress blocked President Ronald Reagan's attempt to reinterpret the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, canceled the navy's plans to develop a new generation of tactical nuclear missiles, and limited the deployment of the MX missile.[7] On the hotly contested

[7] See Barry M. Blechman, *The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy*

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issues of El Salvador and Nicaragua, legislators placed so many constraints on the executive branch that by the end of the Reagan presidency "U.S. policy toward Central America was effectively being set by Congress."[8] With the Midgetman missile and sanctions against South Africa, Congress even succeeded in generating and enacting its own policy initiatives. All of these successes would have been unthinkable two decades ago.

Still, legislative victories on foreign policy appear to be the exception rather than the rule.[9] In some areas Congress appears to do no more than ratify the president's proposals. This is especially so on decisions to use force. As Operation Desert Storm illustrates, Congress exercises its war powers reluctantly. In other areas Congress often fails to overrule the president, even when the circumstances seem favorable. Take the debates over the Panama Canal treaties and the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In both instances substantial numbers of legislators opposed the president's preferred policy. The opposition legislators were highly motivated, enjoyed the support of well-heeled interest groups, and had public sentiment on their side. Congress seemed poised to overrule the White House. But in both cases the president prevailed.

The reluctance of Congress to dictate foreign policy to the president extends beyond high politics, an area where presidents historically have exercised the greatest power. Trade policy offers a case in point. For almost one-hundred-and-fifty years Congress zealously guarded its constitutional prerogatives on trade. Many analysts argue, however, that today legislators are more interested in taking popular positions on trade issues than in making policy.[10] With procedural innovations such as fast-track legislation and private-sector advisory committees, Congress has delegated enormous powers to the executive branch, while asking

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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 89–111; and James M. Lindsay, *Congress and Nuclear Weapons* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 62–85 and 145–151.

[8] Christopher Madison, "Follow the Leader," *National Journal*, 12 January 1991, 104.

[9] Among others, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy*, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989); I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 129–162; Harold Hongju Koh, "Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair," *Yale Law Journal* 97 (June 1988): 1255–1342; and John Rourke, *Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking: A Study of Interaction and Influence, 1945–1982* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983). The one major exception to the view that Congress seldom legislates issues of consequence on foreign policy is Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

[10] See I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics: System Under Stress* (New York: Institute for International Economics and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1986); I. M. Destler, "Protecting Congress or Protecting Trade?" *Foreign Policy* 62 (Spring 1986): 96–107; Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy," *International Organization* 42 (Winter 1988): 179–217; Robert Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Robert Pastor, "The Cry-and-Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy" in Allen Schick, ed., *Making Economic Policy in Congress* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983).

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only for a process that will not offend "congressional sensitivities."[11] The overwhelming margins of approval for trade legislation are often cited as conclusive evidence of the lack of congressional influence.[12]

Even when Congress succeeds in legislating foreign policy, the results may be less than meet the eye. In passing legislation Congress typically delegates tremendous power to the executive branch. Such discretion is justified on the grounds that the president needs flexibility when conducting foreign affairs. But discretion gives the president the opportunity to subvert the intent of Congress. To take one of many possible examples, Congress appropriated military aid to El Salvador provided that President Reagan "certify every six months that the Salvadoran government was 'achieving substantial control' of its armed forces . . . that it was 'implementing essential economic and political reforms,' . . . and that it was holding free elections and demonstrating a willingness to negotiate a political settlement."[13] But the constraint may have been more appearance than reality. Given President Reagan's ideological preferences, it is hard to imagine circumstances in which he would have withheld certification.[14]

Efforts to explain the lack of legislative success on foreign policy usually cite the inherent advantages of the presidency: "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch."[15] These inherent advantages are greatest in national security affairs, and especially in crisis situations. As Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) once complained, crises "never reach Congress until they have developed to a point where Congressional discretion is pathetically restricted."[16] Even when legislators decide to confront the president, he can derail any legislation through the threat or use of a veto; Congress has overridden only one foreign policy veto since 1973.[17] The inherent advantages of the presidency have been reinforced by the Supreme Court.[18] *I.N.S. v. Chadha*, for example, made it more difficult for Congress to use the legislative veto to overturn executive decisions. The Court

[11] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988): 448.

[12] Sharyn O'Halloran, "Congress, the President, and U.S. Trade Policy: Process and Policy Outcomes" (Paper presented at the 1990 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco), 16.

[13] Destler, Gelb, and Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy*, 158–159.

[14] See, for example, Tanya Broder and Bernard D. Lambek, "Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of U.S. Human Rights Legislation," *Yale Journal of International Law* 13 (Winter 1988): 111–145.

[15] Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 70" in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1961), 424.

[16] Quoted in Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War. 1945–1971*, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1972), 60.

[17] Bruce W. Jentleson, "American Diplomacy: Around the World and along Pennsylvania Avenue" in Thomas E. Mann, ed., *A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), 160.

[18] Thomas M. Franck, "Courts and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 83 (Summer 1991): 66–86; and Koh, "Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs," 1305–1317.

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has perhaps done even more to enhance the power of the presidency with its willingness to dismiss many congressional challenges to the executive on the grounds that the contested issues are not ripe for judicial decision or raise political and not legal questions. During Operation Desert Shield, for example, the courts refused to enjoin President George Bush from ordering U.S. troops into combat without congressional authorization.[19]

The difficulty Congress has in legislating foreign policy cannot be laid entirely at the feet of the other two branches of government. It also owes to factors specific to the House and Senate. Partisan and institutional divisions mean that lacking consensus—and today consensus is often absent on foreign policy—Congress will not act. Congressional action is further complicated by the widely held belief that presidential leadership is essential to successful foreign policy. Electoral considerations reinforce the inclination to defer to the president. Members want to avoid stands that might leave them open to blame and thus to punishment at the polls. Because much of the public believes in the need for strong presidential leadership, many members find "blame avoidance" strategies compelling.[20]

The inherent advantages of the presidency, Supreme Court rulings, and the nature of Congress take us a long way in explaining why Congress seldom defeats the president on foreign policy. They do not, however, tell the entire story. An essential lesson of life on Capital Hill is that members often have sound *policy* reasons for not wanting to defeat the president. The reasons for this are many. Congressional debate is public, and the rejection of presidential requests may undermine the negotiating posture of the president or jeopardize U.S. relations with other countries. Legislation almost by necessity is rigid, but diplomacy frequently requires flexibility. Congress acts slowly, but issues can change rapidly. In some cases, resorting to legislation may mean taking a sledgehammer to a problem that requires a scalpel. Legislation may even create perverse incentives: the president may drag his feet implementing congressional directives because he believes any policy failure will be blamed on Congress. In short, legislators often do not want to win, because they believe that legislated solutions will prove unwise or unworkable in practice.

For these members, then, the object is not to pass bills but to use the threat of legislation as a lever with which to pressure the president. Take the efforts of Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) to save the MX missile. Like many of his fellow Democrats, Aspin doubted the strategic argument for the MX. If stopping the MX were his sole concern, a vote against the missile would have been in order. But Aspin concluded that killing the MX undermined a higher policy goal, namely, arms control. Keeping the missile alive would place pressure on the administration to negotiate an arms control treaty.

[19] Anthony Lewis, "Republic Under Law," *New York Times*, 4 January 1991.

[20] R. Kent Weaver, "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," *Journal of Public Policy* 6 (October-December 1986): 371-398.

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> It seemed to me that if [Brent] Scowcroft came up with a bipartisan package and the President accepted that, the Democrats would not be in good shape if it was voted down. It was clear that most Democrats would vote against it. But if enough voted for it, and Reagan got it, the headline would say "Reagan Gets MX." If not, the headline would be "Democrats Block MX." Reagan could have used that as an excuse. Now that he has the tools he needs, the Administration is in a bit of a hot seat. *It has to produce an agreement.*[21]

Similar concerns dominated the 1985 debate in the Senate Finance Committee over fast-track legislation for the U.S.–Canada free trade negotiations. Angered by what they saw as an incoherent American trade policy, half the members of the committee voted against granting fast-track status to the negotiations. The opponents, however, believed that the trade talks were necessary and that denying fast-track status would damage U.S.–Canadian relations as well as future trade negotiations. The senators voted no anyway, because they were "expecting to lose; theirs was to be a protest vote."[22]

The desire many members of Congress have to change policy without passing legislation begins to highlight the problem with using legislative scorecards to assess congressional influence. Executive-legislative relations on foreign policy are far more complicated than can be captured simply by examining which bills pass. Congress often influences policy indirectly. It is to those indirect means of influence that I now would like to turn.

Anticipated Reactions

A major flaw with legislative scorecards is that they assume that influence can be determined on the basis of observed behavior alone. Yet in any stable institutional arrangement people will act strategically. Just as chess players consider their opponent's possible moves and plan several steps ahead, Congress and the executive branch anticipate one another's behavior and modify their own behavior accordingly.[23] Presidents are especially likely to anticipate the mood in Congress on foreign policy, because public defeats threaten to weaken their credibility on the world scene. As Secretary of State James Baker explained President Bush's reluctance to request congressional authorization for Operation Desert Storm: "The President has not wanted to ask for such a resolution unless the leadership of the Congress could assure him that such a resolution would be forthcoming, because your hand would be weakened if it were not forthcoming."[24]

[21] Quoted in Elizabeth Drew, "A Political Journal," *New Yorker*, 20 June 1983, 75 (Emphasis added.)

[22] "US–Canada Free Trade Negotiations: Gaining Approval to Proceed (B)," Case C16-87-786.0, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1987, 8.

[23] See Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), 589–591.

[24] Quoted in Adam Clymer, "Votes Backing Use of Force Are Predicted in Congress," *New York Times*, 7 January 1991.

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Of course, anticipated reactions have always influenced executive-legislative relations. The essential question is whether anticipated reactions matter more today. That question is far easier to ask than to answer. No systematic studies have been done on anticipated reactions in foreign policy. We can only turn to logic and anecdotes. Logic suggests that today the president is more inclined to incorporate congressional positions into his own policy proposals. The willingness of the president to act strategically varies directly with the willingness of Congress to contest his proposals, and by all accounts Congress over the past two decades has become more willing to challenge the president.

On the anecdotal level, stories abound of administrations changing course because of anticipated congressional opposition. Take for example arms sales. In the mid-1970s, Congress passed legislation giving itself the power to veto major arms sales. Although Congress has never vetoed an arms sale, the threat of a veto appears to have shaped many presidential proposals. On several occasions the Ford and Carter administrations modified their proposed arms packages to defuse congressional opposition.[25] Three times between 1983 and 1985 the Reagan administration proposed selling arms to Jordan, and all three times it withdrew the proposal because of the mood in Congress.[26] Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration postponed its plans to ask Congress to approve the sale of $13 billion in weapons to Saudi Arabia. Officials calculated that if the proposal had gone forward, "Israel's major supporters in Congress would have raised an uproar."[27]

The history of arms control talks also gives some flavor of the increased importance of anticipated reactions. In the 1960s, presidents typically ignored Congress on arms control. During the SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty) negotiations, for example, Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) repeatedly failed to convince the Nixon administration to include senators in the American negotiating delegation.[28] When Senator Hugh Scott (R-PA), the Senate minority leader, announced he would visit Helsinki, the U.S. delegation discussed whether it should meet with him. The delegation eventually decided to meet with Scott but agreed to tell him little of substance.[29]

White House attention to the mood in Congress soon increased. Jimmy Carter actively solicited congressional views, especially the views of Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-WA).

> The special attention that was paid to the Washington senator was manifested in numerous ways, including: (1) a willingness on the part of the administration to study

[25] Robert S. Gilmour and Barbara Hinkson Craig, "After the Congressional Veto: Assessing the Alternatives," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 3 (Spring 1984): 375–376.

[26] Jentleson, "American Diplomacy," 161.

[27] Rochelle L. Stanfield, "Weighing Arms for Saudis," *National Journal*, 12 January 1991, 79.

[28] Alan Platt, *The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969–1977* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 19–20.

[29] Personal communication with Joseph Kruzel, member of the SALT I delegation, 22 September 1990 and 19 June 1991.

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seriously and ultimately incorporate a number of Jackson's SALT recommendations into the comprehensive U.S. proposal presented to the Soviets in March 1977; (2) an unprecedented commitment by Secretary [Cyrus] Vance in October 1977 to meet with Jackson's Armed Services Subcommittee every two weeks; and (3) President Carter's agreement to reappoint General Edward Rowny, Jackson's choice, to be the representative on the SALT delegation.[30]

The Carter administration also approved the creation of a Senate SALT advisers group. "Members were permitted to attend plenary sessions of the negotiations as observers, to sit in on delegation meetings in Geneva, and even to read the joint draft text of the treaty."[31] The Reagan administration initially tried to shut Congress out of the arms talks. Congressional pressure forced the administration to retreat, however, and in 1985 a Senate Arms Control Group was reestablished. "In addition to the functions carried out by their predecessors, the new Senate observers were permitted to meet separately with Soviet negotiators, both to learn firsthand of Soviet positions and to express their own concerns."[32]

It should be said that in influencing executive branch behavior, anticipated reactions function as a negative power.[33] As presidents look to Capitol Hill, their reading of the congressional mood tells them what policies are not politically possible. But the mood in Congress seldom compels the president to pursue specific policies. The one exception is the rare case where consensus reigns on Capitol Hill on a particular issue. As U.S. policy toward China after Tiananmen Square attests, however, presidents can resist congressional attempts to push them in a specific policy direction even in the face of near unanimous opposition.

Anticipated reactions clearly influence the executive branch. Yet does the impact of anticipated reactions extend beyond the margins of policy? On a major policy issue a president may ignore congressional objections or sidestep the objections by changing the style but not the substance of policy.[34] Refuting this claim is impossible, both because we lack systematic studies of anticipated reactions and because the claim inevitably involves counterfactuals.[35] Even if anticipated reactions operate only at the margins, Congress's influence still should not be dismissed as inconsequential. "The margins are frequently the vital edges, and

[30] Alan Platt, "The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance" in Barry M. Blechman, ed., *Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 169–170.

[31] Barry M. Blechman, "The New Congressional Role in Arms Control" in Thomas E. Mann, ed., *A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), 122.

[32] Ibid., 122.

[33] Friedrich, *Constitutional Government*, 590–591.

[34] See, for example, Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency* (New York: Schocken Books, 1989); and Jonathan Schell, *The Time of Illusion* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).

[35] On the problems posed by counterfactuals, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991): 169–195.

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Congress's ability to shape them is of real importance."[36] As the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam illustrates, incremental decision making can lead to major policy commitments.

Structures and Procedures

A second reason why a focus on the legislative track record underestimates Congress's influence over foreign policy is that it assumes that legislators only try to change policy directly. Yet legislators are far more savvy than this assumption suggests. They know all too well that efforts to change policy face considerable obstacles. That's why they often try to change structures and procedures in the executive branch. As Representative Aspin writes: "often by establishing new procedures, which are, of course, ostensibly neutral, Congress is able to effect substantive changes."[37]

Political scientists have been slow to recognize how process shapes policy. Recently, however, the "new institutionalism," which seeks to uncover how different institutional forms affect policy outcomes, has begun to explore the topic.[38] New institutionalists begin by noting that electoral incentives limit the enthusiasm legislators have for proactive, systematic reviews of agency behavior. Such "police patrol" oversight has limited electoral appeal either because the agency usually complies with the intent of Congress or because the agency does not harm a legislator's supporters. Either way, legislators often cannot gain credit for their legislative work. Moreover, police patrols entail opportunity costs; legislators could be devoting time to more electorally valuable activities. This incentive structure encourages legislators to fashion the decision-making process in the executive branch in ways that will promote executive compliance with legislative intent or, failing that, will make it easier for affected groups to seek remedies from the agency, the courts, or Congress itself.

Although new institutionalists generally assume legislators are single-minded seekers of reelection, the assumption is not critical.[39] Members who want to influence policy also have reason to prefer procedural innovations over police

[36] Alton Frye, "Congress: The Virtues of Its Vices," *Foreign Policy* 3 (Summer 1971): 125.

[37] Les Aspin, "The Defense Budget and Foreign Policy: The Role of Congress," *Daedalus* 104 (Summer 1975): 168.

[38] See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3 (Fall 1987): 243–277; Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and Political Control of Agencies," *Virginia Law Review* 75 (March 1989): 431–482; and Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrol Versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (February 1984): 165–179. For an assessment of the claims made about congressional influence by the new institutionalism, see Terry M. Moe, "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance,'" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 12 (November 1987): 475–520.

[39] McCubbins and Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked," 167.

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patrol oversight. Because procedural changes are often seen as neutral, members find it easier to build a winning coalition around a procedural change than around a substantive policy change. Legislators also know that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Policy battles are most easily won if the policy can be countered before it gains momentum. And policy-oriented legislators also have an incentive to shift the burden for monitoring the behavior of agencies to other groups: it frees them to work on other issues.

Whatever the motives of legislative behavior, attention to process leads to two conclusions at odds with the conventional wisdom about Congress. One is that the decision to delegate authority to the executive branch does not necessarily mean Congress has abdicated its powers. Congress may have created a decision-making process that incorporates congressional views or that provides Congress with opportunities to influence the development or implementation of policy. The other conclusion is that a decline in traditional indicators of oversight (for example, hearings, reports) does not mean that Congress has abandoned oversight; Congress may have designed procedures that lessen the need for police patrols.

Over the past several decades Congress has created several institutional structures inside the executive branch in an effort to shape foreign policy outcomes. In 1961 it created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) because many members believed that insufficient attention had been given to arms control.[40] Congress established the Office of the Special Trade Representative in 1974 because legislators believed "that the State Department . . . was unsympathetic and unresponsive to domestic interests and that the responsibility should be assigned elsewhere."[41] And in 1986 Congress created the post of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition "to prod the system to buy weapons that work, on time and at cost."[42] All of these efforts proceeded from a simple assumption about bureaucratic life: policies that don't have champions in the bureaucracy are doomed.

Legislators also at times seek to change procedure. One approach is to give Congress a veto over executive actions. The War Powers Resolution is a case in point. Of course, *Chadha* reduced the effectiveness of the legislative veto as a check on executive power.[43] Still, it did not require that all congressional resolutions of disapproval be presented to the president (and, hence, subject to his veto).

[40] See Duncan Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency* (New York: Free Press, 1979), x.

[41] Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy*, 112. See also U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Trade Reform Act of 1973*, 93d Cong., 1st sess. H Rept. 571, 1973, 40.

[42] Representative Aspin as quoted in David C. Morrison, "Another Czar Bows Out," *National Journal*, 5 January 1991, 43.

[43] See Gilmour and Craig. "After the Congressional Veto," 373–392; and Thomas M. Franck and Clifford A. Bob, "The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After the Chadha Case," *American Journal of International Law* 79 (October 1985): 912–960.

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So long as they affect congressional procedure rather than policy, committee, one-house, and two-house vetoes remain constitutional. Thus, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 allows the president to extend the fast-track procedure so long as neither chamber adopts a resolution of disapproval within ninety days of his request for an extension. President Bush invoked the procedure in March 1991 when he asked Congress to extend for two years the fast-track procedure for considering any agreement that emerged from the Uruguay round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[44]

A second type of procedural innovation stipulates conditions the executive must meet before it can go forward with a policy. This type of procedural innovation has been popular in human rights policy.[45] The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, for example, barred the president from granting most-favored-nation status to nonmarket countries that deny their citizens the right to emigrate. Likewise, in 1981 Congress acceded to President Reagan's request that it repeal a 1976 ban on military assistance to Chile. But in doing so, Congress conditioned future aid on presidential certification that Chile had taken steps to bring the murderers of Orlando Letelier to justice, a condition the Reagan administration could not meet.

A third procedural tactic popular with legislators is to impose reporting requirements on agencies. Current statutes contain roughly 600 requirements for routine reports in the area of foreign policy.[46] Many of these reporting requirements merely require the executive to inform Congress of agency decisions. Ever since the passage of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been required to report each covert operation to the appropriate congressional committees. Other reporting requirements are designed to force the executive to assess the implications of its policies. For instance, Congress requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to submit an arms control impact statement for every major weapons program. Besides recurring reporting requirements, Congress also directs agencies to undertake studies of specific issues. The use of such reports has been especially popular in defense policy, where requests for reports rose from roughly 30 per year in the 1960s to over 500 in the 1980s.[47]

A fourth procedural innovation legislators use is to enfranchise new groups into the decision-making process. Sometimes the newly enfranchised groups are existing agencies that share the preferences of Congress. In 1988, Congress re-

[44] "Bush Asks to Stay on Fast Track," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 March 1991, 531.

[45] See Broder and Lambek, "Military Aid to Guatemala"; and David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988).

[46] Ellen C. Collier, "Foreign Policy By Reporting Requirement," *Washington Quarterly* 11 (Winter 1988): 75.

[47] James M. Lindsay, "Congress and the Defense Budget," *Washington Quarterly* 11 (Winter 1988): 61.

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quired DOD to solicit recommendations from the Commerce Department when negotiating agreements with foreign governments on the production of defense equipment.[48] At other times Congress incorporates nongovernmental groups into decision making. The Trade Act of 1974 "established various private sector advisory groups, representing labor, industry, agriculture, consumers, and the general public, to provide policy and technical advice during negotiations."[49] Members even legislate themselves into the process. In 1983, for example, Congress "created a formal process of executive-legislative consultations in anti-drug policy."[50] Congress may even create a space for itself in international negotiations. The Trade Act of 1974, for instance, provided for members to serve as official advisers in international trade negotiations. At a recent meeting of the Uruguay Round of trade talks, a dozen members of Congress and many more congressional aides participated.[51]

Structural and procedural innovations need not be directed at changing policy. Legislators may alter the process because they want to protect themselves from constituent wrath. Here innovations become a ruse designed to "pass the buck" for decisions to the bureaucracy.[52] Yet, innovations probably aren't used very often to accomplish this end. If constituents are intelligent and forward-looking (as most of the literature in the new institutionalism assumes), they will see through the ruse, and the incentive to use the innovation will evaporate.[53] Conversely, if constituents are ignorant of congressional actions, then legislators do not need the protection that the innovation would afford.

While procedural innovations might be used as ruses, many (if not most) innovations are designed to influence policy. They do this in several ways: they keep Congress abreast of what the agency is doing; they discourage the agency from acting in ways substantial numbers of legislators would disapprove of; they force the executive branch to consult with Congress or key legislators; and they ensure that someone in the executive branch is accountable. For instance, the sponsors of the arms control impact legislation believed the statements would force DOD to consider the arms control implications of the weapons it was developing, and, failing that, provide Congress with advance warning of the

[48] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Conference, *National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989*, 100th Cong., 2nd sess, H Rept. 753, 1988, 105.

[49] O'Halloran, "Congress, the President, and U.S. Trade Policy," 19.

[50] Jeffrey A. Meyer, "Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance," *Yale Journal of International Law* 13 (Winter 1988): 86.

[51] Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Trade Team: 'A Kind of Stew,'" *New York Times*, 1 December 1990.

[52] Morris P. Fiorina, "Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 33 (Spring 1986): 33–51.

[53] See Murray J. Horn and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Commentary on 'Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies': Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs," *Virginia Law Review* 75 (March 1989): 505.

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potential arms control ramifications of new weapons systems.[54] The authors of the provision requiring DOD to consult with the Commerce Department when negotiating co-production agreements wanted to check what they saw as the willingness of DOD to negotiate agreements that hurt American commercial interests. The sponsors believed that including the Commerce Department in the process would substantially change policy outcomes.[55]

How successful are structural and procedural changes in shaping policy? Definitive answers are hard to come by, because the subject is understudied. Even when scholars begin to address the question, it will be a slippery one to answer, because it involves anticipated reactions and counterfactuals. We have no way of knowing how many covert operations or arms sales packages were stillborn because administration officials knew the proposals would not pass muster in Congress. Moreover, studies of structural and procedural innovations will have to put aside conventional notions of oversight. Innovations are often designed to force executive compliance with legislative preferences without requiring Congress to act. For example, much has been made of the fact that Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) seldom read DOD reports on U.S. arms sales, even though he had sponsored the legislation that mandated the reports. Many observers point to Nelson as an example of the emptiness of much of Congress's work on foreign policy.[56] Such an inference, while tempting, is wrong. Nelson didn't need to read the reports for his legislation to affect policy. By requiring DOD to make public its arms sales proposals, he had ensured that interested groups would receive advance notice and could mobilize to defeat proposals they opposed.

What conclusions can be drawn then? The least controversial one is that some innovations flop. ACDA, the War Powers Resolution, and the post of under secretary of defense for acquisition all failed to fulfill legislative expectations.[57] These examples notwithstanding, however, in many instances structural and procedural innovations do affect policy. In the case of trade, Congress often tinkers with the decision-making process to ensure executive compliance with legislative intent. The 1988 Trade Bill took several steps to limit presidential discretion. Concerned that the president was unwilling to punish trading partners who engage in unfair trade practices, Congress transferred responsibility for retaliation from the president to the special trade representative. The 1988 Trade Bill also broadened the definition of unfair trade practices and terminated the International

[54] See Robert Lyle Butterworth, "The Arms Control Impact Statement: A Programmatic Assessment," *Policy Studies Journal* 8 (Autumn 1979): 76–84.

[55] Louis L. Ortmayer, "The Political Economy of National Security: The FSX Agreement" (Paper presented at the 1990 annual meeting of the International Studies Association/South, Raleigh, North Carolina).

[56] Destler, Gelb, and Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy*, 145.

[57] On ACDA, see Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control*, 97. On the War Powers Resolution, see Robert A. Katzmann, "War Powers: Toward a New Accommodation" in Mann, *A Question of Balance*, 35, 65. On the post of under secretary of defense for acquisition, see Morrison, "Another Czar Bows Out," 43.

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Trade Commission's discretion to investigate claims of dumping. Both changes were designed to make it easier for injured groups to claim relief.[58]

In changing the rules of the game, the Omnibus Trade Bill also changed the behavior of the White House, which underscores the link between procedural skirmishes and anticipated reactions. When Congress began in the mid-1980s to debate proposals for restricting presidential discretion on trade, the Reagan administration suddenly made trade policy a priority.[59] Then-Vice President George Bush spelled out the link between the new-found executive interest in trade and the mood on Capitol Hill: "Frankly, we are trying as hard as we can to derail the protectionist juggernaut now sweeping through the United States Congress. . . . That's one more reason why our recent actions have been necessary. If we don't demonstrate good faith in enforcing our existing trade laws, we risk inviting sterner medicine from the Congress."[60] When the Omnibus Trade Bill finally passed, the Bush administration initiated the Structural Impediments Initiative talks with Japan in an effort to avoid invoking the retaliatory provisions of the bill. The Omnibus Trade bill also altered the behavior of several of America's trading partners. South Korea, for example, apparently worked to increase its import of American-made goods in an effort to avoid becoming the target of the retaliatory provisions of the bill.[61]

The success of procedural innovations on trade policy might not seem remarkable given Congress's historical and constitutional interests in trade policy. But innovations appear to work in other areas of foreign policy as well. The CIA provides an example that challenges conventional wisdom. As a result of the reforms implemented over the past fifteen years, virtually all CIA assessments go to the Intelligence Committees. The Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Relations Committees also receive CIA reports, and many individual members receive CIA briefings.[62] These reforms have made the CIA more attentive to the views of Congress. To quote Robert M. Gates, then deputy director of Central Intelligence: "The result of these realities is that the CIA today finds itself in a remarkable position, involuntarily poised equidistant between the executive and legislative branches. The administration knows that the CIA is in no position to withhold much information from Congress and is extremely sensitive to congressional demands; the Congress has enormous influence and infor-

[58] See Pietro S. Nivola, "Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field" in Mann, *A Question of Balance*, 235–239; and O'Halloran, "Congress, the President, and U.S. Trade Policy," 13–14.

[59] Harold Hongju Koh, "Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after *I.N.S. v. Chadha*," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 18 (Summer 1986): 1223–1225.

[60] Gerald M. Boyd, "Bush Urges Restraint by Canada," *New York Times*, 13 June 1986.

[61] Ronald D. Elving, "Trade Mood Turns Hawkish As Frustration Builds," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 31 March 1990, 969.

[62] Crabb and Holt, *Invitation to Struggle*, 182; Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (Winter 1987/88): 225; Gregory Treverton, "Intelligence: Welcome to the American Government," in Mann, *A Question of Balance*, 79.

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mation yet remains suspicious and mistrustful."[63] Even the Iran-contra affair supports Gates's conclusion about Congress's influence over the CIA. William Casey tried to create an "off-the-shelf" covert operations team precisely because he wanted to circumvent congressional oversight of covert operations.[64]

Structural and procedural innovations give Congress an indirect means for influencing foreign policy. Again, we do not know precisely how important such innovations are. Some matter, others don't. More research is needed. Future studies should try to answer two questions. First, why at times does Congress push policies on the executive while at other times it pushes procedures? Second, under what conditions do structural and procedural innovations give an advantage to Congress? The answers to these two questions will greatly improve our understanding of how Congress influences foreign policy.

GRANDSTANDING

Observers often lament that Congress contains too many showhorses and not enough workhorses. It is understandable why members of Congress grandstand. Well packaged comments on major issues can attract considerable media attention. Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY), for example, figured prominently in news coverage of the Philippines in 1986. "By his staff's count, he appeared on thirty-four radio and television shows and was quoted in eighty articles in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal* in a five month period."[65] Exposure can help a legislator if the position taken pleases constituents, interest groups, or campaign donors, or it may help simply by giving the member more visibility.[66] However helpful grandstanding may be to legislators, many people believe that playing to the galleries hurts U.S. interests. As one work complains: "We pay when loud position taking and ideological point scoring substitute for a willingness to act and share or bear the consequences."[67]

The inclination of critics to assume that the work of Congress should be an "eat your peas and spinach" endeavor fundamentally misunderstands life on Capitol Hill. To be sure, members sometimes grandstand for cynical reasons. Senator Frank Church (D-ID) sounded the tocsin on the Soviet "brigade" in Cuba less to influence President Jimmy Carter than to ingratiate himself with voters back home.[68] Much the same occurred with the neutron bomb controversy. The

[63] Gates, "The CIA and Foreign Policy," 224–225.

[64] See Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

[65] Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Random House, 1988), 140.

[66] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 43–79; and James M. Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom," *Armed Forces and Society* 17 (Fall 1990): 7–33.

[67] Destler, Gelb, and Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy*, 157.

[68] See Dan Caldwell, *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 160–163.

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floor debates revealed that many legislators did not understand the weapon they were discussing.[69] But even when motivated by cynical reasons, grandstanding may affect policy. Senator Church's charges exacerbated anti-SALT II sentiment, and the flap over the neutron bomb turned an obscure weapons program into a divisive issue for the Atlantic alliance.

More often than is acknowledged, however, members of Congress grandstand to influence policy.[70] Because of the power of the presidency, playing to the galleries is an essential tool of policy entrepreneurs. Legislators understand far better than their critics E. E. Schattschneider's point that increasing the scope of the decision-making arena may change the ultimate decision.[71] The media, and especially television, give members the means to overcome the obstacles that block attempts to shape policy through substantive legislation. The glare of the public spotlight is often the best weapon legislators have to dislodge a bill from a hostile committee, to force the administration to reverse its course of action, or to build public support for new policy initiatives.

The fact that legislators usually stand to benefit politically from grandstanding does not make it any less useful a tool for influencing policy. The American political system rests on the assumption that self-interest will motivate legislators to address pressing policy issues. As James Madison wrote, the best way to promote the public good is to create a system in which "the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights."[72] Grandstanding also is no less useful because it typically invokes simple, if not simplistic, arguments. Not only do presidents themselves indulge in simple and dramatic appeals—recall President Reagan's Star Wars speech—such appeals are essential to winning the support of the average citizen. Roger Hilsman's discussion of defense policy illustrates why legislators must simplify issues if they want to shape opinion: "There is a great advantage in having an investigation of our military policy concentrate on the single question of who has the most airplanes, the Russians or ourselves. This is a question that anyone can understand, and if the answer is that it is the Russians, then the burden of proof lies on the Executive to justify itself and its policy."[73]

At the most general level, legislators grandstand to change public opinion. Writing thirty years ago, Warner Schilling argued that legislators who want to influence defense policy should "change their policy target from the budget to the

[69] Barry Rubin, "The Media and the Neutron Warhead," *Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies* 1 (July 1978): 93.

[70] See John A. Ferejohn and Charles R. Shipan, "Congressional Influence on Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989).

[71] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1961), 1–3.

[72] James Madison, "Federalist No. 51," in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, 322.

[73] Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," *American Political Science Review* 52 (September 1958): 737.

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climate of opinion that shaped it."[74] In the mid-1980s, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) showed the wisdom of Schilling's advice. Rather than attacking individual defense programs, Grassley released information that the air force had paid $916.55 to purchase a small plastic cap for the leg of a navigator's stool.[75] The story captured national headlines, and soon other legislators were scrambling to reveal stories of waste, fraud, and abuse in the Pentagon budget. As the *Almanac of American Politics* described Grassley's grandstanding: "He has shown the capacity to change the terms of the debate, and future historians may date the end of the Reagan Administration's huge increases in defense spending to Grassley's initiative."[76]

Legislators also grandstand to convince the administration to change its policies. Trade policy is driven by a "cry-and-sigh" paradox.[77] Although members know that the protectionist tariffs contained in the Smoot-Hawley bill of 1929 helped cause a world depression, electoral incentives push them toward protectionism. Caught between competing impulses, members use threats of protectionist legislation, fiery speeches, and political theater to pressure the administration to address their grievances. "In short, the signals from Congress are received, and upon recognizing this, the congressional frustration quotient drops, and a liberal trade law is passed, or at the least, a restrictive bill fails. *A sigh of relief is heard.*"[78] Legislators also used grandstanding to force the Reagan administration to withdraw its support for Ferdinand Marcos. When President Reagan disputed reports of massive fraud in the February 1986 Philippine elections, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, countered with a media blitz. "He appeared on all three network television interview shows (*Meet the Press*, *Face the Nation*, and *This Week with David Brinkley*). . . . From that television platform, Lugar called on Reagan to telephone Marcos to ask him to resign."[79] Lugar's media campaign worked; within days Reagan withdrew his support for Marcos.

In sending signals to the president, legislators often act on behalf of midlevel officials in the executive branch who believe current policy is flawed. The fall of Marcos illustrates the point. By 1985, midlevel officials at State, DOD, and the National Security Council had concluded that the United States should ease out Marcos if it wished to avoid another Iran. With Reagan and his senior advisers staunchly supporting Marcos, however, mid-career officials encouraged congres-

[74] Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950" in Warner Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, eds., *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 248.

[75] Theodore J. Crackel, "Pentagon Management Problems: Congress Shares the Blame," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder*, No. 405, 22 January 1985, 3.

[76] Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics 1988* (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1987), 424.

[77] Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy*, 191–198.

[78] Ibid., 193. (Emphasis in the original.)

[79] Smith, *The Power Game*, 43–44.

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sional debate over the Philippines "as a way to persuade *their* bosses, not least the president, that Marcos might have to go."[80] More recently, a government scientist turned to Senator Albert Gore, Jr. (D-TN) for help when the Bush administration toned down his conclusions on the need to combat global warming. When Gore played the story to the hilt with the media, the White House found itself under a barrage of criticism. Bowing to public pressure, "the White House announced it would hold a workshop on global warming to prepare for negotiations on an international treaty."[81]

The third possible target of political grandstanding is another country. Legislators often want to send signals to friends and foes. At times the administration encourages grandstanding as a way of strengthening its own hand in foreign negotiations. For instance, during the Nixon administration Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans asked Wilbur Mills, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, to introduce a bill on textile quotas. Stans apparently hoped to create a good cop/bad cop scenario that would force the government of Japan to make additional concessions in trade negotiations.[82]

More often, however, the executive and legislative branches are not colluding. Take the case where a subsidiary of Toshiba sold sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. The government of Japan initially dragged its feet on the issue. Then the matter reached Capitol Hill. On 20 June 1987, five members of Congress took sledgehammers to a Toshiba radio on the grounds of the Capitol building.

> The video clip was replayed again and again on Japanese television. One day later, the chairman and president of Toshiba Corporation announced their resignations. On July 20, the Toshiba Corporation ran a full-page ad in dozens of American newspapers apologizing for the actions of its subsidiary. By the end of July, a memorandum between MITI [Ministry of International Trade and Industry] and the Japanese Foreign Ministry provided for ministerial review of sensitive exports, thus raising export control to a higher government level. On July 31, the Japanese government sent a tougher export control law to the Diet; the bill passed in early September. In a series of talks over the summer and fall, the Japanese agreed to become partners with the US in a new program to develop anti-submarine warfare technology. Japanese companies, led by Toshiba Corp., began formulating their own COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] compliance regulations.[83]

Or take Operation Desert Shield. Germany and Japan initially balked at providing aid. In September, a burden-sharing amendment to the House defense appropriations bill sparked "a storm of animosity, extraordinary in its extent and intensity," over the reluctance of Germany and Japan to help support the

[80] Treverton, "Intelligence," 98. (Emphasis in the original.)

[81] Karen Wright, "Heating the Global Warming Debate," *New York Times Magazine*, 3 February 1991, 31.

[82] Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy*, 193.

[83] "Taking Toshiba Public," Case C15-88-858.0, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1988, 11–12.

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multinational force.[84] Within two days of the debate, Germany agreed to contribute to the Gulf effort, and Japan quadrupled its aid offer.[85]

Of course, it is difficult to establish that grandstanding in Congress causes real changes in the behavior of other political actors, be they the public, the administration, or foreign countries. Public support for high levels of defense spending may have fallen without the efforts of Senator Grassley and his imitators. The Reagan administration might have dropped its support for Ferdinand Marcos even without being pushed by Senator Lugar. And the changes Japan made to its export controls might be all style and no substance. Even so, it's hard to deny the conclusion that members of Congress often focus the glare of the public spotlight on foreign policy issues and that sometimes the results matter. Scholars must abandon their implicit assumption that grandstanding simply injects politics into an otherwise technocratic process and recognize it as another tool members use to counter the inherent advantages presidents have on foreign policy.

Conclusion

To return to the question that began this article, Congress does matter on foreign policy. To be sure, pessimists are right to claim that Congress sustains the policies of the president far more frequently than it overturns them. And within foreign policy, Congress's record of success varies across policy domains; Congress seldom defeats the president on issues involving high politics. But focusing on the legislative scorecard overlooks the dynamics of influence. The bulk of Congress's influence over foreign policy rests in indirect means. The failure of political scientists to scrutinize anticipated reactions, structural and procedural innovations, and political grandstanding has created a serious gap in our understanding of how Congress influences foreign policy.

Rigorous study of Congress and foreign policy is more imperative today than ever before. Several ongoing developments at home and abroad promise to enhance the power of Congress in foreign policy. The first is the end of the cold war. As perceptions of external threat recede, the public is much more likely to tolerate legislative dissent on foreign affairs. Faced with fewer electoral costs in opposing the president, legislators are more likely to deal the president public rebuffs. Some signs of increased congressional assertiveness appeared in 1990, when Congress imposed significant restrictions on how DOD spends money on "black programs."[86] Congress also passed a bill, subsequently pocket-vetoed, that

[84] R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bonn and Tokyo Are Criticized for Not Bearing More of Gulf Cost," *New York Times*, 13 September 1990.

[85] John Tagliabue, "Kohl Vows to Widen Role in Gulf Effort," *New York Times*, 14 September 1990; and Steven R. Weisman, "Japan Defends Aid in Mideast Effort," *New York Times*, 15 September 1990.

[86] Robert Pear, "Congress Imposes New Restrictions on Secret Funds," *New York Times*, 31 October 1990.

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would have required the president to inform Congress whenever an American intelligence agency sought foreign help in conducting covert operations.[87] The Gulf war is likely to prove only a brief detour on the road to increased congressional assertiveness.

A second reason why Congress is likely to become more influential is that global interdependence is blurring the line that once separated domestic policy from foreign policy. Acid rain provides an example of such an "intermestic" issue.[88] The problem affects not only U.S. relations with Canada but also the economic well-being of states in the Midwest. Drugs, energy policy, farm subsidies, global warming, and immigration are other salient issues that lie astride the domestic and international spheres. Intermestic issues encourage congressional influence because they involve decisions traditionally considered part of domestic policy. Members of Congress, who can be counted on to protect their institutional prerogatives and their constituents, will feel comfortable rewriting presidential proposals on intermestic issues, regardless of the foreign policy implications.

The third development pushing Congress toward greater influence is the ever rising gap between American commitments abroad and American resources. No one denies that today the United States operates under a severe budget constraint. With it becoming increasing unlikely that the federal government can solve the commitment-resources gap by running larger budget deficits, Congress will have to chose between guns and butter. As the steady decline in real spending on defense illustrates, guns are likely to lose that showdown.

The last development that offers to enhance Congress's power stems from growing fears that the American economy is falling behind the economies of Germany and Japan. In the words of Representative Aspin, today we are seeing "the emergence of an entirely new concept of national security. It embraces economics and competitive, commercial relations."[89] Former U.S. trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz put the same point more bluntly: "Trade *is* defense. We must recognize the nature of the game."[90] If the argument that economic vitality is national security continues to gain ground, Congress will become more involved in national security policy for the same reasons it is more influential on intermestic issues. If issues are defined in domestic economic terms, Congress becomes less likely to defer to the wishes of the president. In this respect the 1989 debate over the FSX fighter may be a harbinger of things to come.[91]

Today the United States is crossing a watershed in its history. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of American hegemony are forcing the first

[87] See Christopher Madison, "Reopened Wound," *National Journal*, 15 December 1990, 3056.

[88] Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," *Foreign Affairs* 55 (January 1977): 306–324.

[89] Quoted in John Greenwald, "Friend or Foe?" *Time*, 24 April 1989, 44.

[90] Ibid., 45.

[91] See Ortmayer, "The Political Economy of National Security"; and Bruce Stokes, "Beat 'Em or Join 'Em," *National Journal*, 25 February 1989, 454–464.

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major rethinking in fifty years of the premises of U.S. foreign policy. Congress will play a key role in redefining America's interests and strategies. How well or poorly elected representatives handle the coming challenges will shape the future of both the country and the world. Unfortunately, a fixation with the legislative scorecard has led scholars to underestimate how Congress influences foreign policy; as a result, we are ill prepared to explain and predict congressional behavior. Hopefully, future research will take up William Bundy's challenge to explore the complexities of congressional decision making on foreign policy. The reward is not only a better understanding of how Congress operates, but also a better understanding of how U.S. foreign policy is made.*

* An earlier version of the paper was presented at the annual Iowa Conference of Political Scientists, 3 November 1990, in Des Moines. I am grateful to Eileen Burgin, Paul Gehman, Joseph Kruzel, James McCormick, and especially Steven S. Smith and Peverill Squire for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Evaluating Bargaining Performance: The Case of Camp David

SHIBLEY TELHAMI

Nearly a decade and a half after Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David accords in 1978, Arabs and Israelis were engaged in a new set of direct negotiations in a process begun in Madrid, Spain, in the fall of 1991. What insight can the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations at Camp David provide for evaluating the bargaining behavior of Arabs and Israelis in the Madrid process?

The Camp David accords raise two important questions: Why did Egypt and Israel move to sign a bilateral agreement at the expense of Egypt's relations with the Arab world? What explains the specific terms of the Camp David accords? This article examines the second question as a means to answering a more general question about international bargaining: How are bargaining performance and outcome to be evaluated? The Camp David case is unusually rich for this task. The bargaining process was so well defined and isolated that the actors' bargaining tactics and strategies lend themselves to examination. The contrasting systems of government of Egypt, Israel, and the United States, and the different personal styles of their top leaders make the case useful for the study of these variables in bargaining situations.

While it is assumed that the general tendency toward bilateral peace between Israel and Egypt is explained by objective variables that lie outside the bargaining process, the specific terms of the agreements were dependent on bargaining behavior. I make two conclusions. First, bargaining at Camp David supports the proposition that decentralized systems of government are more conducive to effective bargaining than centralized ones. In this regard, Egypt's centralized

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system impaired Egypt's ability to bargain with Israel and detrimentally affected the outcome of the negotiations on some specific issues. Second, given that some personal styles are more suitable to optimal bargaining than others, Anwar Sadat's personal tendencies were less conducive to optimal bargaining than those of Menachem Begin and Jimmy Carter. These differences too affected the bargaining outcome on some issues. In the concluding section, I make some inferences from Camp David about the Arab-Israeli negotiations in the Madrid process.

Background

The focus of this article is the bargaining over a limited number of issues at Camp David, not the strategic shift toward Israeli-Egyptian peace. The latter issue is best explained by key realist variables—the distribution of economic and military power, both regionally and globally.[1] As a result of change in these variables, Egypt was inclined toward a bilateral treaty with Israel, even at the cost of Egypt's relations with other Arab states. This general Egyptian inclination centered on Egyptian competition with Israel for alliance with the United States, a competition that was central to Camp David. Prime Minister Menachem Begin told President Carter at Camp David that "there had to be two agreements, the most important was between the United States and Israel, and the other, of secondary importance but obviously also crucial, was between Israel and Egypt. . . ."[2]

Egyptian leaders were clearly aware of the centrality of this strategic interest at Camp David. Sadat's aide, Boutrus Boutrus-Ghali, for example, called the Egyptian competition with Israel for strategic alliance with the United States "the most important leverage" that Egypt held, and "the secret weapon" that Israel feared most.[3] Sadat himself was apparently willing to live with a failure to reach an agreement with Israel as long as closer American-Egyptian relations at the expense of Israel's relations with the United States did result.[4] In the end, however, the Egyptians were forced to make a choice: it turned out that failure at Camp David could result in weakening Egyptian-American relations. Perhaps the single most important event forcing the Egyptian choice was Carter's confrontation with Sadat on the eleventh day of Camp David, as the Egyptian leader threatened to abandon the negotiations. Carter warned Sadat that if he left "it will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt."[5] Forced to choose between his relations with the United States and his relations

[1] For a full articulation of this argument, see Shibley Telhami, *Power and Leadership* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 152.

[2] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982), 366.

[3] Boutrus Boutrus-Ghali, interview with author, Cairo, 28 August 1983.

[4] Author's interview with former aide to Sadat, Tahseen Bashir, Princeton, NJ, March 1984.

[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), 272.

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with other Arab states, Sadat decided to choose the former. Nevertheless, these strategic inclinations could not explain specific terms of the agreements, which remained to be determined by bargaining.

Issues of Bargaining

For strategic reasons a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt was better than the status quo for both, other factors aside, and Camp David accomplished at least the minimal goals of both. The questions that remain are these: How much more than the minimum did each side accomplish? What accounts for this? What would the outcome have looked like if all actors had pursued optimal strategies? In order to consider these questions, one needs to define the issues that were open for bargaining.

We can rule out some issues. A comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict could not have been accomplished. The negotiations were by definition between Israel, Egypt, and the United States. For a comprehensive settlement, Syria, the Palestinians, and the Jordanians would have to have been included. Moreover, Israel needed some leverage for any future negotiations with these parties. Similarly, it was unrealistic to have expected that the Egyptians could have accepted anything but a full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Given the peace treaty with Israel and the establishment of full diplomatic relations, Egypt would have had nothing with which to bargain in the future and would probably have been unable to sell the accords domestically.

There remained four conflictive issues between Israel and Egypt. First, in the context of long-term regional strategy, Israel needed at least a peace treaty with Egypt and sought to normalize relations to the maximum. Egypt sought to minimize normalization so as to retain a degree of leverage over other issues. Second, Israel sought maximal demilitarization of the Sinai so as to make the Egyptian military option more remote. Egypt sought minimal demilitarization, so as to retain the military option. Third, Egypt sought maximal linkage between normalization and the resolution of the problem of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel sought the opposite. Fourth, Egypt sought some a priori general agreement on principles (for example, the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the Israeli intention to withdraw from occupied Arab territories). For all of these issues there was both ambiguity about the bottom line and conflictive interests. In other words, these were truly bargaining issues.

Role of the United States

The role of the United States differed from those of Egypt and Israel in that there was ambiguity about whether the United States was a mediator or a participant. To be a participant meant that the United States would seek to pursue its own national objectives. To be a mediator meant that the United States would simply

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attempt to facilitate *any* agreement between Israel and Egypt. The measure of success in the first case is the extent to which a given agreement corresponds to American objectives, while the measure of success in the latter case is whether or not an agreement was reached, regardless of its content. Egypt, needing U.S. leverage, wanted the United States to be a full participant, whereas Israel, having a better bargaining position vis-à-vis Egypt, preferred American mediation. The United States, perceiving its overall Middle East interests to depend on the extent of Israeli compromise, preferred the role of a participant but was willing to settle for the role of a mediator in that any agreement was better than none. Thus, apart from securing an agreement, the real measure of success for American bargaining depended on how much Israeli compromise could be delivered so that the influence of both the United States and Egypt in the Middle East would not be undermined. In this sense at least, despite the ambiguity about the American role, American bargaining behavior can be evaluated.

Criteria for Evaluating Bargaining Performance

Four different methods stand out as candidates for evaluating bargaining performance: comparing each actor's opening bargaining position to the final outcome; comparing each actor's objectively derived preferences with the final outcome; comparing the bargaining behavior of each actor with the recommended strategies of prescriptive bargaining theory; and comparing the actual outcome to the solution predicted by formal bargaining theory. While I will examine the value of each method for the case of Camp David, I will argue that the first is least useful. The other three are necessary but insufficient individually. Most of this article will focus on the third method, but the fourth will also be considered at the end of the article.

Opening Bargaining Positions

One typical and intuitive criterion of evaluation is the degree to which the outcome of negotiation deviates from the opening positions of the participants. By this standard the success or failure of the states at Camp David would involve a comparison of the final accords with the opening positions of each actor.

By this criterion Camp David was an important success for Israel's bargaining team and a poor showing for the Egyptian and American teams. A comparison between the opening positions of the three actors with the Camp David accords reveals that the accords correspond most closely to the Israeli opening position on most central issues. Indeed, this opening position was advanced by the Israelis long before Camp David; it was the first response to Sadat's 20 November 1977 speech at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. When Begin proposed at Ismailiyya on 25 December 1977 that the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza be granted "autonomy," the Egyptians saw it as a step backward and an attempt by Israel

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to control the territory without having to incorporate the undesirable population. Sadat became "completely disillusioned with Begin's 'ridiculous' position," and "when Begin spelled out his self-rule proposal . . . it was obvious that Egypt could not accept it."[6] Yet the final accords did not differ significantly from the original Begin proposal.

Nevertheless, this criterion is not a good indicator of success or failure. Assuming that the opening positions are sincerely held, it may indicate at best the extent to which perceptions conform to positions that are necessitated by other factors. Opening positions can be deliberately exaggerated, unrealistic, or based on misperceptions. Judging the outcome on the basis of opening positions is often misleading, and better criteria for evaluating bargaining behavior are necessary.

Actors' Objectively Derived Preferences

One alternative to the opening position criterion is the objectively derived preferences of the actors and their relative leverage in relation to each other. On the basis of this criterion one can assess the extent to which the final agreement corresponds to the actors' objectives in the negotiations. While this is an essential component in the evaluation process, there are two problems that make this approach insufficient in itself.

First, assuming that the boundaries of the actors' preferences can be fully drawn, the outcome remains largely underdetermined. That is, an actor's preferences may indicate the actor's minimum and maximum goals in the specific bargaining situation, but this may still leave a wide range of possibilities for the exact terms of the final agreement. Second, boundaries can rarely be specified exactly. One major reason for bargaining is the uncertainty about the exact limits of the opponent's (and often one's own) position. Actual bargaining forces the actors to specify these limits. The objectively derived preferences (specified earlier as bargaining issues) are therefore necessary to an evaluation but are also insufficient in themselves. Supplementary criteria are needed.

Optimal and Actual Bargaining Behavior

A third criterion of evaluation is not the outcome of bargaining but bargaining behavior itself. While it may be impossible to predict the precise outcome of different bargaining behaviors, it may be possible to establish the behavior that maximizes the chance for the desired outcome. Given that, it becomes possible to assess the extent to which actual behavior deviates from this optimal behavior. Hypotheses may then be derived to explain the deviation from optimal bargaining. The articulation of such a method and its application in the Camp David accords is now in order.

[6] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 307.

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Prescriptive Bargaining Theory and Camp David

Students of bargaining have long recognized several general strategies that maximize the bargainer's chances of attaining the desired outcome. These strategies hold independently of the actual situation or specific preferences of the actors. While there is a rich literature recommending numerous bargaining tactics, most of these derive from a single (but central) feature of bargaining situations. The starting point is that bargaining takes place because of the actors' uncertainty about the minimally acceptable position of the opponent and about the opponent's rationality. Although both parties may be better off with an agreement than without, bargaining occurs because there is a space within the range of possible agreements where one actor's gain becomes another's loss. If each actor seeks to maximize his or her own gains and knows that the opponent is better off with an agreement than without, it makes sense to project a tougher stance than the actor actually holds.

This central bargaining strategy has organizational implications: a hierarchical organization of the bargaining team with minimal involvement by top leaders and active involvement of subordinates is optimal. This serves to insure that an error by one individual, especially in relation to projecting an exaggerated minimum, can be corrected by others. Since a mistake by a top leader could not be easily corrected, the leaders' involvement should come only at the end of the process.

Projecting uncertainty also entails that bargainers must avoid being overly predictable. The point of this strategy is to avoid giving the opponent any certainty, even about one's own rationality, although some consistency must be maintained to prevent a breakdown in bargaining.

On the basis of these basic recommendations, deriving from the central bargaining feature of projecting uncertainty, I will evaluate the extent to which the actual bargaining behavior of the actors at Camp David corresponds to optimal strategies.

Egyptian Behavior

The bargaining behavior of the Egyptian team deviated seriously from optimal strategy, albeit many members of the team were highly competent. Even before coming to Camp David, many Egyptian diplomats complained that Sadat revealed too much of his position unnecessarily. They argued, for example, that Sadat's unconditional trip to Jerusalem was a form of recognition of Israel that could have been better used as leverage; that his declaration of "no more war" at the Knesset was an unnecessary unilateral move; and that his expulsion of the Soviets was accomplished without first securing promises from the United States.[7] This pattern continued at Camp David.

[7] Ibrahim Kamel and Sayyid Yasin, interviews with author, Cairo, 25–28 August 1983.

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To be sure, the Egyptian team arrived with a tough, professionally prepared opening position. But as soon as the negotiations began, Sadat revealed his actual position. Sadat met with President Carter and handed him the opening Egyptian proposal. "As I read it," Carter wrote, "my heart sank; it was extremely harsh and filled with all the unacceptable Arab rhetoric." But almost as soon as Carter finished reading it, Sadat said:

> . . . he would like to offer me some modifications which could later be adopted as acceptable to him. He cautioned me not to reveal these to anyone because it would destroy his negotiating strength. . . . I saw for the first time that we might achieve substantial success . . . [Sadat's] positions had a good chance of being acceptable to the Israelis.[8]

Sadat offered Carter a written document outlining Egypt's position, of which only one member of the Egyptian delegation was aware.[9] By the fourth day, Carter seemed willing to reveal much of Egypt's position to the Israelis. When Begin expressed frustration with the formal Egyptian position, Carter "tried to convince him that this was not the final Egyptian position, and that the Egyptians were willing to be accommodating within the limits previously explained to him. . . . I had been assured of this by Sadat." When Begin responded that "he did not see how honorable men could put forward one thing publicly and a different thing privately," Carter seemingly felt obliged to divulge more information.[10] The results of this were predictable and, as William Quandt writes, "From then on, Begin adopted an unyielding position on settlements in the Sinai. . . . Unlike Sadat, he had no intention of telling Carter what his fallback position really was."[11]

Sadat would occasionally resort to threats of walking out or reconsidering his commitment,[12] but such threats rarely work. Once a bottom line is revealed it becomes in effect a new formal position and removes a great deal of the uncertainty. To be fair to Carter, Sadat may have given away his minimal position much earlier, during Ezer Weizman's December 1977 visit to Egypt.[13]

The Egyptian team lacked a meaningful hierarchy. It included competent lower-level officials who engaged in painstaking negotiating, but their work was not assimilated into Egypt's overall strategy. Both Israeli and American negotiators had easy access to President Sadat, and when reached he made his mind up without considering his aides' input. As Carter put it, "I never consulted Sadat's aides but always went directly to their leader."[14] Similarly, members of the Israeli

[8] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 340.

[9] William Quandt, interview with author, London, 14 April 1988.

[10] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 365.

[11] William Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986), 225.

[12] Ibid., 354–355.

[13] Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), 87–88.

[14] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 356.

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negotiating team went directly to Sadat, who was willing to make final decisions without consulting his aides.

Sadat's behavior was also predictable, especially in relation to Carter. As Sadat's aide Ghali put it, "Sadat was a real amateur. He often moved hastily and predictably."[15] In short, Egyptian bargaining was nonoptimal.

Israeli Behavior

Israel's bargaining behavior at Camp David shows a close fit with optimal bargaining. Not only did the Israelis refrain from revealing their real position, they also avoided introducing a formal position beyond the initial proposal at Ismailiyya. This tactic was applied to both Egypt and the United States. Recalled Carter, "The Israeli delegation was very reluctant to trust us with any revelation of ultimate desires or areas of possible compromise."[16] Moreover, the Israeli delegation seemed capable of exaggerating its position effectively, especially in the case of Israeli settlements in the Sinai. Coupled with the element of time, this gave Israel a decided advantage.

More time was expended over the issue of Israeli settlements in the Sinai than perhaps any other issue in the negotiations, especially after Carter apparently divulged information about Sadat's fallback position. The Israelis seemed unwilling to negotiate on this issue at all, Begin declaring that "no Israeli leader could possibly advocate the dismantling of the Sinai settlements."[17] Begin maintained this position until the very last day of the negotiations when he was still "shouting words like 'ultimatum,' 'excessive demands,' and 'political suicide.'"[18] Yet it is doubtful that this Israeli behavior was more than a tactic to divert attention (and thus American pressure) from central issues. This tactic was particularly effective in that time seemed to work against the United States. The longer the negotiations lasted, the more pressure the United States came under to end them successfully, and the more the American position shifted toward an agreement for its own sake.

The Israeli team was also organized in a manner consistent with optimal bargaining. While Begin headed the team and made the final decisions, his aides played a central role. Moreover, his aides' opinions seemed to have some influence on him. When a proposal needed his approval it was usually taken up with him by his own aides, not by the Americans or the Egyptians. Carter wrote: "It soon became obvious to all of us that [Moshe] Dayan, [Ezer] Weizman, or Attorney General [Aharon] Barak could be convinced on an issue more quickly than the Prime Minister, and they were certainly more effective in changing Begin's mind than I was."[19]

[15] Ghali, interview, 28 August 1983.
[16] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 356.
[17] Ibid., 351.
[18] Ibid., 396.
[19] Ibid., 356.

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Finally, the Israeli team pursued an effective mix of strategies that was not readily predictable. Begin was not generally inclined to compromise, and when he did the process was time and energy consuming. Often the process stalled over what the American team considered to be "semantics." Cyrus Vance wrote that Begin was "a formidable and at times, difficult negotiator . . . capable of endlessly adhering to the same positions while castigating the motives of his negotiating partners for failing to agree."[20] Carter "dreaded having to negotiate with Begin."[21] Under such circumstances, it was easier to get concessions from the Egyptian side. Carter concluded that "had both men [Begin and Sadat] been preoccupied with semantics or details, my job would have been much more difficult."[22] While part of this behavior by Begin could be attributed to what many students of his personality referred to as "stubbornness,"[23] there is little doubt that it was partly a deliberate tactic. With no Arab country able to threaten Israel militarily, Begin "asked why Israel would have to even consider compromise."[24] Despite this tendency, Vance concluded that Begin was "shrewd enough to know when he must adapt, and he can act with restraint when necessary."[25] In short, Israeli behavior was more consistent with optimal bargaining than Egypt's behavior.

American Behavior

American bargaining behavior is not entirely comparable to that of Israel or Egypt, since the role of the United States was ambiguous at best. If anything, the American team suffered from inconsistency and confusion about this role. While the Carter administration desired the role of participant and assured Sadat of this intention, it also sought to assure Israel that it would be more of a broker. While Sadat trusted American partnership, the role forced on the United States by its own priorities and the structure of the bargaining situation required the betrayal of Egypt's confidence and undermined the achievement of American objectives. An agreement between Sadat and Carter to behave as "partners" and devise a plan that would lead to Israeli concessions was given up by Carter without informing Sadat.[26] And while Sadat seemed anxious to inform Carter in confidence of his real position, Carter sometimes revealed this position to the Israelis.

The organization of the American team was effectively hierarchical but less

[20] Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 181.

[21] Harold Saunders, interview with author, Princeton, NJ, 15 February 1984.

[22] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 356.

[23] Myron Aronoff, "Political Polarization: Contradictory Interpretations of Israeli Reality" in Steven Heydmann, ed., *The Begin Era: Issues in Contemporary Israel* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 56.

[24] Ibid., 83.

[25] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 181.

[26] Quandt, *Camp David*, 171, 218–219.

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than optimal. To be sure, several American officials played a significant role in the negotiations, but Carter himself became too engaged in details to allow for a fallback position, even when the Israeli participants were low-ranking aides.

Finally, American behavior was predictable on at least one significant issue: when Carter confronted Israeli steadfastness, he almost always hurried to the Egyptian delegation, where he consistently found a responsive Sadat. Knowing that, the Israelis could afford to maintain their strategy.

Explaining Deviation from Optimal Bargaining

It is intuitively appealing and often correct to ascribe deviation from optimal behavior to such things as misperception and incompetence. But even if such variables are relevant, one must ask why they are important in some cases but not in others. If other generalizable causal variables could be specified, the entire issue of misperception might be sidestepped and a direct link between these variables and behavior could be made. Two such variables will be considered as they relate to optimal bargaining: system of government and the personal inclinations of leaders. In what follows I will consider these variables both in general terms and in terms of Camp David.

System of Government

The link between domestic political structures and foreign policy has been examined by many scholars.[27] Several analysts, from Alexis de Tocqueville to George Kennan and Stephen Krasner, have argued that a state's foreign policy is more effective the fewer the domestic constraints; the more centralized the state is (the stronger it is), the more effective its foreign policy.[28] Other scholars have questioned this conclusion while enumerating the merits of democracy in the

[27] Among the many scholars studying the link between domestic politics and foreign policy are James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited" in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics* (New York: David McKay, 1973); Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32 (Autumn 1978); David A. Lake, "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983); Jeffrey A. Frieden, "Capital Politics: Creditors and the International Political Economy," *Journal of Public Policy 8* (1988); and Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[28] For example, de Tocqueville argued that "a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles." See his *Democracy in America* (New York: Knopf, 1945), I, 234–35. George Kennan made a similar point in *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 73. Stephen Krasner explored the link between the power of the state and domestic society in *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 55–90.

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conduct of foreign policy.[29] While this debate is likely to continue, there is increasing evidence that in one important area of foreign policy—international bargaining—domestic political constraints in a democracy can enhance a state's bargaining position. As Thomas Schelling put it, "the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and meet demands."[30] Recently, there has been empirical evidence supporting this conclusion.[31]

Contrasting the three vastly different systems of government of Israel, Egypt and the United States as they interacted in the negotiations at Camp David provides additional support for the proposition that decentralized systems are generally more conducive to optimal bargaining behavior than centralized ones. A decentralized form of government minimizes the chance of misperception and leaders' mistakes. It also satisfies the requirements of prescriptive bargaining theory in several ways: it lends itself to meaningful bargaining hierarchy; it permits the appearance of compromise even when the top leadership is steadfast; and it allows for better concealment of the bottom-line position through proliferation of views. It also gives leaders a way out when pressured to compromise, since they can always argue that they need the approval of the government, of parliament, of coalition partners, or of the general public. These conditions hold no matter what the opponent's system of government happens to be.

One potential drawback of democratic governments is that they can be less efficient in conducting the negotiations, and in some instances can prevent a possible agreement. As Schelling pointed out, they run the risk "of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown."[32] The value of time is often asymmetrical in that one government may need an agreement sooner than another; when this prevails, the latter could employ time as leverage to gain concessions.[33] While this remains an important problem, its consequences should not be exaggerated: Even though time is a factor that can reduce the value of delayed agreements, the most severe potential consequences pertain to crisis situations when time becomes a central factor. But it has been shown that in crisis situations, democratic decision making approximates more closely the decision making of more centralized governments, as domestic constituents put differences behind them to rally behind the government.[34]

[29] See for example, Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 96-119.

[30] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 19.

[31] See for example Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988): 428–460; and Howard P. Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," *World Politics* 44 (July 1992): 600–644.

[32] Schelling, *Strategies of Conflict*, 28.

[33] I have argued that "time" slightly favored Israel at Camp David. See Telhami, *Power and Leadership*, 152.

[34] As Theodore Lowi points out, the tendency to rally behind the executive in crisis situations gives

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The Egyptian government. Egypt's system of government is highly centralized with the president making all of the critical decisions. Other Egyptian officials owe their positions to the president, who may appoint and dismiss as he wishes. Moreover, with a government-controlled media and only nominal elections, the president is not held accountable for his actions. As a result, the system allows for a considerable presidential role and potentially unchecked mistakes. At Camp David, therefore, the Egyptian system was not conducive to effective bargaining behavior.

Competent Egyptian negotiators were often humiliated by Sadat, who overruled them casually in the presence of others. On critical issues Sadat preferred to negotiate without them.[35] The system did not allow for dissent, since Egyptian officials lacked any independent power base. As former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy put it, "if you disagreed with Sadat, you collapsed."[36]

While leader personality can make a noticeable difference in centralized governments, the system cannot protect itself against negative influences from this source. The system also imposes limitations on any leaders that are difficult to overcome. For example, during one bargaining session Sadat attempted to use "Egyptian public opinion" as leverage, only to be told by Begin that "the people of Egypt could be easily manipulated by Sadat, and their beliefs and attitudes could be shaped by their leader."[37] While Sadat could rhetorically object to Begin's characterizations, his leverage was inevitably diminished.

Even similarly inclined leaders will behave differently in different systems of government. As Egyptian Minister Boutrus Boutrus-Ghali said ". . . both Carter and Sadat were amateurs [at bargaining], but whereas Carter was inclined to listen to his aides, Sadat was not."[38] Sadat simply did not have to. The system of government also contributed to Sadat's overconfidence, which in turn increased the likelihood of misperceptions and policy mistakes.[39] Isolationism and lack of dissent were partly responsible for Sadat's feeling of invulnerability, so that when mistakes were committed his tendency was to rationalize them and chastise those who pointed them out. "[H]e sustained the illusion of success by denying any one the right to challenge it."[40] The Egyptian system of government thus contributed to wishful thinking because, to use Robert Jervis's words, there was a "lack of incentive for accuracy."[41] In conclusion, the centralized Egyptian system of government was not conducive to optimal bargaining behavior.

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incentives to U.S. presidents to "oversell" foreign dangers. See *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 127-163.

[35] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 342.

[36] Ismail Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 277.

[37] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 356.

[38] Ghali, interview, 18 August 1983.

[39] Fahmy, *Negotiating*, 25.

[40] David Hirst and Irene Beeson, *Sadat* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), 324.

[41] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 357.

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The Israeli government. The Israeli pluralist-parliamentary system of government was more conducive to optimal bargaining. To be sure, the government was largely controlled by the Likud party, which was dominated by Begin. But although Begin had a substantial hand in the ranking of individuals within the party, several members of his team had their own political standing and could run independently. Indeed, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan was not a member of Likud, and another member, Ezer Weizman, later broke from Likud and was elected to the Knesset as an independent. Begin thus could not ignore at least some of his key aides, especially given his slim plurality in the Knesset.

Nor was Begin's deference to his aides' opinions due to his personality. If anything, Begin was inclined to rule like a dictator and did not tolerate dissent. David Ben-Gurion had once remarked that Begin would rule the way Hitler did.[42] As one biography notes, "... it is Begin's voice that has consistently predominated ... not consensus among members of his government"; he was "leader of party" but not a "party man."[43]

The involvement of the entire Israeli team made the team effective, especially given Begin's steadfastness and difficult bargaining style, which made him an effective final arbiter. Even if Begin felt pressured to make decisions, he had several fallback positions. He could claim that he needed the approval of the full Israeli government, the Knesset, or Israeli public opinion. Indeed, on several occasions, Begin used these arguments to avoid making unwanted concessions.

The participation of top officials with independent political stature in the Israeli bargaining team was also conducive to the impression of a conciliatory attitude, even when no concessions were forthcoming. Positions hinted at by Dayan or Weizman gave Egyptian and American negotiators hope and incentive to make more concessions and to maintain the bargaining process, even if these concessions were later overruled by Begin. In short, the Israeli system of government improved the bargaining posture of the Israeli team.

The American government. The American system of government was somewhat effective, but less so than the Israeli system. Although power is decentralized in the United States, the president still holds substantial power, especially in foreign affairs. He does have the fallback of congressional approval and deference to public opinion, but within the cabinet his authority is nearly absolute. All members of the cabinet and the national security staff owe their positions to him, and most have little independent political clout. Thus presidential personality and inclinations can greatly influence the team's performance. Though some presidents allocate much responsibility to their staff, this need not be so. Carter's tendency to involve himself in the minutest details showed itself at Camp David. While he often listened to the advice of his aides, his decisions were final. And

[42] Eitan Habec, *Menachem Begin: The Legend and the Man* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1978), 255.

[43] Gertrude Hirschler and Lester S. Eckman, *Menachem Begin: From Freedom Fighter to Statesman* (New York: Shengold Publishers, 1979), 9.

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of course, a president has a tendency to select those who agree with him, and those whom he selects have the tendency to tell him what he likes to hear.

Nonetheless, the diffuse nature of the American political system, with an independent media and relevant public opinion, gives every official a degree of independence in that mere resignation can weaken the president. Unlike the situation in Egypt, an official is not "finished" if he or she disagrees or resigns. In conclusion, the degree of governmental centralization partly accounts for deviation from optimal bargaining. The Israeli structure, the most decentralized of the three at Camp David, was most conducive to optimal bargaining; the American system less so; and the highly centralized Egyptian system was least conducive to optimal bargaining.

Personal Styles of Leaders

The more centralized a government is, the larger the role of the leader in shaping policy, though leaders' personalities play some role in any system. What personality traits are most conducive to optimal bargaining? How did Carter, Begin, and Sadat perform at Camp David?

Students of the role of personality in politics have identified several apparently useful characteristics, most of which are not directly relevant to bargaining.[44] A full examination of this literature is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, the focus will be on three traits that have support in the literature of social psychology and that are directly relevant to the primary tasks of effective bargaining: keeping your opponent guessing about your position while making the best assessment you can of your opponent's own position.[45]

Degree of realism. Wishful thinking can influence bargaining in obvious ways. As Robert Jervis put it: "A statesman would like his enemies to be weak—or better yet, for them not to be his enemies at all—but if he believes this and it is not true, he will pay a high price."[46]

Wishful thinking could also lead to overestimation of one's capabilities, under-

[44] For general works on the subject of personality in politics, see Margaret C. Hermann and Thomas Milburn, eds., *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Lloyd S. Etheredge, "Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy: 1898–1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory" *American Political Science Review* 72 (June 1978): 434–451; James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985); and David C. McClelland, *Human Motivation* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1985). For specific applications in bargaining situations, see Dean G. Pruitt, *Negotiation Behavior* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1981); and Jeff Rubin and Burt Brown, *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiations* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1975).

[45] Two points should be stressed in this regard. First, I am not making the assumption that personal traits of individuals never change, but only that they are sufficiently durable for certain time intervals so that they are useful tools in some cases. Second, I am not making the claim that these variables are the only relevant ones.

[46] Jervis, *Perception*, 357.

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estimation of the opponent, an overly trusting strategy, or the interpretation of failure as success, such as when the opponent does not reciprocate one's optimistic gestures. The tendency then is not to recognize the failure of the strategy.

Separation of roles. Robert Price has made a relevant distinction between leaders in various societies on the basis of their capacity to separate roles.[47] In experimental social psychology, Mark Snyder makes a distinction between people who have high and low self-monitoring based on their ability to alter their self-presentation to accommodate different situations. Low self-monitors are more readily predictable than high self-monitors, and at least in this sense they make poor bargainers. But this distinction is relevant to bargaining for several other reasons.

Bargaining situations are inherently both social and professional situations. A leader whose behavior is dominated by the social dimension will be less effective, hence the need to insulate the top decision maker from the initial process, since even a good bargainer may make mistakes to protect his or her social integrity. Further, the relationships within a bargaining team are both those of the domestic social and political order and those of a professional team. This tension often accounts for what Irving Janis called "groupthink." Though Janis did not put it this way, his recommendations for minimizing groupthink seem designed for better separation of roles.[48] Some leaders can separate these roles better than can others. The more successfully they can do so, the more successful their bargaining should be.

Level of focus. Some leaders tend to focus on the highest levels of analysis, on the forest of broad relations and general categories, ignoring the details within. Others tend to focus on details, the trees, without being fully aware of the broader situation. A similar distinction exists in social psychology between people who are "broad categorizers" and those who are "narrows." Thomas Pettigrew found that, "Broad categorizers are superior on tasks that benefit from a more integrated, holistic strategy; narrows are superior when detailed or analytic processing is required."[49] He also found that narrows are more susceptible to cognitive dissonance.

These categories have particular relevance for bargaining situations. A leader with a lower level of focus is likely to perform well in negotiating details, while a leader with a higher focus is likely to do well in strategic planning but poorly in over-the-table bargaining.

Anwar Sadat. That Sadat was excessively inclined toward wishful thinking has been observed by most of those who knew him and studied his personality.

[47] Robert Price, *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 24–25.

[48] Irving Janis, *Groupthink*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982), 260–276.

[49] Thomas Pettigrew, "Cognitive Style and Social Behavior: A Review of Category Width" in Ladd Wheeler, ed., *Review of Personal and Social Psychology: 3* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 202.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that Sadat ". . . had the tendency to let himself be carried away by his own words, and I noted in my journal that 'my worry is that Sadat does not seem to differentiate clearly between fact and fiction'. . . ."[50] Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Kamel observed that "Sadat lived in a world of fiction,"[51] and former Chief of Staff Saad el-Din Shazly noted that Sadat was usually overconfident in his assessment of such issues as the ceasefire, the peace talks, and the Egyptian initiative in the Sinai. During the final days of the 1973 war, "Sadat kept rejecting a ceasefire initially because he led himself to believe we were victors and could command next steps."[52] Two of his biographers observed that Sadat "chose to ignore diplomatic consequences [of his actions], to pretend before his people and perhaps even to himself, that it never really happened." His response to Arab outcry was "a mixture of wishful thinking and weird arithmetic . . . that most of the Arab world supported him."[53]

Sadat lacked the capacity to separate social and professional roles effectively. In his dealings with his aides he failed to separate his superior position in the government and his position as leader of a bargaining team. Since the characteristics of the dominant roles conflicted with those of professional bargaining, Sadat was less effective at over-the-table bargaining.

In his dealings with foreign leaders, Sadat often failed to distinguish between personal (social) and state (professional) relations. He developed close personal relations with Henry Kissinger and was accused by many of his domestic critics of relying too much on Kissinger's "goodwill."[54] His personal relation with Carter also seemed to obscure relevant professional considerations. "Sadat seemed to trust me too much," remarked Carter, as though he was burdened with a responsibility that he could not meet, for while Carter truly liked Sadat and even agreed with his political objectives, Carter's own professional constraints as president inclined him to behave independently.[55] Cyrus Vance remarked that ". . . above all, [Sadat] valued loyalty and friendship. Once trust was gained, he would stand with you unfailingly."[56] At the same time, aware of the dominance of social-cultural traits in Sadat's behavior, Carter used them to gain concessions from Sadat. Remarked Brzezinski: "He showed sensitivity to Sadat's pride, he appealed for his magnanimity, at no point did he make Sadat feel inferior or dependent, and yet he pressed steadily for more and more significant concessions."[57] This inability to separate roles was particularly striking and detrimental to Egyptian bargaining. Sadat's revelation of his fallback position to Carter is an example of

[50] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 93.

[51] Kamel, interview, 25 August 1983.

[52] Saad El Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), 282.

[53] Hirst and Beeson, *Sadat*, 310.

[54] Fahmy, *Negotiating*, 401.

[55] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 322.

[56] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 174.

[57] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 93.

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this. He apparently assumed that a personally frank relationship with Carter was more beneficial than caution, oblivious to the professional pressures on Carter as president.

Sadat's level of focus was clearly high, or forest level. Butrus Ghali said that, "Sadat had no interest in detail whatsoever."[58] Ibrahim Kamel concluded that, "Sadat was too lazy to deal with detail. He never read reports, and never displayed interest."[59] Sadat's behavior at Camp David clearly reflected this. He considered it small-minded to be concerned with details, and "accused" Begin of being so inclined.[60]

This tendency served Sadat well in grasping overall relationships and relative leverage with the United States and Israel. His ability to perceive the potential competition between Israel and Egypt for alliance with the United States enabled him to maneuver toward a favorable bargaining situation. But even here, Sadat's lack of attention to detail may have been partly responsible for his apparent failure to recognize that American domestic politics and the Middle East's ranking in American priorities would incline the American government toward an agreement for its own sake, negating much of Sadat's leverage. In summary, Sadat's personality was not conducive to optimal bargaining behavior.

Menachem Begin. Begin did not display the optimism and trust of the opponent that are entailed in wishful thinking. He was not inclined to rely on verbal agreements or gestures by other leaders, and he appeared to examine the consequences of his actions very carefully. Carter wrote: "He reminded Sadat of the transient nature of our leadership but the permanent nature of the consequences of our decisions. He tried to convince Sadat that we had to be very careful not to make a mistake through undue haste."[61]

Begin was also capable of separating roles, clearly distinguishing between social and professional situations. Vance noted that while Begin was ". . . a formidable and, at times, difficult negotiator, . . . when formal negotiations ceased, he could become charming and relaxed, speaking lovingly of his family and grandchildren."[62] Begin was usually conscious that his role as prime minister did not put him on a par with Presidents Carter and Sadat, who by protocol were heads of state. Begin was always properly attired in their presence and went to their quarters for discussions.

Begin had a potentially serious conflict of roles. It involved his roles as both the leader of an ideological party and prime minister of a nation-state. Although this tension was stronger for Begin than for other Israeli leaders, it derives from the very nature of Israel. This tension became clear in discussions by members of the Israeli government. Ezer Weizman recalls that Chief of Staff Motta Gur

[58] Ghali, interview, 28 August 1983.
[59] Kamel, interview, 25 August 1983.
[60] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 330.
[61] Ibid., 357.
[62] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 191.

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remarked: "Peace without Zionism is something I do not want. Zionism without peace? That's feasible. Sadat wants peace, but on his own terms and we can't accept those terms."[63] This tension, however, only minimized Israeli concessions and certainly did not in the end prevent an agreement.

It is widely recognized that Begin was exceptionally inclined toward detail and semantics, and seems to fit the characteristics of someone with low-level or tree focus. While some of this preoccupation with detail at Camp David was tactical, prompting Carter to conclude that Begin "was trying to postpone" decisions, there is little doubt that this was part of Begin's personality.[64]

Such attention to detail can help bargainers once general parameters have been set. Thus, in over-the-table bargaining this behavior helped the Israelis, especially since in the end the letter of the agreement dominated whatever spirit may have prevailed during the negotiations. It could hurt a bargainer who loses sight of the larger picture, but Begin apparently kept the greater strategic picture in mind and was able to shift focus when necessary. For example, he was obviously aware of the implications of the negotiations for American-Israeli relations and, as Carter noted, was more interested in preserving Israel's relationship with the United States than in reaching an agreement with Egypt.[65] Begin was also aware of the domestic constraints that made Carter's first priority at Camp David the achievement of success for its own sake. Thus, when Carter seemed to threaten Begin, he felt sufficiently confident to "counterthreaten" Carter.[66] And when Israeli officials were concerned that Israel might be cornered at Camp David, Begin seemed to have the vision to see the Israeli advantage. Carter wrote that when he told Begin that "Sadat had expressed a concern about Begin's preoccupation with details at the expense of major issues," Begin replied that he could handle both. "I believed him," Carter continued, "and hoped he would be inclined to prove it."[67] In the end, whatever obsession with detail Begin had did not seem to prevent an agreement acceptable to Israel. Begin's personal style was generally conducive to effective bargaining.

Jimmy Carter. Carter tended to be overoptimistic, inclined to trust the opponent, and usually predictable in persisting in a cooperative strategy—all of which are traits of wishful thinking. He also had some difficulty (though less than Sadat) in separating roles, and he was decidedly a man of low-level focus, making him a successful bargainer tactically, but a poor one strategically.

In terms of role separation, Carter's personal values and his "chivalry," as Brzezinski called it, often dominated his professional role. In one case, when Brzezinski suggested wiretapping the Israeli and Egyptian quarters, Carter re-

[63] Weizman, *The Battle*, 75.

[64] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 357.

[65] Ibid., 366.

[66] Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 315.

[67] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 330.

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fused. Ironically, both the Egyptian and the Israeli delegations apparently assumed that their quarters were not secure and typically conferred outside.[68] Carter also changed his mind, apparently on moral grounds, following an agreement with Sadat to advance a settlement plan that was seen as serving both American and Egyptian interests.[69] Carter was generally predictable in persisting with his cooperative strategy.

There is a near consensus that Carter was interested in smaller details and that he possessed great talent at comprehending the most intricate relations at that level. This gave Carter a strong edge in tactical bargaining, and he impressed many of his own aides in that regard. Whatever tactical weakness the American team had did not derive from this aspect of Carter's behavior but from the organization of the team. Had Carter been a negotiator rather than head of the team, his personal effectiveness would have been more visible.

Yet Carter lacked the capacity to shift his focus when necessary. This tendency manifested itself in his general lack of understanding of Washington politics, his apparent failure to perceive the prevailing norms of international relations (he failed to predict Israel's reduced incentives to make concessions on the Palestinian question after it secured the bilateral treaty with Egypt), and his inability to correctly perceive his own dependence on domestic politics as he entered negotiations at Camp David. As a result, he lacked the ability to make full use of his potential strategic advantage.

Evaluation

I have argued that Israeli bargaining behavior at Camp David corresponded more closely to effective bargaining than did that of Egypt or the United States and that this deviation seems to correspond to differences in the system of government and leader personalities. So far there has been no attempt to establish the effect of this deviation on the outcome. What outcome could have been expected had all actors followed optimal bargaining strategy? One member of the Egyptian team suggested that the outcome could not have been substantially different in any case.[70] How, then, does one assess the possibilities?

The answer cannot be derived from prescriptive bargaining theory. All that prescriptive theory can state is that prescribed strategies will maximize the chance of attaining one's preferences. On that basis one can only state that Egypt (or Israel) may or may not have been able to achieve more. The only way to find out is to behave optimally, as each actor must test the limits of the opponent's position to the maximum.

Assessment of outcome. The difficulty in assessing possible outcomes given

[68] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 254.
[69] Quandt, *Camp David*, 235–236.
[70] Ghali, interview, 28 August 1983.

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optimal bargaining behavior derives from two sources: the actors' uncertainty about the positions of their opponents and the underdetermination of the model even with such information. Prescriptive bargaining theory cannot specify the exact outcome, but it does recommend that each actor test the limits of the opponent. At Camp David, Israel tested the limits of the Egyptian position on relevant issues, while the Egyptians did not similarly press Israel. In the end the outcome was closer to Israeli preferences than to Egypt's on all four bargaining issues that were defined earlier.[71]

Whether or not the outcome could have been different given optimal Egyptian behavior remains unclear. Butrus Ghali concluded that the outcome could not have been substantially different and that the real Egyptian position couldn't be hidden by good tactics, because "objectively speaking, our relative weakness was out there for the whole world to see."[72] Sadat shared this view. Given that details mattered little to him, Sadat paid less attention to such issues as the Israeli settlements once he concluded that an overall agreement was not possible.

But such issues do matter. According to Harold Saunders, who was dispatched to the Middle East following the accords to secure the approval of Arab states, several states would have accepted the agreements if they had contained two specific changes: a freeze on Israeli settlements and recognition of the right of Palestinian self-determination. Whether or not Saunders's impressions were justified, his observations demonstrate the potential significance of these issues.[73]

An examination of the bargaining over the two issues is telling. Egypt demonstrated a lack of interest in them, and certainly did not press the Israelis to test the limits of their position. This may have been partly due to Sadat's operating at a much higher level of abstraction, but there seem to be other reasons. When asked about Egypt's apparent lack of attention to these issues, Butrus Ghali replied that: "[W]e left these issues to the Americans to handle. We and the Americans had full agreement over them, and we simply trusted them to use their leverage to negotiate over them."[74]

Yet the Americans, who already faced a dilemma over their roles of mediator and partner (and the tension this dilemma brought between success of any sort and success for American objectives) faced another problem. While those U.S. positions that coincided with Egypt's were independently based on American preferences, the United States often appeared to be taking sides. Egypt's lack of involvement in negotiating some of the issues threatened to make Carter appear "more Arab than the Arabs," according to Saunders. The United States could not maintain such positions for long.

One issue where a different management of detail may have made a difference in the outcome is the controversial agreement on the freezing of Jewish settle-

[71] Telhami, *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining*, app. A.
[72] Ghali, interview, 28 August 1983.
[73] Harold Saunders, interview with author, Princeton, NJ, 15 February 1984.
[74] Ghali, interview, 28 August 1983.

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ments on the West Bank and Gaza. The Egyptian delegation was largely absent from the negotiations on this issue, with discussions generally conducted by the Israeli and American delegations. While there remains some ambiguity about what took place, accounts by Israeli and American negotiators and research by William Quandt make several facts clear.

Most of the negotiations over this issue were conducted on the twelfth day, one day before the conclusion of the negotiations, after agreement had been reached on all other issues. Both sides had agreed that the issue should not be addressed in the text of the accords, but in a public letter from Begin to Carter. The text was to read: ". . . After the signing of the framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among negotiating parties."[75] The American delegation specifically understood this to refer to the negotiations for autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza and so stated during that session. The Israelis understood this to be the case. The Israelis apparently thought that the talks on autonomy would last two to three months, but that they could be extended. The Americans had the distinct impression that the Israelis fully approved the American interpretation of the agreement, while some Israeli members of the delegation understood that Begin's approval was only tentative, and that he was to give his final answer the next day. William Quandt concluded that: ". . . it seems most likely that on Saturday night Begin did not give Carter a firm agreement to a freeze on settlements for the duration of the autonomy negotiations. But he may have wanted to leave the president with the impression that such an agreement had almost been reached."[76] The letter handed to Carter by Begin the next day, after agreement had been reached on the text of the accords, stated that the freeze on settlement building applied to the three months envisaged for the negotiation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

On Sunday, 17 September 1978, the final day of the negotiations, an "exhausted" American delegation suddenly discovered the discrepancy over the settlement issue.[77] Quandt put it: ". . . by then, they were so close to concluding the negotiations that they chose to overlook this 'misunderstanding.' It was a costly mistake."[78] Asked why the American delegation, which had clearly perceived the issue's significance, did not press it further, Harold Saunders replied: "You cannot imagine how difficult, how agonizing, it was to deal with Begin. It was so time and energy consuming. Carter dreaded having to deal with him. And we were all so exhausted, yet so thrilled that we finally had an agreement."[79]

From this it would appear that the Israeli use of this issue as a tactic, Begin's bargaining style, and the American desire for diplomatic success were responsible

[75] Quandt, *Camp David*, 248.
[76] Ibid., 250.
[77] William Quandt, interview with author, Princeton, NJ, 15 February 1984.
[78] Quandt, *Camp David*, 251.
[79] Quandt, interview, 15 February 1984.

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for the failure to press the central issue of settlements further. Yet while such pressure may have improved the chance of a favorable agreement for the American side, one cannot predict the outcome with certainty. Further theoretical hypotheses are required to measure the likelihood of competing possible outcomes. For the purpose of accomplishing the latter task, I will now turn to formal bargaining theory.

Formal Bargaining Theory: Speculative Outcomes

As stated earlier, bargaining takes place because of uncertainty about two factors: the opponent's position and the opponent's rationality. Optimal bargaining strategy is designed to test the limits of the opponent's position. For example, while Israeli preferences could be derived on objective grounds (that is, on the basis of the behavior of states in general and the historical pattern of Israeli behavior in particular), one is nonetheless faced with the possibility that Begin was so committed to his ideology that he was willing to take more risks on security in order to attain his ideological goals. While general theoretical hypotheses may explain a phenomenon well in the aggregate, there is always the exceptional case; and while a theorist must always bet on the verified general hypothesis over the unique, the decision maker in a specific case may not be able to afford even the smallest risk. Thus, while it is often the case that a negotiator attempts to project preferences as unique in the interest of maintaining maximum uncertainty, the opponent cannot always tell the difference between a ploy and serious positions, and may not be willing to take risks. Begin in particular was so adept at this game that he often kept his real position unknown to some of his closest aides.

Even if reasonable certainty about the actors' real positions could be established, however, a specific outcome cannot be predicted without additional assumptions about the actors' behavior. One central assumption pertains to the expectation of rational behavior. The problem is that theorists have different but equally reasonable definitions of rationality. For example, there is a disagreement as to whether a rational player tries to maximize gains (liberal rationality) or to minimize losses (conservative rationality). The outcome is decidedly different depending on what assumption one chooses, yet the choice is independent of any objective criterion. The matter seems to be strictly one of individual taste or inclination.

Yet regardless of which assumption one adopts in a given model, those actors who employ the opposite strategy would be judged by the model to be irrational. This should make it clear that the distinction is merely formal and cannot in itself provide a basis for judging the desirability of the actor's approach. For example, it may be argued that Sadat adopted liberal rationality in risking a great deal in case of failure but maximized his chance in case of the success in the competition with Israel for alliance with the United States. His failure to attain his objective would not in itself be a reason to fault his approach or to consider him irrational.

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It should be evident that it is difficult to usefully employ formal bargaining theory in real-world political bargaining. Even if one chooses among the alternative assumptions, it remains extremely difficult to translate the real preferences of the actors into a mathematical form that lends itself to identifying a specific solution. Nonetheless, John Harsanyi concludes from a formal solution to the bargaining game that an actor is more likely to have a favorable outcome "the greater his own willingness, and the less his opponent's, to risk a conflict in order to obtain better terms. . . ."[80] It is worthwhile to assess Israeli and Egyptian behavior in relation to this condition.

While Egypt's overall strategic behavior conformed to this prescription, Egypt's tactical behavior on specific issues did not. Egypt seemed willing to risk a great deal in initiating the Camp David process in order to obtain its long-term regional objectives. But over such issues as Israeli settlements on the West Bank, Palestinian self-determination, and firm linkage between normalization of relations and an agreement on Palestinian autonomy, the Egyptians did not project any willingness to risk failure. The Israelis, on the other hand, successfully projected their willingness to risk failure on these issues. The model predicts that had the Egyptians behaved like the Israelis over these issues, they would have been able to obtain more. How much more and whether it would have been worth the effort can only be assessed by less formal methods. I will venture some informal conclusions based on my empirical study of the case, as well as a probabilistic assessment of the theoretical propositions.

The failure to ensure firmer links between the two Camp David agreements was probably due to ineffective Egyptian bargaining, which resulted from a system of government that did not lend itself to optimal bargaining. The second is that the failure to attain a specific agreement on settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza was due to superior Israeli bargaining that can be credited in this case to the superior bargaining traits of Begin, especially in comparison with Carter and Sadat. These conclusions require further elaboration.

One could wonder whether, given Begin's strong ideological commitment to the West Bank, which few scholars doubt, he would have accepted a freeze on settlement building for the duration of the autonomy talks. Is it reasonable to expect that given better Egyptian bargaining Begin would have acquiesced in a firmer linkage between improved Israeli-Egyptian relations and progress on Palestinian autonomy? Yet international relations, especially in the Middle East, are rich with examples of leaders who have modified ideological positions to accommodate international and domestic needs. Begin himself, although always coveting the West Bank ideologically, was not an advocate of Israeli military action to occupy the West Bank, as were some of his colleagues in the early 1960s. Failure to achieve an agreement with Egypt would have been extremely costly to

[80] John Harsanyi, *Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 79.

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Begin, both internationally and domestically, regardless of the lack of concern that he tried to project.

In the end, however, acceptable methodologies and prescribed strategies are based on empirical corroboration in the aggregate, and there are always exceptions. Begin could have been this exception, although I almost always bet on the general. The key point, however, is that the Egyptians could not really have known what Begin's bottom line was unless they pursued optimal bargaining strategies that could have forced choices. Begin, the seasoned political bargainer, was fond of rhetorically asking his Israeli critics why he should compromise when this was unnecessary. Egypt clearly failed to create an incentive for Begin to see such a necessity.

From Camp David to Madrid

On 30 October 1991, Arabs and Israelis met in Madrid to inaugurate a process of direct negotiations cosponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia). It was clear to all that the United States was the primary sponsor. These negotiations were organized into simultaneous but bilateral sets of talks, although some issues were taken up in multilateral sessions. Three central Arab delegations emerged in these negotiations: Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian-Jordanian; but the most difficult issues clearly related to Syria and the Palestinians. The organization of the negotiating teams in this process differed markedly from those at Camp David. The top Arab and Israeli decision makers were not members of the negotiating teams nor were they in direct contact with each other. This served to prevent the typical dilemma that the Egyptian team faced at Camp David, when Sadat was susceptible to mistakes from which he could not back down. He was so obviously the final arbiter in all Egyptian decisions that when compromise was needed the pressure on Sadat would become relentless. Both Hafiz al-Assad and Yassir Arafat, whatever their personal styles, were insulated from the daily demands of bargaining.

The structure of the Palestinian team was especially conducive to effective bargaining. Ironically, this favorable Palestinian bargaining posture came with the inadvertent help of former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzaq Shamir, who insisted that the PLO be excluded from the negotiations, then further insisted that Palestinians from East Jerusalem not be part of the delegation. As a consequence, the PLO became almost invisible. In addition, the exclusion of East Jerusalem Palestinians like Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Husseini from the delegation, despite their obvious influence and legitimacy, forced an effective Palestinian negotiating posture: aside from the delegates, a second tier of more influential Palestinians would act as advisers who could speak out and be listened to. Even though the PLO is almost invisible, it remained through Arafat the final Palestinian decision maker.

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Because of this arrangement, responsibility for Palestinian behavior could not easily be pinned on one individual, mistakes by Palestinian negotiators could be corrected by the next tier of authority, image problems could be corrected by a division of labor, and proliferation of opinions and views within the Palestinian community could appear more natural. But this arrangement, while tactically helpful to the Palestinians in negotiating the specific details of an agreement, makes bold decisions by a remote leadership more difficult; it encourages stalemate. This latter tendency is further complicated by the diplomatic inexperience of the Palestinian negotiating team, which cannot fully exploit its tactical advantages. Ultimately, stalemate is more costly to the Palestinians than to the Israelis, although both sides stand to lose.

The Palestinians lost important allies as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union, the defeat of Iraq, and the loss of financial support for the Gulf states; and the United States may lose the incentive to intervene now that the American public is looking inward. On the ground, many Palestinians remain under difficult conditions of occupation while others are experiencing another round of homelessness following expulsion from Kuwait. But the Israelis also stand to lose from a stalemate: the failure to reach an agreement with the Palestinians will surely increase the power of the extremists among the Palestinians, lead to more violence on both sides, make peace agreements between Israel and some Arab states more remote, and cause tension in Israel's relations with the outside world.

The Palestinian dilemma points out the inescapable conclusion that the organizational features of each team, no matter how optimal, cannot transform the objective strategic realities, which in the case of Arabs and Israelis in both Camp David and Madrid strongly favor Israel. Domestic structures and political leadership affect the process and outcome of bargaining, but neither can outweigh the superior objective leverage of the opponent.

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

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The State, Economy, and Self-Determination in South Africa

ANTHONY W. MARX

Political analysis has traditionally projected material structure or the power of ideologies as the primary determinant of popular movements and other pressures for social change. Applying either a reductionist materialism or a disembodied idealism to the South African conflict cannot fully explain variations in the political analysis and strategy of popular challenges to the minority regime, nor the likely outcome of such challenges. The dynamics of the South African conflict can only be understood by analyzing the impact and interaction of structural changes in the economy and state rule and the role of mass mobilization.

Country-wide South African opposition has a long and variously textured history, dating back at least to the founding of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912. In the 1950s the still legal ANC had organized a popular, multiracial, national protest movement. By 1959, the racially exclusive Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) had broken away from the ANC and begun to gain support for its more confrontational approach. One year later, both the ANC and PAC were banned, forced into exile, and began low-scale guerrilla activity launched from neighboring states and from within South Africa.[1] This analysis focuses on the

[1] T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History* (London: Macmillan, 1977); and Edward Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).

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development of opposition politics within South Africa in the period between this banning of the ANC and PAC, and their legalization in early 1990.

South African internal opposition has varied greatly over the last thirty years, presenting many changes that call for explanation. Organized, public opposition reemerged in South Africa with the founding in 1969 of the student led Black Consciousness (BC) movement, which remained practically the only internal opposition through much of the 1970s. Believing that "the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed," the BC movement focused on spreading ideas that would undermine continued black submission to the minority regime.[2] The movement spread this message largely through discussion groups, seminars, newsletters, and by establishing pilot service projects that demonstrated black self-sufficiency. The relatively idealistic goal of shaping a more assertive form of black identity was interpreted as requiring the exclusion of whites but little in the way of organized mass protest. The spontaneous explosion of unrest in Soweto in 1976 demonstrated both the popular appeal of BC's message and the movement's organizational limitations.[3]

In the 1980s, BC was largely eclipsed by the nonracial United Democratic Front (UDF), which followed the ANC's traditional focus on mobilizing more active resistance, guided by the inspirational language of the ANC's Freedom Charter. More specific ideas were eschewed in order to allow for unity among the broadest possible anti-apartheid alliance, including sympathetic whites and businesses. The Front was defined by popular rejection of what was vaguely described as "the system," leaving more "visible enemies" unidentified.[4] On the other hand, there was nothing vague about the Front's efforts at mass mobilization. Unlike the relatively spontaneous uprising of 1976, unrest orchestrated by the UDF affiliates in the mid-1980s—including consumer and rent boycotts, community "stayaways," and other activities of civic associations and street committees—were all carefully organized.[5]

Heightened state repression of the UDF in the late 1980s brought to the forefront of internal opposition the black trade unions, with their emphasis on class analysis and their powerful strategy of politically motivated strikes.[6] Workers' economic self-interest both unified these unions and initially constrained their political involvement, though state repression made it increasingly difficult to separate such concerns. By 1986, the largest union federation had committed itself to both "bring the lessons of solid organizing to our people . . . (and) to

[2] Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 28–29.

[3] Gail Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[4] Terror Lekota, Correspondence with Author, April 1988.

[5] Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983); and Martin Murray, *South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny* (London: Verso, 1987).

[6] Steven Friedman, *Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970–1984* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); and Eddie Webster, "The Rise of Social-movement Unionism" in Philip Frankel, et al., eds., *State, Resistance and Change in South Africa* (Kent, England: Croom Helm, 1988).

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develop an increasingly coherent political perspective."[7] Pursuing this agenda, the unions were able to launch massive short-term cross-industry strikes and to call for international economic pressures, which significantly contributed to the pressures that resulted in the state's unbanning of the ANC and of the less popular PAC in February 1990.

Popular adherence to these differing opposition tendencies has not shifted in neatly delineated stages, for there has been considerable overlap and interaction between these movements. However, the various changes of ideological preference and related activity can be distinguished and have been subject to varying analysis. Adherents of a strict Marxist interpretation have explained such shifts primarily as superstructural outcomes of changes in basic economic relations.[8] Those more influenced by the tradition of Max Weber have argued that the various beliefs shared by activists have determined opposition activity, with little indication given to more structural influences.[9]

Recent theoretical work and historical studies of other countries have suggested that the traditions of Marx and Weber need not be mutually exclusive. Social processes can be seen as having been shaped by combinations of economic relations, the state, and subjective interpretations of such factors.[10] The writings of leading political activists, including V. I. Lenin and Antonio Gramsci, reinforce the need to combine economic and political analysis for both evaluating and leading potentially revolutionary organizations.[11] However, the patterns by which such diverse factors interact remain relatively unexplored for South Africa.

Though debate about social causation cannot be resolved in the abstract, the factors influencing collective action in a particular case can be disentangled, with their sequence and possible interaction analyzed. Such an approach avoids reducing explanation to a single cause, forgoing the attractions of theoretical simplicity in favor of historical specificity. In keeping with this approach, I discuss and illustrate the factors influencing recent transitions in internal South African opposition. I have divided my analysis of possible determinants into three categories: state policies, economic relations, and developments internal to

[7] Jay Naidoo, "The Significance of COSATU," *South African Labour Bulletin* 11 (April/May 1986): 38.

[8] For example, see John S. Saul, and Stephen Gelb, *The Crisis of South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981).

[9] For example, see Mokgethi Motlhabi, *Black Resistance to Apartheid* (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1984).

[10] For example, see Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Frank Parkin, *Max Weber* (Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood, 1982); Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon, 1966); and Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[11] V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?" in Robert Tucker, ed., *The Lenin Anthology* (New York: Norton, 1975); and Quintin Hoare and G. N. Smith, eds., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

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the opposition itself. International influences are also discussed within the context of each of these three categories. Though we can anticipate considerable interaction between these three types of factors, maintaining an analytic distinction between them is useful for ordering both analysis of the past and informed discussion of the future.

State Repression and Resistance

In the 1970s and 1980s, South African state policies often influenced the ideological parameters or goals, if not set the specific strategies, of opposition. The state's efforts to reinforce racial, national and class divisions have been challenged by popular movements seeking to invert and transform each of these distinct aspects of oppression to the advantage of the opposition. Racial discrimination has provoked assertions of black unity, minority domination has provoked an inclusive form of national mobilization, and exploitation has provoked working-class organization. The state's own strategies have come back to haunt the regime in popularly revised forms.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the state's grand apartheid design of homelands for blacks, together with forced "removals and influx control," were intended to reinforce racial and ethnic divisions. These state policies were initially justified as consistent with ascriptive distinctions: "the Bantu peoples . . . do not constitute a homogenous people, but form separate national units."[12] Black students, having not yet joined the workforce or fully experienced economic exploitation, were brought together in unprecedented numbers by educational policies that created racially segregated and inferior schools and universities. The BC movement, which grew up among these students, eschewed ethnic divisions and inverted the aim of imposed racial identity, in part by incorporating Coloureds and Indians together with Africans. Black Consciousness asserted the power of the majority to shape its own destiny, contesting official racial divisions and acceptance of physical inferiority among the oppressed. Based on the assumption that "the limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress," the BC movement set out to end popular endurance and to inspire resistance.[13]

In the early 1980s, the state adopted a somewhat more reformist line, hoping to buttress continued national domination with the limited inclusion of other minority groups. A new tricameral parliament was designed to involve "Coloureds and Indians" in setting policies on their "own affairs," narrowly defined. The "African" majority, excluded from this new parliament, was to be satisfied with the establishment of subordinate local "councils with extended powers."[14]

[12] Jeffrey Butler et al., eds., *The Black Homelands of South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 25.

[13] Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 90.

[14] South African Institute of Race Relatisn, *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1984), 72, 91.

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According to long-time activist Ismail Mohamed, the "parliament proposals were a blessing. They gave us the opportunity to politic since the state wanted a broader base."[15] Taking advantage of this opportunity to respond to the state's initiatives, civic organizations and other groups formed the UDF to coordinate wide-spread resistance to these proposals, giving a national and nonracial focus to previously locally-based organization.

In 1979, the state legalized the development of emerging black labor unions, in the hope of creating a more disciplined and complacent "labor aristocracy." A "more structured and orderly" process of labor negotiations was envisioned by the state, which remained eager to "subordinate the bargaining power of the trade unions to the national interest."[16] The unions have taken advantage of this opening to grow and to build their organizational structures, with unionized workers increasingly challenging both the established political order and economic exploitation which defines them as a subordinate class. By 1986, the largest union federation, COSATU, had committed itself to "organizing and mobilizing not only in our factories but in our townships . . . to raise the issues of social, political and economic transformation now."[17]

The South African state's varying exercise of domination has to a large extent set the terms of struggle for opposition aimed at defeating that domination. As admitted by Peter Jones, a leading figure in the BC movement of the 1970s, "the state can't directly dictate the terms of opposition but it can make a set of alternatives more attractive at a time." The opposition has sought to strengthen itself in response to policies of domination, turning to its own benefit the process by which "the character of the state conditions not only the terms of domination and submission, but also the ideologies and political behavior that challenge . . . it."[18]

Though the state apparently influences its opposition, the regime is not as free to shape its opponents as it might wish. Just as aspects of opposition ideology have responded to state policy, so have state policies often been shaped in response to prior opposition. For instance, the state's 1983 proposal of a tricameral parliament was in part an effort by the state to win back the "Indian and Coloured" communities claimed by BC. Legalization of black unions in 1979 acknowledged the extent of unionization already achieved.

The state's responses to opposition have not always been defensive, with the regime also having tailored its repression to the particular vulnerabilities of opposition movements. For example, BC's focus on reshaping racial identity and its

[15] This quotation, as are all subsequent ones not footnoted, is from an interview conducted by the author during more than twenty-four months of fieldwork in South Africa between 1984 and 1989. During this period, more than 150 in-depth interviews were conducted with leading opposition activists, rank-and-file members, and analysts.

[16] Lodge, *Black Politics*, 337; Friedman, *Building Tomorrow*, 153.

[17] Naidoo, "Significance of COSATU."

[18] Sam Nolutshungu, *Changing South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1982), 147.

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purposeful underemphasis of organizational structures encouraged the relatively impulsive unrest of 1976. The state was able to crush this uprising with force, only banning BC organizations a year later. In 1984 through 1987, unrest was more structured but also more dependent on access to resources and media publicity as a means of ensuring coordination. In response, the state became more sophisticated, initially using detentions, bannings, censorship, and misinformation campaigns to disrupt and divide the UDF coalition, rather than only resorting to lethal force. The state also increasingly used local clients to combat UDF affiliates and their followers, most notably by encouraging the use of violence by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's alternatively subnational Inkatha movement in Natal. By 1988, state security officials were explicitly advocating that the "governing power must adapt to revolutionary strategy and principles and apply them in reverse."[19]

Just as it must respond to opposition forces, the state has also been constrained by those social conditions which also affect its opponents. For example, reforms and the redress of material grievances have been used to quell opposition only when the state was able to generate or levy from its tax base the resources required for such reforms. With insufficient funds available during recessions in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, the state has been inclined to fall back on control through repression, relying more fully on its well financed military and less on optional social programs. During such periods of economic decline, mass unrest became more likely, adding further impetus to the state's reliance on force.

The complex nature of official policy responses to changing economic conditions reflects the particularities of the South African state. On the one hand, the state enjoys a relatively high degree of autonomy from private business interests, with total public sector expenditure itself constituting 37.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1985.[20] On the other hand, this large public sector has also made South African state policy all the more subject to downturns in the business cycle or to more fundamental economic dislocations, including the impact of international capital flight, reduced trade, and sanctions.

For all its relative ability to resist pressure from private capital, the South African state remained subject to the control of its electoral base. The white electorate's resistance to any material sacrifice aimed at appeasing blacks has been reinforced by the state's own long-standing apartheid propaganda. Pretoria is particularly dependent on its own white bureaucrats and employees of state owned firms, both as essential to state control and as a constituency comprising over 40 percent of the economically active eligible voters.[21] These functionaries may be particularly resistant to any efforts to share power with blacks, since they

[19] *The Weekley Mail*, 20 May 1988.

[20] R. P. Gouws, *The Growth of the Public Sector and Use of Privatization Proceeds in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Rand Merchant Bank, 1989), 2.

[21] Republic of South Africa, Central Statistical Service, *South African Statistics, 1988* (Pretoria: Government Printers), tables 1.11 and 1.16.

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are among those white South Africans who would be most directly affected by a transfer of political power and patronage. Their resistance to change is not necessarily contradicted by the positive results of the whites-only referendum on reform of 1992. Indeed, it is perhaps just as significant that their approval was sought at all. The autonomy the state has gained from private business interests, it has lost to its pampered internal constituency.

State efforts to head off opposition are not only limited by economic constraints and political rigidities, but also by failures to anticipate the results of its own official policies. When the state has attempted to persuade the black populace to go in a certain direction, it has often done so in a clumsy manner. Pamphlets dropped on a township by an "anonymous" helicopter, for instance, are unlikely to be mistaken for anything other than state propaganda.[22] And whatever is advocated by the state may be rejected by its opponents simply for being associated with continued oppression. According to leading BC adherent Lybon Mabasa, "government justification has damned capitalism," racism, ethnic divisions and minority domination. Rejection of these aspects of oppression are evident not only in opposition rhetoric, but also in recent efforts to build popular organizations which meet social needs and are nonracial and democratic.

As Alexis De Tocqueville warned, reforms and state leniency often backfire, as does state advocacy.[23] The South African regime initially embraced BC as consistent with the racial distinctions of apartheid, allowing the BC movement to consolidate itself and to further undermine subservience. In the hope that meeting material grievances would buy support for the government, affiliates of the UDF were permitted to organize locally during the early 1980s. Similarly, black workers were allowed to unionize through the mid-1980s. By the late 1980s, when it became obvious that the resulting organizations were using material gains to motivate further political activity, the state acted to disrupt such community and union activity. But it was then too late for the state to halt the trend toward broader opposition. As summarized by Reverend Molefe Tsele, a leading education activist associated with the UDF, "attempts at cooptation have boomeranged into increased community activism."

The space the state has given for airing grievances tends to be filled, until pressure builds against the boundaries of permitted activism. Reforms of petty apartheid restrictions, including the desegregation of various public facilities, have increasingly focused mass attention on the effective constraints of poverty. As one migrant worker explained, he may now be able to enter a shop through the same door as whites, but "I still don't have any money to buy anything." Relative leniency in the 1970s toward adherents of Marxism, then seen by the state as ineffective intellectuals, allowed for a greater circulation of radical ideas.

[22] Johan Muller, "Peoples' Education and the NECC," *South African Review 4* (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987), 25.

[23] Alexis De Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 177.

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Class analysis has since been used by the unions to focus challenges to continued political and economic oppression.

The South African state's use of repressive force deserves special attention in our consideration of the factors shaping opposition. In the short term, repression has made discussion among opposition leaders and groups difficult. Unionist Duma Nkosi acknowledges that people can be "disciplined by fear, which curtails participation." As debate is curtailed, insistence on conformity and hooliganism to enforce it, internecine conflict, and demoralization have emerged within and between opposition camps. For example, violent conflict between UDF and BC adherents exploded in the Eastern Cape stronghold of the UDF at the height of the repressive State of Emergency in 1985. Presumably, such divisive conflict was one of the results intended by state repression.

Repression in South Africa has been effective at disrupting opposition in the short term, but as repression continues it has often had unintended consequences. Prolonged repression has revealed weaknesses in current opposition activity, thereby directing and encouraging reconsideration which has on occasion led to refinements in that activity. For instance, repression after 1976 encouraged a greater emphasis on the careful organization of active mass protests than those pursued by the BC movement. Such protests emerged in the mid-1980s under the loose coordination of the UDF, with the state using more sophisticated repression techniques to try to divide the movement. In response, the UDF and the unions were pressed to address divisions within their ranks. In these instances, repression helped opposition adherents identify what they themselves had come to see as previous weaknesses and vulnerabilities in their approach. As UDF-aligned lawyer Priscilla Jana notes, "every time the state clamps down, people must reassess and find new involvement."

One of the most direct ways in which prolonged repression has encouraged reconsideration is that it has forcibly brought activists together for discussion. During the active phases of opposition, after the initial planning and before evaluation in the aftermath, such discussion is often eclipsed. For the leadership, group cells in prison have regularly provided an opportunity to evaluate achievements and to discuss their differences, undistracted by immediate pressures. This has particularly been the case for prisoners sent to Robben Island, where discussion was so prevalent that the prison is known as a "university" from which those released "graduate." Such prison meetings do not necessarily result in agreement but do often lead to greater mutual respect across ideological divisions.[24] Below the top leadership, according to UDF aligned educator Curtis Nkondo, "sending the youngsters to prison politicizes them." Even for those not imprisoned, extended repression curtails mass activity and thereby provides an ironically valuable opportunity for discussion and reevaluation.

[24] Thami Mkhwanazi, "My Years on Robben Island," *Weekly Mail*, 21 August 1987; and *The Star*, 15 April 1988.

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For all of the hardship which it brings, repression can also bring the unexpected benefits of attracting new opposition adherents and allies. In its most extreme form, police violence unifies and politicizes many through grief. The regime has isolated itself with brutality, which offends former supporters, even resulting in the emergence of open dissent within the ranks of the police.[25] Though it has been rare, the potential threat posed by such internal dissent for the viability of minority rule should not be underestimated.

More measured but constant repression through draconian laws has further helped to unify apartheid's victims in opposition to the existing political order. For instance, in the mid-1970s, one in four adult "Africans" was arrested at least once each year for technical breaches of laws applicable only to Africans, contributing to black disrespect for the rule of white-imposed law.[26] Legislation mandating black homelands and massive forced migration politicized many more, blurring the distinction between the rural and urban populations.[27] As a result, the state has increasingly suffered from not being able to isolate rural areas from opposition activity and unrest, which has most often begun in urban townships. In addition, state efforts to use education to train and to discipline black youth have provided the opportunity for students to organize themselves in schools, often used as the staging ground for unrest.[28] Limitations on black education have constrained the distribution of skills but also ensured that the undereducated poor include many talented activists who might otherwise have been mollified by personal advancement.

Both institutionalized and more draconian forms of state repression have undermined any lingering legitimacy of the South African regime in the eyes of its majority populace. The initial response to repression has often been shock, but this has usually worn off. Prolonged repression has encouraged shifts of opposition ideology, though such shifts have been consolidated only slowly. In the gap between immediate shock and long-term impact, repression has often brought greater popularity to its targets. For example, in 1988 a leading student organization argued that the "UDF being banned shows it was not a failure" and that repression of the leading union federation was a signal of its "correctness in political approach."[29] As former unionist Eddie Zwane concludes, "the harder (the state) tries, the better they make things for us. They organize for us." This

[25] Complaints against police brutality made in 1989 by Cape Town's police Lt. Gregory Rockman have been given wide publicity. See *The Weekly Mail*, 8 September 1989, 2. For a more general discussion, see D. E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

[26] John Kane Berman, *Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1978), 14; and Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 75–76.

[27] Between 1960 to 1984, over 3.5 million blacks were "removed" from their homes, most often moved from semi-urban areas to rural "homelands." See *The Star*, 16 May 1984.

[28] Colin Bundy, "Schools and Revolution", *New Society*, 1986, 53.

[29] South African Youth Congress, "Everyone and Everything for the Liberation Struggle," *COSATU Second National Congress*, 1987, 3.

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is not to ignore the human price of repression, but it does suggest that state brutality can also work against itself.

Finally, the state's military operations outside of the country have also had an impact on internal opposition. Most notably, the South African Defence Forces' image of invincibility was challenged by their inability to prevent Mozambiquean independence in 1975, bolstering popular support for BC at the time, and by the military stalemate in Angola, which helped lead to Namibian independence in 1989. On the other hand, foreign military success by Pretoria has encouraged shifts of opposition strategy. For example, South African-supported insurgency and economic pressure on Mozambique led to the Nkomati Accords of 1984, which deprived the ANC of its closest external bases. As a result, internal activists were discouraged from relying on the ANC to bring liberation from outside the country, shifting the impetus for opposition more clearly to the internal unrest which had begun the following year.

Though the consequences of state policy or repression are often unintended, there is no doubt that the state does play an important role in shaping its opponents. As the object of opposition activity, the state has considerable power to set the terms of struggle, both shaping the ideological focus of the opposition and providing opportunities for consolidating that focus. But the state is itself subject to economic constraints and obliged to respond to its own constituents and to new challenges, just as such factors also shape the opposition. An exclusive focus on the role of the state would not be able to account for these various interactions.

Economic Pressures on the State and its Opposition

The history of South African opposition during at least the 1970s and 1980s suggests that economic advancement has fed the desire for material gains, rather than having shifted attention to more radical demands. Material gains are only likely in times of economic growth, and it is precisely during such periods that demands for further gains have appeared likely to succeed and proved worth pursuing. During these periods, economic growth has also provided the state with resources with which it has attempted to appease rather than repress opponents. The state's confidence during such periods is further indicated by an easing of restrictions on foreign funding for various community service projects, such as legal advice offices and educational programs. Such gains and the relaxation of repression in the early 1970s and early 1980s were used by opposition groups to consolidate their organizations and to recruit additional supporters. Though this pattern invites analysis, we shall also see that economic trends alone cannot account for specific opposition responses.

In periods of relative prosperity, opposition activity has been more limited to an activist elite, which has often called for reforms that do not risk disrupting further economic gains. Between 1969 and 1974, South Africa continued to enjoy

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a period of unprecedented growth based on continued mining and the maturation of a modern manufacturing sector. This growth enabled and encouraged a dramatic increase in black university enrollment from 3,915 to 11,013 nationwide.[30] During this period, the BC movement focused on removing racial barriers from the paths of this relatively privileged elite of black students and of the emerging black middle class, in part to set an example of black self-reliance.

From 1977 into the early 1980s, when the economy had recovered from its decline and the oil price shocks of the mid-1970s, community groups that would later form the UDF were pressing for redress of local and material grievances. According to the UDF's Popo Molefe, these "grassroots organizations" taught "skills of organization and democracy," while giving people "confidence that through their united mass action they can intervene and change their lives on no matter how small a scale."[31] Similarly, skilled workers in South Africa joined unions in the 1970s to press for a greater share of the economic benefits of industrialization, avoiding wider political engagement. As unionist Kaiser Thibedi acknowledges, this pattern suggests a "danger of economic privilege leading to less political participation."

The pattern of black South African responses to economic growth and the use of service projects and material incentives by opposition groups to gain adherents suggests a strong degree of mass pragmatism. In contrast with activist elites' more conceptual analysis of state policy, "analysis by the masses," is described by the activist Reverend Geoffrey Moselane as being "based on bread and butter issues, not on intellectual analysis." Though such descriptions of the masses by activists are not necessarily accurate, Moselane's description of mass pragmatism is consistent with the narrowly focused grassroot protests which emerged in the early 1980s. In addition, popular political allegiances have often been determined by which group can provide resources or appears strongest and therefore most likely to be a profitable association later on. For example, many followers of the UDF acknowledge that the provision of direct services by affiliates of the Front formed the initial basis for their loyalty to UDF ideals. According to a UDF supporter among the squatters in Katlahong, "if they didn't have money, that would be a big problem." Again, it is unclear how representative such motivation is, though a wide adherence to such pragmatism would not be surprising in a society where there is much deprivation and, by state design, little education to prepare the rank and file to respond to more sophisticated ideological motivations.

South African activists may have responded pragmatically by taking advantage of economic growth or resources, but the response to economic downturn has often been much more widespread and passionate. South Africa contains millions of marginally urbanized and impoverished people who are relatively integrated into the modern industrial economy, if not directly through wages, then by their

[30] Republic of South Africa, *South African Statistics, 1988*, Table 5.11.

[31] Popo Molefe, "Responses to State Strategy" in National Union of South African Students, *Beyond Reform: The Challenge of Change* (Cape Town: University of Cape Town, 1983), 28.

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dependence on the wages of others. These people have no cushion to fall back on in hard times and are highly vulnerable to economic shifts reflected most directly in higher prices for corn "mealies" and other foodstuffs on which they depend.[32]

Anger over increased material hardship has exploded during economic downturns in South Africa, contributing to the unrest in 1976-1977 and 1984-1987. These periods of unrest came in the wake of major recessions and were aggravated by worldwide economic downturn and by the inefficiencies, expenses, and constraints on an internal market peculiar to apartheid. There is an obvious parallel between these events and instances of relative deprivation leading to revolt in other countries.[33] As a more specific example, the start of unrest in 1984 was triggered by protests in the Transvaal against rents that had increased by 400 percent since 1977.[34] Deprivation and economic shifts alone do not explain the focus of such militancy, but these economic conditions did feed into and exacerbate the processes that initially created a volatile population.

Responses to economic conditions have not only followed short-term trends but also varied according to the socioeconomic position of those involved. The small black middle class, fearful of losing its advantages, has been less adversely affected or radicalized by economic downturn. During periods of relative growth, this sector's efforts for greater political rights were highly influential. Migrants and the urban working class are both more volatile and particularly vulnerable to economic decline, during which their willingness to follow reformist leadership has decreased. For these more deprived groups, as one worker in Soweto explains, "mealie meal is politics here. We have no other politics." Tom Manthata, a close associate of Archbishop Tutu, concludes that "if there are no issues, people are led by the middle classs. But if there is general dissatisfaction, then leaders are forced to follow the masses." Economic shifts appear to have altered the militancy and the influence of the middle and working classes, but they have only marginally affected the truly destitute, including rural poor who continue to grow or barter barely enough to survive.

Economic determinants of opposition activity also include the impact of long-term structural transitions. Industrial growth throughout the second half of this century has fundamentally altered South African society and the opportunities for opposition activity. Between 1960 and 1980 alone, the number of black South

[32] Jeremy Keenan and Mike Sarakinsky, "Black Poverty in South Africa," *South African Labour Bulletin*, 12 (May/June 1987): 110–12; Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, *Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), 17 and 91; and Baruch Hirson, *Year of Fire, Year of Ash* (London: Zed, 1979), 125.

[33] "The Coincidence of Recession and Socio-Economic Protest" in Centre for Policy Studies, *Policy Perspectives 1989: South Africa at the End of the Eighties* (Johannesburg: Penrose Press, 1989), 164. For a more general discussion of such patterns, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).

[34] Mark Swilling, "The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt," *Work in Progress* 49 (September 1987): 29.

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Africans living in urban areas increased dramatically, from 4.9 million to 9.2 million, excluding illegals, at the same time that those working in manufacturing plants grew from 479,200 to 1,085,500.[35] These trends have expedited mass communication and popular organization among blacks, while bolstering their bargaining position in economic relations. Businesses needing to attract and retain more skilled black labor reduced the overall ratio of white to black wages from 5.8:1 in 1970, to 4.3:1 in 1979, with such gains attracting larger numbers into then legalized black unions.[36] The increasing concentration of South African business, with 80 percent of the shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange controlled by four conglomerates in 1986, has also impelled efforts toward a matching organization and unity among unionized workers seeking further material gains.[37]

Since the mid-1980s, unrest, resulting capital flight, and population growth have squeezed the economy. South Africa's average per capital GDP between 1981 and 1986 fell dramatically by 2.1 percent annually in a period when the same measure of the United States economy grew by 2 percent.[38] In 1987–1990 the South African economy continued to decline, further diverging from the pattern of other western economies, which until the early 1980s it had tended to follow. International economic pressures, including sanctions, contributed to this trend, though such measures have been most often implemented following the outburst of violent conflict within South Africa, rather than having preceded or directly caused such conflict. The economic decline of the 1980s encouraged a shift of union activism away from material demands that were no longer being met to political protest. By 1987, politically motivated, nationwide work stoppages dramatically outnumbered industrial action for wage gains, as the total number of lost worker-days and multiplant strikes rose accordingly.[39] Continued economic decline has also contributed to widespread militancy beyond the ranks of the unions, for instance among migrant workers living in hostels.

Both short- and long-term economic trends appear to be an important influence on the immediate goals and mass activity associated with opposition. Though the ideology of activist elites was strongly influenced by state policy, the immediate tactics of mass action have been more fully shaped in response to the daily experience of economic conditions. At the same time, economic trends alone cannot explain the content or preferred strategies of the movement. Growth has tended to encourage more reformist strategies of opposition, though the student

[35] Republic of South Africa, *South African Statistics, 1988*, Tables 1.6, 1.7, 7.4.

[36] "South Africa: The Union Factor," in *Africa Confidential*, 7 July 1982, 2.

[37] Robert Davies, "Nationalization, Socialization and the Freedom Charter" (University of York Conference Paper, 29 September to 2 October 1986), 7–10.

[38] Republic of South Africa, Central Statistical Services, *South African Labour Statistics, 1988*, 485.

[39] *SA Barometer* 1 (8 May 1987): 68; *South African Labour Statistics*, 465; Eddie Webster, "The Rise of Social Movement Unionism, 186-7; *Indicator SA* 5 (Autumn/Winter 1988): 72–3.

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mobilization of the BC movement and the organization around local grievances by what became the UDF were distinct strategies. Mass militancy has erupted with some regularity during periods of economic decline, though the outburst of unrest in 1976 differed considerably from the more organized protests of the mid and late 1980s. Economic changes alone cannot account for such important variation. We must look beyond material causes and influences of the state into the processes and tensions internal to the opposition itself.

Self-Determination of the Opposition

Economic conditions and state policy play an important role in shaping the form of opposition tactics and ideology. But a discernable pattern of responses to the economy and state has depended on there being a coincidence in how opposition leaders and scattered followers experienced, understood, and acted upon such factors. Distinct strategies have been pursued by opposition groups, ranging from BC's efforts to spread its ideology to the organized protests of the UDF and the strikes of the unions. Such patterned responses by large groups over time suggest some commonalties in the developing sensibilities, preferences, and receptiveness of potential opponents of the state. Their self-determination as the focal point for interpretation of new conditions must be central to any explanation of the shifting forms of opposition.

The focus of analysis here shifts from material conditions to the more subjective aspects of individual and historical development. Transitions in opposition ideology and strategy cannot be fully understood if we ignore the thought processes, discourse, and agency of those who perceived a need for, argued for, and implemented such new approaches. The importance of such intentions becomes clear once we recognize that many of the leaders and followers of each of the successively popular opposition tendencies have been the same people. Most of the students politicized by BC went on to help form the United Democratic Front and black unions. The path of activists' development has shaped their interpretations of experience and their varied responses to material changes.

In part, individual opponents of the state have altered their views and activities in response to the changing social conditions discussed above. Ideologies and strategies effective under one set of conditions were often perceived as less effective when those conditions no longer existed. Opposition members have attempted to identify and build on past achievements and sought to redress failures. In assessments of past strengths and weaknesses, economic downturn has been an important form of "cruel teaching," just as "premature uprisings" crushed by the state have contributed to "how people learn," as described by Neville Alexander. In accord with Alexander's assumption that "freedom will only come when we have matured enough to seize it," this learning process based on past failures is essential to the further development of opposition.

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Opponents of the South African regime have not simply responded mechanically to new conditions, but have also been guided by historical developments and by a desire to direct such developments to their advantage. Activists have consciously sought to build on past achievements, for instance by using the inspiration of BC as a foundation or as a "launching pad," according to one young activist, making possible later mobilization under the UDF. By extension, according to a squatter at Tekoza in 1988, "if the UDF fell down, we would decide on a new organization. We will change our ideas." The development from one approach to another has often been motivated by perceptions of how the opposition can become more effective by inspiring and organizing a broader and stronger base of support. For instance, the BC movement's focus on inspiring racial assertiveness contributed to the highly charged outburst of unrest in 1976, but provided an insufficient organizational structure for maintaining mass protest. The local community groups that emerged in the early 1980s and came together to form the UDF learned the lesson of BC's organizational shortcomings. These groups organized boycotts and formal protests throughout the mid-1980s, for which there was no direct parallel in 1976.[40] Such organizational achievements and growth of the opposition to date suggest that much of the reasoning about how to redirect its development has been sound. The continued cruel teaching of failures and the occasional reversion to previous strategies indicates that interventions in the development of the opposition have been neither infallible nor unilinear.

Analysis of how new social conditions have been interpreted and new approaches formulated confirms that the development of the opposition has been anything but a neatly progressive process. For instance, even before the 1976 Soweto uprising inspired many to seek a new approach, there were considerable debates within the BC movement as to the need for more class analysis and better organized mobilization.[41] Steve Biko, the founder of BC, recognized the need for "more careful planning" of future protests before he was killed.[42] The UDF succeeded at providing such a greater level of mass organization, though in the process of building the most inclusive coalition possible, the Front sacrificed a degree of ideological cohesion for which it was widely criticized. The union movement has been plagued by debates over how much to subordinate its class analysis and economic agenda to the political leadership of the ANC.[43] Each of these debates has contributed to the formulation and growth of a new opposition approach, but also failed to convince others who remained adherents of BC rather than of the UDF or who have resisted ANC influence over the unions.

[40] Swilling, *United Democratic Front*.

[41] Anthony W. Marx, "Race, Nation and Class-Based Ideologies of Recent South African Opposition," *Comparative Politics* 23 (April 1991): 313–328.

[42] Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 148.

[43] Allan Fine and Eddie Webster, "Transcending Traditions: Trade Unions and Political Unity" in South African Research Service, *South African Review 5* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1988).

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Varying interpretations and responses to changing social conditions, alterations in opposition ideology and strategy, and disagreements over how to influence further historical developments all form a part of the attempts of the opposition to learn from experience. Many of these shifts and debates have been concentrated or initiated in urban townships, where the opportunities for education, discussion, and analysis are greatest. Former BC activist Mamphela Ramphele believes that such factors contribute to people becoming confident "enough to identify past mistakes as part of a learning process." Recent transitions within the opposition can be understood as the result of such a learning process, at least as much as the outcome of internecine conflict.

This learning process has not been free of uncertainty, conflict, and missteps, for such experiences have often been the most educational. Interpretations of new conditions have been highly subjective, as indicated by the tendency of opposition actors to swing between excesses of optimism and pessimism. For instance, the expectations of imminent victory in the midst of unrest in 1985 and 1986 were replaced by extensive defeatism in 1988, by which time even the low-level organization of the street committees had been disrupted by police action. As a general rule, new phases of opposition have often begun cautiously and become more grandiose or intolerant of alternative approaches as pressures have built for a transition of ideology and strategy.

Activist elites have played a particularly prominent role in the assessments, debates, and efforts to redirect the historical development of the South African opposition. In the disillusionment after high points of militancy and repression, it has often been the more educated and steadfast who became most quickly involved in reappraisal and consolidation of the next phase of opposition. Such elite reappraisal has often been shaped by theoretical discussions and reading, as indicated by BC's evocation of Frantz Fanon or unionists' references to Karl Marx. International trends and experiences, as interpreted by elites who travel and have foreign contacts, have also been influential. In addition, leading activists had earlier and closer contact with officials of exiles groups, such as the ANC, and used the propaganda of these groups to convince others to adopt specific positions. Of course, the influence of activist elites was constrained by the difficulties of dissemination under oppression and by the elites' own ambiguity and multiple messages.

The influence of opposition elites is indicated by the degree to which ideologies, rhetoric, and organizational priorities developed by the elite have been adopted more widely by the rank and file. Emerging activist elites have responded to changes in social conditions by seeking to consolidate new conceptions of opposition, which have become highly salient and evident in distinct forms of collective action. Black Consciousness leaders' focus on individual racial assertiveness transformed the language and mood of opposition in the 1970s. Leaders who then sought to mobilize "group action (that) is more effective than individual actions," embraced nonracialism in recognition that "black awareness is only part

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of national consciousness," of which whites are also a part.[44] The growth of black trade unions is a testament, in part, to the influence of those activists who argued for looking "at our struggle not only in terms of color interests but also in terms of class."[45] In each of these cases, the idioms of race, nation, and class have been redefined to mean different things at different times, with each suggesting a distinct "repertoire of strategies" popularly pursued.[46]

As influential as leaders may have been, shifts in the form of opposition have also been constrained by resilient mass symbolic loyalty to particular individuals, groups, or tendencies. Most people in South Africa, according to a union official, "don't want to live or die for any one grouping." But practical concerns do not preclude people from also having loyalties, often attached to symbols such as the ANC's Freedom Charter and long-jailed leader Nelson Mandela, or less commonly to the PAC. Such loyalties have often been inherited through family ties and lifetime associations, picked up through friends, and encouraged by organizational activities or press reports. The ANC's heightened guerrilla activities in the late 1970s and mid-1980s demonstrated the ANC's ability to physically confront the regime at a time when the BC movement was engaged in internal debates. As a result, the ANC was able to take advantage of popular disaffection from BC.[47] For the masses, the influence of personal connections and public activities have been reinforced by the momentum of a groundswell of popularity and by the desire not to be left out of the mainstream of opposition activities. For some, loyalty to a particular opposition group can be a very practical issue, given the possibility of ostracism or physical attacks against those seen in any one location as dissenting from the prevelent tendency.

To a large degree, mass disinterest in the fine points of ideological debate reflects a pragmatic concern with practice over theory. The ANC's nonracialism (that is, its inclusion of whites) has had widespread appeal, perhaps less because of any theoretical defense than because of the practical advantages of being allied with whites who can provide resources and some degree of protection. Similarly, the South African Communist party's insistence on a two stage struggle, in which economic issues are postponed until after democracy is achieved, has the practical appeal of setting a more achievable immediate goal.

The other major factor limiting shifts in mass opposition loyalty is the fairly strong consensus among black South Africans about certain ideals shaped by the common experience of multifaceted oppression. For example, out of the experience of pervasive and institutionalized racial discrimination, the South African opposition has long been committed to an idealistic vision of overcoming

[44] *SASO News Bulletin* 1 (June 1977): 3 and 8.

[45] Ibid., 2.

[46] Charles Tilly, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750–1830" in John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., *The Dynamics of Social Movements* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1979).

[47] Tom Lodge, *Black Politics*, 340; *The Weekly Mail*, 11 March 1988.

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all forms of racism. This consensus on nonracialism as a goal, however, has not fully resolved the debate between those who argue for consistently nonracial means and others who favor the BC strategy of racial separatism during the struggle for a nonracial state.

Consensus on goals, if not strategies, has grown beyond the principle of nonracialism. Particularly in the 1980s, minority domination encouraged a widespread popular desire for democracy. Extreme exploitation encouraged varying levels of commitment to redistributing wealth. For instance, a 1985 poll of urban blacks found a remarkable consensus of 80 percent favoring a nonracial democracy and 77 percent favoring socialism over other options, with support for democracy and socialism often coinciding.[48] Activist elites appear reticent to attempt to alter this popular preference for socialism in light of the recent experience of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, preferring instead to reinterpret socialism as no longer necessarily implying a command economy.

Just as the ability of leaders to influence followers should not be exaggerated, so the constraints on shifts of the opposition posed by popular commitments has not been absolute. There are always doubts to be addressed, further experiences to be integrated, and remaining ambivalence. For instance, racial identity and anger toward whites coexist with personal attachments, respect, envy, or fear of whites. As a result, a future transition of popular beliefs away from the principle of nonracialism is not impossible. Indeed, the Pan Africanist Congress is currently positioning itself to benefit from just such a transition.

Ambivalence has not been limited to political issues but is also evident in the arena of the economy and related class issues. Alliances with business have been embraced for the resources these provide, though the same business people have been resented for profiting from apartheid. Capitalism is still viewed with suspicion, though people often want the benefits capitalism can provide and have only a vague notion of what a socialist alternative would look like. Even leading unionists have wavered between advancing their members' interests within established economic relations and urging sacrifices as part of a challenge to those relations. Debate over which of these approaches should be given priority has reverberated within the union movement throughout its growth in the 1970s and 1980s.[49]

The interplay of elite influences with mass pragmatism, loyalty, and ambivalence has been a major factor in determining shifts of opposition ideology and strategy. Both leaders and followers have attempted to identify the lessons of experience in order to refine and strengthen opposition effectiveness through the development of improved strategies. Such efforts at directing the development of opposition strategy have not been consistently effective nor progressive in a

[48] Mark Orkin, *Disinvestment: The Struggle and the Future* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), 50, 52.

[49] Anthony W. Marx, "South African Black Trade Unions as an Emerging Working-Class Movement," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27 (September 1989): 383–400.

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single direction or toward a single goal. But this development has been very much a conscious process, with adjustments debated and assessed with considerable energy.

The Pattern of Recent Opposition and its Implications

An overview of transitions in South African opposition during the 1970s and 1980s suggests that explanations of such shifts cannot be reduced to a single category of determinants. Structural and more volitional factors have interacted to shape such outcomes in a recognizable, if not absolutely predictable, pattern. Ideological goals have partly reflected the current focus of state policy with overt discrimination provoking racial assertiveness, parliamentary reforms raising the issue of political dispensation and thereby encouraging national mobilization, and limited material concessions encouraging further worker organization. Less confrontational tactics have been more often used to pursue such goals during periods of economic growth, with militancy erupting more often during economic downturn. State policy has itself also been shaped by such economic trends, with a reliance on repression more likely during recession, though neither state policy nor opposition tactics can be explained according to economic factors alone. Opposition responses to both the economy and the state have been guided by the conscious efforts of leadership, international influences, long-standing loyalties, and popular beliefs, all of which have been reflected in identifiable repertoires of strategy.

Interplay of these various factors will continue to shape the opposition confronting South Africa's established order in the future. However, the complexity of past patterns of opposition development makes it difficult to project these patterns into the future. The landscape of literature on the South African conflict is littered with unfulfilled predictions. Previous efforts at analysis that focused exclusively on the state were fundamentally flawed by their simplifying assumption that opposition activities were either constant or irrelevant to the outcome of the conflict. But the necessary addition of analysis of the opposition increases the difficulty of prediction. The important role of varying interpretations and other aspects of self-determination only adds to our appreciation of the subjective elements, which have and will continue to shape the opposition.

Projection of analysis of the past into the future is made even more difficult by the degree to which events in the 1990s have altered some of the preconditions on which our analysis of past patterns has rested. Historical developments, such as those sketched below, have simply overwhelmed the previous logic of key actors in the South African conflict, including the state and the ANC.

Periods of economic downturn have in the past reduced the state's capacity to appease its opponents, resulting in an increased dependence on repression. While repression continues, on-going economic dislocation caused by unrest, investors' fears, and remaining sanctions has not led the South African state to abandon

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its current reformist approach toward negotiations. In part, this disjuncture can be explained by Pretoria's fears that instability will continue and that investors are unlikely to return, as they have in the past. With no foreseeable economic recovery ahead, the state is threatened with heightened international pressure and even greater economic dislocation if existing opportunities for reconciliation are lost. Under this pressure, President F. W. deKlerk's government has entertained the possibility of agreeing to a new constitution giving a constrained electoral role to "Africans" before the next scheduled election. Such a policy would free the state of its own electoral constraints and fortify it against the unprecedented division of the white populace engendered by recent reforms.

The ANC has been subjected to similarly unprecedented pressures to accept Pretoria's overtures for resolution. The former Soviet Union is no longer able to continue to fund the ANC's military operations. This development has also undermined Pretoria's previously questionable assumption that fear of a Soviet advantage in the region ensured continued support from the West. In addition, the ANC may have been pressured by fear that its internal popularity, based in part on symbolic loyalty to Mandela and other recently freed leaders, would be threatened if no resolution were achieved during the lifetime of this older generation. Pressure from the white right wing and from the relatively conservative Inkatha movement has already helped to disrupt the current negotiation process. All of these factors combined in 1992 to give both the ANC and the state a sense that resolution could be reached only "now or never." Such a denouement itself invalidates many of the past patterns of political action.

But as much as historical developments may have interrupted overarching patterns of past activity by the state and its opponents, specific aspects of those patterns may still hold and help to indicate future possibilities. Having long advocated and fostered popular demands for a nonracial, unitary democracy, neither the ANC nor its allies can now abandon these basic principles without risking the confusion or alienation of their followers. These principles cannot be easily reconciled with the state's continued support of violent homeland clients and its commitment to group rights as a means of protecting white interests, suggesting a lack of common ground for frequently stalled negotiations. At the same time, economic dislocation continues to evoke mass militancy, which has already exploded beyond levels generally conducive to negotiations. If these conditions lead to further mass militancy, the resulting conflict may be sharpened by the spread of union-style organization and class consciousness, linking national political issues to material demands that the state cannot meet.

Mass deprivation, combined with the raising and then frustrating of public expectations of a negotiated settlement, has created a highly volatile situation in South Africa. As the state's reformist approach and negotiations have wavered, the opposition faces a potential division between the ANC leadership, continuing to push for a resolution through compromise, and its less patient followers. Still weakened by long years of repression and exile, the ANC may then have further difficulty controlling the populace, its own militants, or other more radical

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groups. Under Nelson Mandela's active leadership, the ANC and its allies must therefore prepare for the possibility of even more violent conflict and meet the people's demand for self-defense, while continuing with negotiations. Their immediate challenge will be to allow a contained level of mass militancy, which strengthens their bargaining position, while pressing the state to limit further escalation of violence, which would foreclose the possibility of a relatively peaceful resolution.*

* The author wishes to acknowledge comments on earlier drafts from Theda Skocpol, Henry Bienen, Jennifer Hochschild, Mark Orkin, Jeffrey Herbst, Kay Warren, participants in the "Culture and Conflict" seminar at Princeton University, and in the Committee for Research on Political and Social Organization at Harvard University. Financial support for this research was provided by the Princeton University Center for International Studies and by the John T. and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation.

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Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective

SCOTT MAINWARING

Until the 1980s, most analyses emphasized the similarities of political parties throughout Latin America. More recent scholarship has argued that this perspective is misleading.[1] Parties have been central political actors in some countries (Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela) and less important in many others. Even where parties have been less important, their nature can differ in significant regards, as can the reasons for the relative subordination of parties.

This point is important, because many of my arguments about Brazilian party development resemble, on first appearance, conventional—and often mistaken—wisdom about the nature of parties in Latin America. Many analysts portray parties throughout all of Latin America as weak, but this characterization is somewhat misleading in its own right and draws attention away from the singular nature of party fragility in Brazil. The first half of this article argues that the underdevelopment of political parties in Brazil is exceptional in Latin America and on a world scale. Endowed with the eighth largest capitalist economy in the world, Brazil still lacks enduring parties that effectively represent civil society.

[1] Among many examples, see Liliana De Riz, "Politica y partidos. Ejercico de análisis comparado: Argentina, Chile, Brasil y Uruguay," *Desarrollo Económico* 25 (January 1986): 659–662; Scott Mainwaring, "Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone," *Comparative Politics* 21 (October 1988): 91–120.

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The second half of the article explores the causes of this party underdevelopment, focusing on the past decade.[2]

During more than two decades of military rule (1964–1985), Brazilian society was transformed in fundamental ways. The society that emerged was more urban, more industrial, more organized—features that led some astute observers to conclude that the chances for creating a more modern, fluid political system were good.[3] These transformations of the social structure and organizational network could augur relatively well for party development over the long run, but in the short run the Brazilian party pathology has reasserted itself. In the recent (post-1985) democratic period, the catch-all parties have disintegrated, and retrograde forces have prevailed, creating doubts about the viability of democracy.

Many of the problems in party development in the new democratic period can be traced to conjunctural issues: the incompetence of President José Sarney; the economic crisis; and the unique features of the Brazilian transition to democracy, which only in 1989 culminated in democratic elections for president and which had disruptive effects on the major parties. A fundamental argument of this article, however, is that beyond these temporary problems four enduring features of the Brazilian political system create obstacles to party building. First, because of abject poverty and extremely limited information about the political system, dozens of millions of Brazilians do not participate effectively in the political system. Dependent upon the state for their survival, these people look to politicians for clientelistic mediations that make viable the parties of the state that still dominate the political scene. Second, the consolidation of a state with massive intervention and regulatory powers means that the bureaucracy, rather than representative institutions, has the decisive weight in the political system. The major parties remain dependent on the state. Third, the combination of presidentialism and a fractionalized multiparty system makes party building difficult. Finally, the Brazilian political class has consciously opted for weak parties. This option is reflected and institutionalized in party organization and in electoral legislation.

Assessing Party Development, 1979–1989

Compared to parties in the other more developed countries of Latin America and even in some countries that are less developed than Brazil, Brazilian parties stand out for their short duration. Table 1 provides evidence for this point, and it does not even include changes that have occurred because parliamentary representa-

[2] I specify this focus on the past decade because the causes of party underdevelopment have changed over time. The continuation of a condition does not always mean that its causes are constant. Nevertheless, I believe the factors that I identify as obstacles to party development in the current period also obtain for the 1946–1964 period.

[3] See Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, "A Pós-Revolução Brasileira" in Hélio Jaruaribe, et al. *Brasil, Sociedade Democrática* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1985), 223–335.

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TABLE 1

Distribution of Congressional Representatives by Party

Party	February 1987	September 1987	January 1990	October 1990	Year Founded
PMDB	305	235	200	153	1966
PFL	134	125	108	103	1984
PDS	37	34	32	35	1966
PSDB	0	48	61	72	1988
PDT	26	28	35	43	1979
PTB	19	29	26	32	1979
PT	16	16	16	17	1979
PL	7	7	19	13	1986
PDC	6	13	17	22	1986
PCB	3	3	3	3	1922
PC do B	3	5	6	6	1962
PSB	1	6	8	10	1985
PRN	0	0	24	34	1989
Others	2	10	15	24	post-1985
Total	559	559	570	570	—

Source: Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo, "O Quadro Partidário e a Constituinte," *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política* 1 (March 1989): 94–95; *Folha de São Paulo*, 14 January 1990; *Folha de São Paulo*, 29 October 1990.

tives have switched parties since November 1986. The discontinuity in parties from the previous democratic experience to this one is remarkable. Only two of the seven parties that have at least 2 percent of the representatives in the current congress have existed since before 1979, and these two (PMDB and PDS) date back only to 1966 and with different names—MDB and Arena. A PDC and a PTB existed before 1964, but they bear little resemblance to the current parties with the same names. (See Table 2 for a glossary of party initials and party names.) The abrupt changes in party systems are equally notable. Since parties first emerged in the 1830s, Brazil has had seven distinct party systems (1830s until 1889, 1890s until 1930, 1930–1937, 1945–1965, 1966–1979, 1979–1984, 1984–present) with sharp changes in the number of electorally significant parties from one system to the next.

On these two dimensions, the contrast to most Latin American countries is noteworthy. The two large parties in Colombia and Uruguay have existed for 150 years, and the two large Argentine parties for 100 and over 40 years, respectively. With the important exception of the Christian Democrats, the major parties in Chile have existed for between 50 and 130 years. Party systems in these four countries and also in Costa Rica, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Honduras exhibit considerable continuity and stability. This comparison gives one rough indicator of the historic fragility of Brazilian parties, but in itself says relatively little about their present situation.

In 1979, the military government imposed an end to the two-party system it

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TABLE 2

Glossary of Party Initials and Party Names

PCB	Brazilian Communist Party. Follows the Soviet line.
PC do B	Communist Party of Brazil. An Albanian oriented party.
PDC	Christian Democratic Party. In contrast to Christian Democracy parties in many countries, the Brazilian party is on the right end of the political spectrum.
PDS	Social Democratic Party. Despite its name, the PDS is another conservative party. It provided the partisan support for the military regime.
PDT	Democratic Labor Party. A populist party with predominantly social democratic tendencies.
PFL	Party of the Liberal Front. Created in 1984 by dissidents of the PDS, the PFL is a conservative party.
PL	The Liberal Party. A conservative party known for its antistatist discourse.
PMDB	Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement. The PMDB's precursor, the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) was created in 1966 as the official party of opposition to the military regime. It was renamed the PMDB in 1978. Since its inception, the PMDB has been an extremely heterogeneous party, but its hegemonic group is centrist, although many conservatives have flocked to the party in recent years.
PRN	Party of National Reconstruction. A center-right party created in 1969 as a vehicle to enable Fernando Collor de Mello to run for president.
PSB	Brazilian Socialist Party. An independent leftist party
PSDB	Party of Brazilian Social Democracy. Created in 1988 by a dissident group of the PMDB, the PSDB follows the line of social democracy.
PT	The Workers' Party. A heterogeneous leftist party, ranging from some revolutionary groups to social democrats.
PTB	Brazilian Labor Party. A predominantly center-right party.

had introduced fourteen years earlier. Revisions in electoral laws in 1981 and 1985 and the erosion of the military government between 1983 and 1985 led to important changes in the party system between 1979 and the present. Nevertheless, these changes did not imply a complete rupture in the party system, so it is meaningful to take 1979 as a beginning point for our inquiry. This means that the parties have had well over a decade to establish themselves. In some recent cases of democratization (Portugal, for example), ten years was sufficient time for the consolidation of a democracy in which parties play a central role in political life.[4] What has happened in the Brazilian case? What kind of parties are emerging? How do the parties bode for democracy and for the representation of popular interests?

In addressing these questions, it is important to avoid positing a specific kind of party or party system as necessary for the effective functioning of democracy. Because of the well known counterexamples (United States, Canada, Costa Rica,

[4] See Thomas Bruneau and Alex Macleod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986).

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Venezuela), it would be misleading to imagine that democracy requires highly disciplined and programmatic parties. In any case, the emergence of party systems dominated by strong (that is, disciplined and programmatic) parties of the type described by Robert Michels and Maurice Duverger is unlikely under current historical conditions.[5] This point is important because, as Fábio Wanderley Reis has argued, sometimes the problem of Brazilian parties is incorrectly identified as a lack of clear ideological positions, with the ideological party systems of Western Europe serving as an implicit reference point.[6]

Even from a minimalist perspective, however, the difficulties of Brazilian party development in the post-1979 period are notable. Many of the cliches about parties in Latin America—clientelistic, dependent on the state, little impact in formulating public policy—are partially misleading when applied to the other more developed countries of the region; but they are generally true in the Brazilian case. The following pages examine this ongoing fragility of parties by analyzing three crucial relationships that disaggregate the parties' functions in the political system: party and state; party and civil society; and party and politicians, especially congressional representatives. The third issue, which involves consideration of party organization and internal process, has generally been neglected in studies of Latin American parties, but it is important.

Let us first consider the relationship between parties and the state. Those in power continue to use the state apparatus to form—and deform—political parties. For most analysts, parties represent civil society, but the Brazilian reality is often otherwise. Through a variety of mechanisms the state continues to interfere with and even control a broad range of party processes: party affiliation, voting behavior of parliamentary representatives, party sympathies and affiliations of mayors and deputies. By using the state apparatus to ensure or deny access to jobs, resources, promotions, and favors, state leaders (even when they are originally recruited from political parties) control the political parties that support the government. To some extent this is true in many democracies, but the magnitude of the problem in Brazil is exceptional.

Party membership is often stimulated and even coerced by the state apparatus as a way of strengthening the position of those who control the state. In exchange for joining the party in power, poor people win vouchers for milk and promises that they will get on a list for public housing. Politicians provide jobs to community organizers who deliver enough party members. People may even be paid in subterfuge ways from state resources in order to secure party affiliations, and

[5] Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Dover, 1959); Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Metheun, 1954). Even in Western Europe, parties have tended to become somewhat less programmatic and disciplined since Michels and Duverger wrote their classic studies.

[6] Fábio Wanderley Reis, "Partidos, Ideologia e Consolidação Democrática" in Fábio Wanderley Reis and Guillermo O'Donnell, eds., *A Democracia no Brasil: Dilemas e Perspectivas* (São Paulo: Vértice, 1988), 296–326.

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they may be threatened with losing their jobs if they do not deliver. Obtaining a certain number of party affiliations may win an individual a promotion within the bureaucracy. Community groups can win sewer lines, electricity, pavement for the streets in the neighborhood, or other services if they deliver enough signatures for the party.

The use of state favors to promote party membership is an important tool in winning internal party control. Local party conventions are restricted to members of the party; whichever individual or faction can get the most people to the party conventions wins control of the local party. Whoever controls the party at the local level will be able to win the nomination for mayor—a decisive post because of local patronage possibilities. More important, local party conventions determine who the delegates to the state convention will be. The state delegates in turn exercise the decisive voice in determining candidacies for governor, vice-governor, senators, and federal and state deputies, as well as deciding the composition of the state directorate and executive committee. The state delegates also vote to determine the national delegates, who elect the National Directorate and candidates for vice-president and president.

Indicative of how effective the use of the state apparatus can be in securing control of the major parties is the fact that after the May 1988 conventions, all twenty-two PMDB governors controlled the party in their states. This control cannot be attributed to their popularity among the electorate, because most of the governors had terrible reviews in public opinion surveys. In 1988, widespread use of the state apparatus to obtain control of the party occasioned the departure of some of the party's most renowned figures, who claimed that it was impossible to fight back against the disloyal competition of the state machinery.

Among the more developed countries of Latin America, Brazil also stands out for the degree to which the state manipulates resources to influence the party affiliations and voting behavior of politicians. The survival of most politicians depends on their ability to deliver goods to the regions they represent. Mayors, governors, state secretaries, ministers, heads of governmental agencies and firms, and presidents use this fact to pressure politicians into supporting their lines and in some cases even into changing parties. Access to state favors lubricates many changes of heart. An egregious case of using the state machinery to purchase support occurred during the Sarney government. Sarney built his coalition not through party politics, but through extensive repartition of the state apparatus. Many politicians need no such pressure; they actively seek to join the government party, regardless of what it is. Thus, a two-way process draws legislators to support executives: the latter use sticks and carrots, the former are drawn to those who hold power.

The use of state resources is so decisive in party processes—both internal struggles and competition among parties—that we can speak of parties of the state. By this I mean that Brazilian parties are formed by the state as much as they are by civil society and that they represent interests in the state as much as

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they represent civil society.[7] Despite the sharp differences in the party systems, the catch-all Brazilian parties resemble the Mexican Institutionalized Revolutionary party (PRI) in their symbiotic relationship with the state. Nowhere else among the more developed countries of Latin America does the state play such a decisive role in party formation.

Thus, it is not just that parties were formed by the state, as Maria do Carmo Campello Souza compellingly shows.[8] Decisive party processes—joining the parties, becoming delegates, determining which factions of the parties are dominant, voting in congress, and voting for representatives among the general population—are still greatly influenced by the state apparatus. This state influence over party processes has deleterious effects on party building. It has undermined parties as agents of political decision making in congress; support is bought and sold, rather than determined along party lines. Such practices have contributed to a depoliticization among the population, both by creating a negative view of politicians and by generating pessimism regarding the prospects for political change. It has reduced major parties to agents of the state, which distribute state resources in exchange for political compliance.

The major parties' lack of autonomy vis-à-vis the state is also apparent in the parties' weak influence in formulating programs and policies. Even if one agrees with Leon Epstein, as I do, that the importance of the programmatic and decision-making functions of political parties is often overstated, the catch-all Brazilian parties are singularly anemic.[9] None of the major parties wrote programs for the 1986 elections or even for the constitutional assembly, precisely the kind of event that usually occasions party programs and internal programmatic debates. The PMDB has not rewritten its party program since 1981, when it was an opposition party in an authoritarian regime and when social democrats had hegemony within the party. Since then, it has become the largest party in a period of civilian government. More conservative politicians now dominate the party, and yet the party has not bothered to revise its program.

Perhaps more revealing than the parties' lack of concern with updating programs is their limited influence in formulating policies. The influence of parties in the decision-making process is generally limited to the fact that politicians

[7] My distinction between "parties of the state" and "parties of civil society" bears some parallel to the dichotomy Simon Schwartzman established between cooptation and representation. See his "Representação e Cooptação no Brasil," *Dados* 7 (1970): 9–41. "Parties of the state" should not be confused with parties that have statist practices or programs. I am using the concept to refer to parties that are to a considerble extent created by the state apparatus, are controlled by the state, and whose continuing existence depends on the use of state resources to secure support in civil society. Parties of the state do have linkages to civil society, but they tend to be constructed through clientelistic mechanisms rather than through representation of organized groups. Parties of the state have been a fundamental pillar in a pervasively elitist political system.

[8] Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, *Estado e Partidos Politicos no Brasil (1930 a 1964)* (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1976).

[9] Leon Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 261–350.

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TABLE 3

Spontaneous Party Identification

Q: Which political party do you prefer?	
PT	11.7%
PMDB	9.9%
PDT	5.3%
PFL	1.9%
PDS	1.5%
PTB	0.8%
Others	1.0%
Total number who mentioned a party	32.1%
No preference	65.7%
No answer	2.2%

Source: IBOPE Survey, June 1988.

name a wide range of bureaucrats and policy makers. Given the size of the bureaucracy and the inordinate number of patronage positions, this kind of influence is significant. The problem is that the nominations are almost always individually determined rather than made by the party. In fact, what is occurring is a private appropriation of the state apparatus rather than an increase in parties' influence in the decision-making process. I interviewed several top level members of the various economic teams of the New Republic, as the post-1985 regime is commonly known. They almost all reported that no politicians debate policy matters with them, but that countless had come to request personal favors for themselves or for friends and relatives. One dissented slightly from this affirmation and noted that several politicians had come to discuss interest rates; but these politicians were either personally in debt or were supported by entrepreneurs who were. In brief, most politicians do not even attempt to affect macrodecisions within the bureaucracy except through appointing friends and relatives to policy-making positions.[10]

There is also evidence that parties have comparatively weak penetration in civil society. By international standards, levels of party identification in Brazil are very low. Table 3 shows levels of spontaneous party identification according to a June 1988 survey of 500 people (100 per city) in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, and Curitiba. The rise of independent voters with no fixed party attachments is common to most western democracies,[11] but the signifi-

[10] The limited policy-making capabilities and interest of Brazilian deputies is not dissimilar to that in France described by Ezra Suleiman, *Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 285–315. But in France, the bureaucracy is highly insulated from deputies. The Brazilian bureaucracy has historically been divided, with some domains reserved for patronage politics and others insulated from the same. In the 1980s, according to both the politicians and bureaucrats I interviewed, the insulation of public administrative with respect to patronage politics eroded sharply.

[11] There is considerable literture on this subject. A good overview is Russell Dalton, "Cognitive

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TABLE 4

Party Preference in the City of São Paulo (in percentages)

Party	*April 1985*	*June 1985*	*September 1985*
PMDB	46	54	34
PT	14	10	13
PTB	3	6	8
Other parties	11	11	9
No preference	26	19	36

Source: Datafolha surveys, each with 1,000 respondants.

cance of this phenomenon is not uniform. In Brazil, it reflects not a questioning of old, well established institutions, but rather the failure of new ones to develop minimal roots and attachments in civil society.

Party identification has decreased sharply since the days (1974 to 1978) of a two-party system with plebiscitary elections. As Bolivar Lamounier and Maria Judith Muszynski have argued, this fact in itself is neither surprising nor worrisome.[12] With a two party system, it was easier for the electorate, most of which has extremely limited access to political information, to retain the names and diffuse identities of the parties. The plebiscitary character of elections—for or against the military government—during the two-party system also facilitated higher levels of party identification. What is more troublesome is the erosion of levels of party identification since 1985, a process that suggests disaffection with the major parties.

For most of the electorate, party affiliations are not significant in structuring the vote. Surveys conducted by the prominent newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* in the city of São Paulo in 1985 indicated that the PMDB was overwhelmingly the preferred party among the electorate, as Table 4 indicates. (In contrast to the survey cited in Table 3, which measured spontaneous party identification, the *Folha* survey gave a list of parties and asked which one the person preferred.) Contrary to what might be inferred from the information on party preference, the PTB candidate won the November 1985 election for mayor in São Paulo, defeating the PMDB candidate by three percentage points and the PT candidate by almost a 2 to 1 margin.

The limited extent to which parties structure the vote (especially for executive positions) was equally apparent in the 1989 presidential election. The eventual winner, Fernando Collor de Mello, created a new party so he could run for president, and he frequently denigrated parties and politicians throughout his campaign. The second place finisher was from the PT, which had only 3 percent

Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies," *Journal of Politics* 26 (February 1984): 264–284.

[12] Bolivar Lamounier and Maria Judith Muszynski, "A Eleição de Jânio Quadros" in Bolivar Lamounier, ed., *1985: O Voto em São Paulo* (São Paulo: IDESP, 1986), 1–31.

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of the congressional representatives. Conversely, the candidates of the two largest parties fared dismally, winning only 4.4 percent (PMDB) and 0.8 percent (PFL) of the vote. Parties that won 82.7 percent of the Chamber seats in 1986 accounted for only 6.2 percent of the presidential vote in 1989.

The extraordinary electoral volatility of the 1980s also reveals the inability of parties to win enduring allegiances. Mogens N. Pedersen's index of electoral volatility shows the percentage of seats (or votes) that changed hands from one election to the next. It can be calculated by adding the percentage (as an absolute value) of change in each party's share of seats from one election to the next and dividing by two. From 1982 to 1986, the index in Chamber seats was 42.5 percent, and from 1986 to 1990 it was 38.6 percent. So the mean volatility for these two electoral periods was a staggering 40.6 percent. Pedersen's calculations for thirteen Western European democracies for the 1948–1977 period provide one indicator of how extreme Brazil's electoral fluctuations have been. The country with the highest average volatility was France, with an index of 16.8 percent—well under half the Brazilian index. The period average for the 103 election periods in the thirteen nations was 8.1 percent, or about one-fifth the Brazilian mean.[13] The average volatility in the Weimar Republic (18.8 percent, again measured in votes), long considered a paradigmatic case of electoral instability, was also less than half the volatility in Brazil.[14]

Repudiation of parties and politicians is also suggestive of the parties' weak penetration in society. The IBOPE survey of 500 residents of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, and Curitiba, carried out in June 1988, asked the question, "Recently, many people and organizations have attempted to show the Brazilian people the real situation of the country. For each person and/or organization I mention, please tell me if you think they have always told the truth, told the truth more than lied, told more lies than the truth, or always told lies." The responses suggest generalized cynicism, but the credibility of politicians is especially tarnished; it is the lowest of all the major actors in Brazilian society, lagging far behind that of most others. The credibility of parties and politicians has fluctuated sharply since March 1985, peaking during the euphoric days of the Cruzado Plan (the stabilization plan of 1986) and plummeting since then. To some degree a parallel disenchantment with democratic institutions has occurred

[13] Mogens N. Pedersen, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977: Explorations in Explanation" in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 29–66. The comparison is slightly uneven because Pedersen's data are in votes, and it is difficult to obtain the information needed to calculate the Brazilian index in votes. Nevertheless, at the state level Brazil's system of representation is highly proportional because of high district magnitudes and the use of the largest remainders method of assigning additional seats. Consequently, the volatility in votes and seats usually differs only slightly.

[14] W. Phillips Shively, "Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case," *American Political Science Review* 66 (December 1972): 1221.

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TABLE 5

Credibility of Institutions, Organizations, and Individuals (in percentages)

	Always Tells the Truth	*Usually Tells the Truth*	*Usually Lies*	*Always Lies*	*N.A.*
Politicians	0.8	4.4	51.1	41.2	2.5
President Sarney	4.5	17.4	35.7	36.6	5.8
Cabinet Ministers	1.2	10.3	43.9	37.4	7.3
Catholic Church	24.1	34.6	22.5	7.7	11.1
TV News	7.4	37.3	42.5	10.3	2.5
Newspapers	6.9	41.4	34.0	11.5	6.5
Labor leaders	7.9	32.8	34.6	10.2	14.5
Radio news	8.8	43.1	32.8	7.4	7.9
Entrepreneurs	2.1	17.1	40.9	28.1	11.8
Court system	5.6	23.6	36.3	22.1	12.4
Magazines	3.9	32.2	31.8	16.4	15.8

Source: IBOPE survey, 500 people, June 1988.

in other Latin American countries, but the magnitude and speed of the disenchantment in Brazil are singular.

Countless other survey questions point to a profound disenchantment with parties. For example, only 38.8 percent of respondents agreed completely or mostly with the statement, "The main parties have proposals for the country's problems," compared to 52.5 percent who disagreed completely or mostly. The level of trust in the parties' ability to handle the crisis declines sharply among middle- and high-income groups, which are generally better informed. Agreement with the statement, "The parties only want the vote of people, not their opinions," was overwhelming: 75.4 percent completely agreed, 12.7 percent mostly agreed, 5.1 percent mostly disagreed, and a paltry 3.7 percent completely disagreed.[15] This distribution of answers reveals a perception that parties are self-serving and do not represent the desires of the Brazilian population. Clearly, parties have failed in creating sympathetic public images or enduring allegiances in civil society. And not only is public credibility low, it has also eroded dramatically since the failure of the Cruzado Plan.

It is not only among the population at large that the parties have weak penetration and credibility. Linkages to social movements are generally weak and became notably more so in the 1980s. Intellectuals, who possibly have more power and influence in Brazil than any other Latin American nation, became deeply engaged in partisan activities in the late 1970s but have become disillusioned since 1986.

Finally, the major Brazilian parties hold little authority over party members, including parliamentary representatives. Perhaps the most telling indicator is the stunning frequency with which Brazilian politicians change parties. The 559

[15] IBOPE survey, 100 citizens in each of five major cities (São Paulo, Rio, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Recife), 10–13 June 1988.

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representatives of the 1987–1991 legislature belonged to an average of over three parties per politician.[16] The extraordinary degree of party switching in recent years is suggested by Table 1 above, which compares the number of congressional representatives per party for four dates during which there were no congressional elections; all of the changes in the size of congressional delegations resulted from individuals who switched parties. Using only these four dates, there were at least 197 cases of party switching among federal legislators between February 1987 and October 1990. As of 1987, seventy-two congressional representatives of the PMDB previously belonged to the party's arch-enemy (Arena and later the PDS) under the military government.[17] After 1982, when the opposition won state elections in nine states, many politicians identified with ARENA and the PDS flocked to the side of their former opponents, joining the PMDB. There are differences in ideologies, practices, and social bases among the parties, but these differences are sufficiently diffuse that politicians of different stripes and colors can accommodate themselves within several parties.

Most politicians see parties as vehicles for getting elected, not as organizations to which they owe an attachment. The three ideological parties of the left (PT, PCB, PC do B) are exceptions to this generalization, but together they have under 10 percent of the representatives in the federal congress. Many individual politicians in other parties have programmatic commitments, but the parties themselves do not. As a result, politicians with programmatic commitments lack strong attachments to their parties. Politicians change parties at will, using the parties as vehicles to get on the ballot, but with generally limited allegiance to the party. Some politicians in the current congress have belonged to as many as six parties. Because of the high turnover in the Chamber of Deputies (the average turnover from one election to the next is about 60 percent), relatively few politicians have lengthy careers in congress, making the high number of party memberships all the more notable.

This practice of changing parties regularly is unheard of in the other more developed countries of the region. In several countries, party identities are relatively strong and consistent, especially on the part of activists and politicians. In Uruguay, where parties are notoriously loosely organized, the dispute between Colorados and Blancos, the two traditional parties, has sharply divided the country's political elite. Politicians who changed parties would face virtually insurmountable difficulties in getting reelected. In Argentina, even though parties have generally not been central actors in political life, party cleavages defined

[16] This is a rough approximation that underestimates the actual number of parties per representative. I compiled information on number of parties from three main sources: Câmara dos Deputados, *Assembléia Nacional Constituinte—1987*; special editions on the Constitutional Congress of the *Folha de São Paulo*, 19 January 1987; and the *Correio Brasiliense* (Brasília), 20 January 1987. These sources did not register all party changes, and there have been many changes since their publication.

[17] David Fleischer "Perfil Sócio-Econômico e Político Constituinte" in n. a., *O Processo Constituinte 1987-88* (Brasília: Agil-UnB, 1988), 29–40.

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political life in sharply polarized terms (Peronists versus anti-Peronists) for decades. Despite mordacious internal squabbles, the Radicals and Peronists have a sense of party discipline unheard of among the Brazilian mass parties. In Chile, party identities not only historically dominated political life, but also penetrated many other aspects of social life in a highly politicized society. In Venezuela, although the two major parties are relatively nonideological, party discipline and cohesion are extremely strong. In all four countries, the relationship between parties and politicians is radically different from what one finds in Brazil. The Argentine, Uruguayan, and Venezuelan cases illustrate, as does the United States, that it does not take ideological parties for politicians to develop a strong allegiance to parties.

Frequent party switching undermines one of the fundamental pillars of liberal democracy, namely the notion of representation. Citizens may help elect a representative, but the mechanisms of accountability between the population and the politician are tenuous at best. People may vote for an individual partially influenced by his or her party affiliation, only to have the representative switch to another party after the election. Perhaps no other feature so radically distinguishes Brazilian mass parties from those in the other more developed countries of Latin America as the extremely weak commitments of politicians to party organizations.

Nor were party affiliations the central axis in structuring the debates and votes of congressional representatives in the constitutional congress of 1987–1988. The PMDB was badly divided on almost every controversial issue, and the PFL split on most of them. Table 6 summarizes the voting by party on important issues in the constitutional congress. The table records information for those issues on which the *Folha de São Paulo* recorded how representatives voted. I excluded two issues on which all of the major parties came to a prior agreement; in these cases, there were no more than a couple dozen dissenting votes.

As Table 6 shows, only two of the six parties that had at least 2 percent of the representatives in the constitutional congress were minimally cohesive. With the rare exception of an occasional abstention, the PT demonstrated remarkable cohesion, and the PDT also manifested considerable internal cohesion. The other parties were highly divided on the most important issues, as is reflected in the Rice Index of party cohesion, shown in the bottom row of Table 6.

On most controversial issues, the PFL leadership was in the minority within the party, and a large fraction of the PMDB also voted against the leadership. Rather than parties, supraparty fronts dominated the constitutional congress. The PDS, the PTB, most of the PFL, about half of the PMDB, and some minor parties formed the conservative Centrão, while the PT, PDT, the other half of the PMDB, and some minor parties formed the Bloco Progressista. This formation of supraparty blocks was particularly noteworthy in the constitutional convention of 1987–1988, but it is nothing new in Brazilian history. In the period between 1961 and 1964, the fundamental cleavages in congress revolved around such blocks rather than parties.

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TABLE 6

Voting by Party on Controversial Constitutional Issues (% of votes that supported (+) and opposed (−) the winning position)

Issue	*PMDB*	*PFL*	*PDS*	*PDT*	*PTB*	*PT*	*Total %*	*Total N*
Popular participation*	+59	+14	+15	+92	+32	+100	+48	(227)
	−41	−86	−85	−8	−68	−0	−52	(248)
Unrestricted property	+66	+15	+12	+92	+32	+100	+51	(248)
rights	−34	−85	−88	−8	−68	−0	−49	(236)
Guaranteed job stability	+73	+93	+94	+4	+42	+0	+71	(373)
	−27	−7	−6	−96	−58	−100	−29	(151)
Exclusive labor	+91	+43	+46	+92	+91	+0	+77	(340)
representation	−9	−57	−54	−8	−9	−100	−23	(203)
Presidential system	+49	+85	+61	+96	+63	+100	+62	(344)
	−51	−15	−39	−4	−37	−0	−38	(212)
Five-year presidential	+55	+86	+68	+8	+70	+0	+60**	(298)
mandate (general)	−45	−14	−32	−92	−30	−100	−40	(198)
Economic order	+69	+19	+29	+93	+41	+100	+57	(279)
	−31	−81	−71	−7	−59	−0	−43	(210)
National monopoly of	+80	+40	+36	+100	+89	+100	+73	(343)
Mineral resources	−20	−60	−64	−0	−11	−0	−27	(126)
Agrarian reform*	+36	+84	+86	+15	+68	+0	+49	(253)
	−64	−16	−14	−85	−32	−100	−51	(268)
Sarney's mandate	+61	+86	+70	+7	+64	+0	+62	(323)
(5 years)	−39	−14	−30	−93	−36	−100	−38	(202)
Cancelation of debts	+64	+66	+72	+94	+80	+0	+64	(286)
for contractors	−36	−34	−28	−6	−20	−100	−36	(163)
Rice Index***	33	58	47	86	41	100	—	—

* In these cases, the winning position had fewer votes than the losing position, but the latter failed to muster the 280 votes needed for approval.

** Incomplete totals.

*** Average Rice Index of party cohesion for the eleven roll call votes shown on this table. The Rice Index is calculated by taking the percentage of party members voting with the majority of the party, subtracting the percentage of members voting against the majority, and multiplying by 100 (that is, dropping the percentage sign). See Stuart Rice, "Measuring Cohesion in Legislative Groups" in John Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), 372–377.

Source: Compiled from information published in the *Folha de São Paulo* on the day following the indicated votes. Those who were absent or abstained are not included in the tabulations.

Organizationally, the large parties in Brazil are fragile. Party organs such as the Executive Committee have fairly broad powers on paper, but in practice meet rarely and decide even less. The situation in some European countries, in which representatives have limited autonomy vis-à-vis their parties and can even lose their mandates for failing to follow the party line, is anathema among the large Brazilian parties. This situation further undermines the significance of party platforms, since the representatives have no obligation to follow them. It could

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be countered that this situation is also true in the United States, and that U.S. parties have on balance served American democracy rather well. But the lack of party cohesion in congress is notably more pronounced in Brazil than in the United States, and one could logically suppose that a multiparty system would offer more, not less, cohesive parties.

Parties have few financial resources and few party volunteers. They have comparatively little control over who becomes a member, how politicians vote, what they do, and who gets elected. Brazilian parties are singularly loose organizations, designed to permit politicians to operate in a free wheeling fashion. The major parties lack cohesion; local disputes between political bosses, rather than ideological or political questions, frequently determine party affiliation. All of these points are true not only with respect to the strong parties of most European democracies, but also with the loosely organized agglomerations of many Latin American nations.

This battery of information about the functions of parties in the Brazilian political system could be expanded, but this should suffice to establish the main contours. The significance of any one of these measures as an indicator of party fragility could be questioned, but collectively, I think they provide a compelling portrait. Brazilian parties continue to have limited autonomy vis-à-vis the state, weak roots in civil society, and few controls over their representatives.

Causes of Party Underdevelopment

Many observers would agree with these broad characterizations of the fragility of Brazilian catch-all parties, although some disagree. What is more controversial and less obvious are the causes of party underdevelopment. In what follows, I address this issue, focusing specifically on the post-1979 period and prospects for the future. The discussion focuses on several structural features of the political system that have impeded party development and that are likely to continue acting as barriers to party building in the medium term. Because of space considerations, I do not analyze the impact of conjunctural factors, party leadership, or party strategy on institution building. Nevertheless, a complete analysis would necessarily take these factors into consideration.

This discussion of structural causes of party underdevelopment is necessarily elliptical. I present four main arguments, each of which could be expounded upon at considerable length. None of the four obstacles to party development is unique to Brazil, but in every instance the Brazilian case stands out as unusual. The four obstacles reinforce each other, creating a unique constellation of problems. The causal effects between weak parties and these four factors is not unilinear, but rather mutually reinforcing. For example, weak parties have helped sustain extreme social inequalities in addition to being a product of a society marked by such inequalities.

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TABLE 7

Levels of Interest in Politics

Level of Interest in Politics	*Class A and B*	*Class C*	*Class D and E*
High interest	22.2%	18.4%	6.0%
Medium interest	31.3%	21.8%	17.2%
Little interest	17.2%	12.8%	21.9%
No interest	29.3%	46.6%	53.3%
No answer	0.0%	0.4%	1.7%
N (total = 500)	129	157	214

Source: IBOPE, 500 interviews, 10 to 13 June 1988, in five major cities–São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Curitiba, Belo Horizonte.

Social Inequalities and the Electorate

Political parties simultaneously reflect and shape the nature of civil society, and they respond to and shape public opinion. For this reason, it is important to analyze the nature of civil society and of public opinion and how they affect party development.

Even though Brazil's aggregate level of modernization places it among the leaders of the Third World, some features of its civil society help explain party underdevelopment. Arguably no country that has reached Brazil's level of development is characterized by such egregious inequalities. In 1985, according to a government report, 20 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty, surviving (when it managed to) on less than one-fourth of the government-established minimum salary per person, equivalent to about $10 per capita per month. According to 1980 income distribution data, the top 10 percent of the population earned 50.9 percent of national income, while the bottom half earned only 12.6 percent.[18]

These extraordinary social inequalities have simultaneously resulted from and sustained a political system in which the masses have little impact. The scores of millions of Brazilians who live in abject poverty cannot participate effectively in the political system. Among this part of the population, political information is extremely rudimentary, and dependence on the state apparatus—and clientelistic politicians—for favors is considerable.[19]

[18] A "minimum salary" refers to a wage fixed by the government but does not imply that all individuals make that much or more. An ample part of the work force makes less than 1 minimum salary. The minimum salary is not fixed in real terms: it has eroded by about 60 percent since 1958. As of this writing, one minimum salary is equal to about $60 per month. The data comes from Brazil (unspecified governmental agency), "Plano de Metas: Sustentação do Crescimento e Combate à Pobreza, 1986–1989" (Brasilia, n.d.); José Serra, "Ciclos e Mudanças Estruturais na Economia Brasileira do Pós-Guerra" in Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo and Renata Coutinho, eds., *Desenvolvimento Capitalista no Brasil* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983), vol. I, 64.

[19] For an elaboration of this theme, see Fábio Wanderley Reis, "O Eleitorado, os Partidos e o

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As Philip Converse and others have made clear, most citizens in most democracies have limited information about politics.[20] Yet Brazil is an extreme case; the level of citizen information, interest, and participation is far lower than in Argentina or Uruguay, not to mention the developed democracies. This fact becomes apparent through countless measures of citizen participation and information. To begin with, a high percentage of Brazilians state that they are not interested in politics. When asked to self-classify their interest in politics, 14.0 percent state that they are very interested, 22.3 percent express medium interest, 17.8 percent express little interest, and 45.0 percent state that they have no interest. As is often true, interest in politics increases among higher income groups. In Table 7 Classes A and B are medium and high income groups, and classes D and E are the lowest income groups.

Surveys indicate widespread skepticism about the impact of political participation upon government. An IBOPE survey of 5,000 people conducted in June 1987 asked three questions about citizen attitudes about political participation. Interviewers asked whether people agreed or disagreed with the statement, "This country is in the hands of a few powerful individuals and a citizen like me can't do very much." Seventy-two percent of respondents agreed; only 15 percent disagreed, 10 percent had no opinion, and 2 percent did not respond. The survey then asked for responses to the statement, "The government really pays attention to what people like me think." Only 29 percent agreed with this statement; 60 percent disagreed, 9 percent had no opinion, and 2 percent did not respond. The third statement was "I feel increasingly powerless about what is happening in the country." Seventy-one percent of respondents agreed, only 18 percent disagreed, 8 percent had no opinion, and 3 percent did not respond.

Levels of awareness and political information are very low. From March 1987 until September 1988, news about the constitutional congress filled the media. Every week day, all of the television channels carried two fifteen-minute programs dedicated to the constitutional congress. Information about the constitutional congress also filled regular news programs on the television and radio as well as newspapers and magazines. Yet only a small percentage of the population knew what the constitutional congress was. In a survey of 5,000 people from all over Brazil conducted in May 1987, IBOPE asked the question, "Do you know what the National Constituent Assembly Is?" Only 6.1 percent could answer well, 24.9 percent more or less knew the answer, 66.7 percent did not know, and 2.3 percent did not respond. Among those whose family income exceeds 10 minimum salaries, 16.6 percent could answer the question well, compared to a meager 1.9 percent among those whose family income was under 2.5 minimum salaries.

Regime Autoritário Brasileiro" in Bernardo Sorj and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, eds., *Sociedade e Política no Brasil pós-64* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983), 62–86.

[20] Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics" in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206–261. Converse's seminal article has been criticized and debated from many perspectives. Some analysts have argued that he overstated how limited

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IDESP's electoral surveys have requested people to classify the main political parties from 1 to 10 on a right to left spectrum. Only a minority of people can do so, indicating either that they do not understand these fundamental labels of politics, or that they do not know enough about the parties to attach these labels to them, or, most likely, both of the above. In the 1982 survey, only 29.1 percent of respondents in the city of São Paulo ventured an answer for the PDS, and 28.6 percent for the PMDB. Figures for other parties were yet lower. Many of those who did answer the question gave replies that do not match well with reality. 12.7 percent of the respondents gave the PDS a ranking of 1 to 5 on the scale, assessing it to the left of center. 29.0 percent considered the PMDB a leftist party (1 to 3 on the scale), and another 16.6 percent viewed it as a rightist party (8 to 10 on the scale). Of course, a person could have considerable political information and come up with a heterodox interpretation of a party's ideological positions. However, if we cross this question with information on education, we find that less educated people were more likely to come up with the heterodox answers, making it likely that the answers reflect positions not well reasoned, but rather a lack of information about the parties or lack of understanding about the concepts of right and left.

Inconsistencies in opinions among the electorate abound. Surveys in the first half of 1988, for example, showed that in the city of São Paulo, PT sympathizers preferred Silvio Santos to the PT's own candidates by a hefty margin. Silvio Santos is an enormously popular television personality known for his conservative political viewpoints and authoritarian personality. If he had run for mayor, it would have been on the PFL or PDS ticket or an alliance of Brazil's two large conservative parties. The overwhelming preference among PT sympathizers for Silvio Santos would inevitably have declined sharply as the campaign progressed and as the party's own publicity got under way. Nevertheless, it is revealing that in Brazil's most industrialized city, ideological structuring is so diffuse that a conservative TV personality won support among the sympathizers of the country's major leftist party.

A vast segment of the population votes according to extremely diffuse images or for personal favors. This characteristic of the electorate limits the viability of parties with a sharp ideological profile that campaign largely on the basic issues.[21] The population is receptive to individualistic and populistic campaigns; these predilections in turn favor nonideological, populist parties. The major political mediations with the popular classes take place through individual politicians and state agencies. Most of the electorate is indifferent not only to issues, but also to parties. The party affiliation of politicians may be important in enabling them

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citizen information was, and most agree that the electorate is more informed now than it was at the time of his research.

[21] See Reis's previously cited articles, "O Eleitorado, os Partidos e o Regime Autoritário Brasileiro"; and "Partidos, Ideologia e Consolidação Democrática."

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to gain access to the state agencies, but it is generally unimportant both to the clientele and the patron.

The counterpart to the fantastic social inequalities is the extraordinary heterogeneity of the society. This is clearest in contrasting the wealthy and poor poles of the society, but it is also apparent within social classes. The working class, for example, is marked by a vast heterogeneity that helps explain the sharp divisions within the labor movement. These divisions make it difficult, if not impossible, for a political party to serve as the partisan channel of the working class.[22] The European situation, in which socialist, labor, or social-democratic parties served as the electoral expressions of the working-class movement, is almost impossible given such intraclass heterogeneity.

The State

In her pioneer book on the state and political parties in Brazil, Campello de Souza argued that the state has exercised a decisive impact on party formation. Criticizing those who had seen the fragility of Brazilian parties as resulting from the nature of the country's political leaders, she argues that the problem derives above all from the relationship between parties and the state. She states her main argument succinctly: "The existence of a centralized state structure *before* the emergence of a party system constitutes, in itself, a difficulty for the institutionalization of the party system and a stimulus to clientelistic politics."[23]

As Souza and others have argued, historical patterns of state formation and interest representation are crucial because in most cases, once they are established, political institutions occupy spaces in the political system that usually foreclose later radical changes.[24] Once the major political institutions are consolidated, the actors in the political system function according to their logic. The identity of the actors is established in interaction with these institutions and other actors.[25]

This does not mean that change in political systems is entirely predetermined by the events and sequences that ushered in modern political institutions. In some countries (Venezuela, Greece, Spain, Portugal) the institutionalization of the party system occurred late historically, but parties have still emerged as central political actors. Conversely, in a few cases, early developments appeared favor-

[22] For an extensive discussion of this point, see Margaret E. Keck, *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[23] Campello de Souza, *Estado e Partidos Politicos no Brasil*, 36.

[24] See also Hans Daalder, "Parties, Elites, and Political Development in Western Europe" in Joseph LaPalombara and Marion Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 43–78.

[25] For an interesting elaboration of this traditional theme, see James March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984): 734–749.

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able to party formation and consolidation, but later events aborted the institutionalization of parties as major actors. In Argentina, the emergence of a competitive political system with fairly broad participation occurred fairly early, 1916 being a key turning point. A high standard of living, a high level of urbanization, and considerable popular participation all could have favored party development. Beginning with the 1930 coup, however, this potential was consistently aborted.

From the vantage point of spaces occupied in the political system, the expansion of the state apparatus during the military regime creates renewed barriers to party development. More so than the legislature, the bureaucracy constitutes the focal point of most political action. During the process of constitution writing, the congress was the focal point of all political actors, but *qua* constitution maker and not *qua* legislator. The new constitution strengthened congress's capacity to block political action (especially of the president), but congress has not become a major formulator of policies or laws. Omissive in the areas of welfare, health, and education for the masses, the Brazilian state is omnipresent in a vast array of economic and regulatory areas. This situation is inimical to party building, since it relegates parties and congress to a dispenser of patronage.

Some of this problem can be addressed by strengthening the legislative branch, a process that the new constitution, promulgated in September 1988, promises to facilitate. The new constitution will considerably expand the legislature's *de jure* authority, and hence may stimulate the parties' influence in decision-making. But optimism about the effect of enhancing congressional authority in decision making may be unwarranted.

This is so first and foremost because of the irresponsible character of much of the Brazilian political class. On the whole, it is a political class known for corruption and clientelism, and it does not always take legislative responsibilities very seriously. Clientelism has a legitimate place in politics, but in Brazil clientelistic activities have predominated at the expense of legislative functions. Even in the constitutional congress, major issues were often debated in cavalier fashion. Many politicians had a poor grasp of the issues, and the quality of debates was usually dismal.

Early this century Weber persuasively argued that where professional politicians do not have serious responsibilities in the political system, they are likely to turn to less responsible activities to compensate for their lack of real power.[26] This observation is apposite in the Brazilian case. To survive during the military period, politicians who supported the government were virtually obliged to make clientelism and patronage their primary focus. Even with the high turnover rates that characterize Brazilian congressional elections, many of these politicians have survived and thrived under democratic politics. The prevalence of this kind of politician creates obstacles to efforts to give more authority to parties and the political class. Enhancing congressional authority is necessary in view of the

[26] Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1392.

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extreme enervation of the legislature's role during military rule, but in the short run one cannot assume that the political class will make good use of its new powers.

The other compelling reason to avoid excessive optimism about greater congressional authority is that congress has become more effective in blocking presidential initiatives, but without acquiring the capacity to initiate policy measures. Interactions between the executive and congress are likely to be quite difficult given several features of the Brazilian political system: a fragmented multiparty system, a presidential system of government, and federalism. A bicameral congress reinforces the overall proclivity towards a political system predicated more upon checks and balances than upon effective or quick processing of major decisions. But conversely, the multiple crises facing a country that is self-destructing favor technocratic decision making within the executive branch of government. Add to this the enormous power of the state bureaucracy, and there are reasons why the recent constitutional changes have not dramatically altered the relationship between parties and the state.

In short, in view of the massive powers of the state apparatus, strengthening the legislature may be more difficult than upgrading its formal powers. Furthermore, it is essential to balance strengthening the legislature with maintaining a fluid, agile decision process so that Brazil can effectively confront the multiple, agonizing crises that beset the country. The political class has been acutely aware of the overshadowing of the legislature by the bureaucracy and has responded by expanding its influence within the bureaucracy. This solution, however, amounts to a private appropriation of the state apparatus and has done nothing to further party building. Furthermore, this solution has in many cases had deleterious consequences upon the efficacy of the state apparatus. Political criteria have reigned supreme; with some important exceptions, considerations of efficiency, rationality, and justice have been neglected. In view of the enormous importance of the state apparatus as an engine of economic development in the last half century, the consequences of this neglect are grave.

The problem of party building in a society in which there is such a profound gap between the development of civil society and of the state is complex. Some of the obvious solutions, such as granting more power to congress, turn out to be more problematic than one assumes. The lengthy history of weak representative institutions works against efforts to create them today. This does not imply some kind of historical determinism, but it does call attention to the importance of historical sequences and specifically to the difficulties created by late party development.

Presidentialism and the Multiparty System

In comparative perspective there is nothing unusual about authoritarian regimes taking measures against political parties. What is more unusual in the Brazilian

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case is the antiparty sentiments and actions of presidents in democratic periods (1946–1964, 1985–1988) and in the oligarchic Old Republic (1889–1930). Presidents have generally tried to govern in an autonomous fashion above the parties. To do so, they have weakened parties as a basis of congressional decision making and policy making.

The presidency of Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales (1898–1902) is the key to understanding much of the political system of the Old Republic. Campos Sales intentionally structured a political system in which parties were at most secondary actors. He strengthened the presidency, weakened congress, encouraged an extreme federalization of power, and relied extensively on the state governors for political support. Subsequent presidents followed his example, consolidating what became known as the politics of the governors, which could also have been called the politics of antiparty executives. The only attempts to create national-level political parties between 1889 and 1930 resulted in failures, in good measure because the presidents had no interest in being dependent on parties. They preferred to administer free of such fetters. With the exception of Rio Grande do Sul, which generally had two competing parties, the states all had one-party systems, with a party that functioned only in that state.

The Old Republic came to an end in 1930, but the antiparty orientation of Brazilian executives did not. President Gelúlio Vargas's (1930–1945) trenchant antiparty sentiments and actions are well known. Even before he abolished the parties in 1937, Vargas had encouraged the introduction of "professional" (Fascist-style) representation that was intended to correct the flaws of liberal (party) representation.

During the democratic interlude of 1946–1964, two presidents (Jânio Quadros, 1960–1961, and Vargas, this time 1950–1954), were unequivocal antiparty men. All of the presidents needed to muster supraparty alliances in order to govern effectively. All of them took some measures to weaken parties, and none of them bore partisan identifications once elected. Presidents have perceived parties as obstacles to realizing their objectives rather than agents for helping to achieve them. Their actions against parties and their efforts to construct a political system in which parties are not key actors have contributed to the secular weakness of parties.

President Sarney followed this lengthy tradition of antiparty presidents. Honorary president of both the PMDB and the PFL, Sarney clashed with both parties and did his best to undermine the former. A sizeable faction of the PMDB made programmatic demands inconsistent with Sarney's conservative predilections—agrarian reform, income distribution, confrontation with creditors on the external front, to name some of the most important. Another equally sizeable faction of the party made rapacious demands for positions within the state bureaucracy. Part of this latter faction was conservative, but many social democrats and radicals within the party also displayed an insatiable appetite for positions in the bureaucracy. Finally, Sarney correctly assessed that it was impossible to govern with the PMDB, given its extraordinary heterogeneity. The best he could

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do was govern with part of it and with the support of other parties as well. But doing this almost inevitably entailed confrontation with the other parts of the PMDB and ultimately triggered the president's efforts to undermine the party. At the same time, Sarney made attempts to articulate an independent base of political support. He also carried on the military government's tradition of governing by decree-laws, executive decrees that virtually bypass congress and political parties.

The antiparty actions of Brazilian presidents have been so common that it is important to ask whether there might not be some *systemic* cause, rather than individual idiosyncrasies and/or authoritarian proclivities of the various people who have occupied this position. In the period since 1945, part of the problem has stemmed from the combination of a fractionalized multiparty system and presidentialism. Under the best of circumstances, presidential systems are less propitious to party building than parliamentary systems. This is so for four primary reasons. In the first place, parliamentary systems seem generally more conducive to stable democracy than presidential systems.[27] Continuity of the democratic process is in itself a powerful stimulus to party development, because it facilitates the sedimentation of identities and practices that make parties a central axis of political life.

Second, because they are elected through a direct popular vote or an electoral college in turn dependent on the popular vote, presidents have an independent base of power.[28] In the age of the mass electronic media, presidents can make direct appeals to the population, thereby increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the parties. Presidents cannot govern effectively when they consistently face a hostile majority in congress, but they can implement some important measures despite broad congressional opposition, thereby going above the parties. In parliamentary systems, the prime minister generally has less autonomy with respect to the parties. Especially in a parliamentary system where a multiparty coalition is ruling, his/her very position directly depends on the support of the parties. Implementing major policy decisions without the support of the parties is difficult in most decision areas.

Third, as Leon Epstein persuasively argued, parliamentary systems have an incentive for cohesive—though not necessarily ideological—parties.

[27] For recent statements along these lines, see Juan J. Linz, "Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary. Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary? Does it Make a Difference* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming); Valenzuela, "Origins and Characteristics of the Chilean Party System"; Fred Riggs, "The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-Constitutional Practices," *International Political Science Review* 9 (October 1988): 247–288; Waldino Suárez, "El poder ejecutivo en América Latina: Su capacidad operativa bajo regímenes presidencialistas de gobierno," *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 29 (1982): 109–144.

[28] On this point, see Richard Rose, "Government against Subgovernments: A European Perspective on Washington" in Richard Rose and Ezra Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 284–347.

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> The individual legislators of a governing (or potentially governing) party have an entirely rational motivation for cohesion in a parliamentary system that they do not have under the separation of power. Each parliamentary vote on an important policy involves the question of whether the M.P. wants a cabinet of his party or of the opposition. . . . He knows that his own electoral fortunes would likely suffer with his party's if the party shows itself so uncohesive as to fail to maintain its leadership in office. . . . No such incentive operates with sufficient force to impel American congressmen, under the separation of powers, to be so cohesive. A congressman is able to vote differently from his party leadership . . . and he does not hurt his party in any way that is politically meaningful to him.[29]

Finally, party programs are often more important in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems. Everywhere, policy makers usually have considerable autonomy with respect to party programs, but in presidential systems, this autonomy is especially pronounced. Programs have symbolic importance, but usually have little impact on the policy-making process. Personality assumes greater weight and issues usually have slightly less.

The combination of a presidential regime and a multiparty system is especially unconducive to party building and to democratic stability. In a multiparty presidential system, governing with the parties is particularly difficult, for the president rarely has a majority in congress. Presidentialism is based on the notion of a balance of independent powers. Where the executive power is constantly thwarted by a hostile legislature, political stability is easily undermined, especially in less established democracies. And presidents will generally encounter more problems in creating a stable majority in a multiparty system than in a two-party system. In a multiparty system, it is difficult for a president to rely on parties as a basis for congressional action and policy implementation, because there are few institutionalized mechanisms that establish fluid negotiations among the parties and between them and the executive. This problem does not exist in the same way in a multiparty parliamentary system, because the parties negotiate and determine themselves the composition of the executive.

This combination of presidentialism and a multiparty system is further complicated by the strong federalist bases of Brazilian politics. Power is concentrated in the national government, but political careers are based on local or state politics. For a majority of federal representatives, having access to state resources is an essential part of representation and weighs decisively in prospects for future reelection. When it comes to ensuring that their states and regions get a fair share of the pie, they put aside party commitments and join hands. Indeed, much of the constant shuffling around of parties results from the need of clientelistic politicians to join the party in power, regardless of what it is. This means that democratically elected presidents must constantly balance an enormous range of demands, coming from different parties and different regions, as well as different

[29] Leon Epstein, "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," *American Political Science Review* 58 (March 1964): 46–59.

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interest groups. Governing in this system is difficult. Of six democratically elected presidents in Brazilian history, one president (Quadros) resigned office, and another (Vargas) committed suicide; both were frustrated with the difficulty of implementing a program. President João Goulart (1961–1964) was ousted by a coup, and President Fernando Collor (1990–1992) now faces an impeachment trial.

Party building in large nations with federal political systems always has some particular problems. The challenge of representing different regions acquires a saliency that is completely unknown in smaller nations with a centralized political system. As a result, ideological parties are usually less prominent. The United States and Canada are obvious examples, but neither country faces the additional difficulty of the combination of presidentialism and a multiparty system.

Both of Brazil's democratic experiences (1946–1964, 1985–present) have been characterized by this combination of presidentialism, federalism, and a multiparty system. Presidents have consistently responded—and are virtually obliged to do so—by attempting to govern above the parties. Governing above parties has entailed attempting to weaken them as political organizations. Winning an autonomous base of legislative support has been synonymous with using state resources to buy off politicians and with undermining parties as a basis of congressional action. Where presidents have failed to win a supraparty basis of support, despite their broad powers they have been incapable of effective action. This helps explain the peculiar combination of omnipotence and impotence that has often characterized the Brazilian presidency,[30] as well as the frequent executive actions against parties. It also helps explain why congressional action has frequently occurred along supraparty blocks, rather than being based in the political parties. In brief, the political structures of the Brazilian political system are quite complex, create obstacles to party building, and open the gates to a difficult relationship between the president and congress.

The relevance of the argument on presidentialism and multiparty systems is not limited to party building. The combination of presidentialism and multiparty systems is also unconducive to democratic stability. The vast majority of long established (twenty-five or more years) democracies in the world have parliamentary systems. The exceptions are the United States, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela. It is probably no coincidence that the first three countries have two-party systems and Venezuela has a two-and-one-half party system.[31]

[30] Despite the enormous importance of the Brazilian presidency, little good work has been done on this subject. The dominant tendency has been to emphasize the imperial powers of the presidency, an interpretation with which I disagree. For an elaboration of this argument, see Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 25, no. 1 (1990): 157–179.

[31] The authors mentioned in footnote 27 above have argued that presidential systems may generally be less conducive to democratic stability than parliamentary systems. This is especially true in the context of a multiparty system.

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Politicians

Brazilian party underdevelopment has been seen as residing largely in factors external to the parties that condition their role in the political system: private domination of the political system and of the parties, state domination of the parties, or state interventions against parties.[32] A factor *within* the parties is also crucial in explaining party underdevelopment: the relationship between politicians and parties. Many features of the political system must be understood in relation not only to the strong state but also to the power of political elites and the economic elites closely connected to them.[33] Parties are overshadowed not only by the state but also by political elites who do not want parties to become major actors in the political system.

Generally speaking, analysts of Brazilian politics have seen the behavior of politicians as a product of their environment and have not asked the opposite question: How have politicians shaped the character of the parties and of the political system more broadly? Yet politicians are not simply products of the political system in which they act; they also help to create that system. The nature (and weakness) of Brazilian parties is in part an intentional consequence of the preferences of Brazilian politicians.

The desire to create effective parties is not sufficient for such parties to emerge, but it is indispensable. Brazilian politicians have attempted to prevent more effective parties from emerging, believing that party loyalty and more disciplined parties would limit their ability to attend to their clienteles. With loosely organized parties, politicians are freer to attend to their own clienteles without being bound to programmatic concerns or organizational commitments. At least since 1930, they have intentionally maximized their autonomy vis-à-vis their parties. Politicians have helped create a political system in which they can deal in more or less independent ways, free of the fetters that disciplined parties would imply.

The antiparty prediction of politicians has been institutionalized in the ways parties are organized and in electoral legislation, ensuring that there is a strong self-perpetuating antiparty tendency. Several aspects of Brazil's party and electoral legislation have either no parallel or few parallels in the world, and there is probably no other democracy that grants politicians so much autonomy vis-à-vis their parties. This electoral and party legislation in turn reinforces the individualistic behavior of politicians. The extremely low degrees of party loyalty and discipline found in the major parties (excepting the parties on the left) are encouraged by this legislation.

[32] On state domination of the parties, see Campello de Souza, *Estado e Partidos Polticos*. On state interventions against parties, see Bolivar Lamounier and Rachel Meneguello, *Partidos Políticos e Consolidação Democrática* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986).

[33] On this point, see also Frances Hagopian, "The Politics of Oligarchy: The Persistence of Traditional Politics in Contemporary Brazil" (Ph.D dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986).

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The unusual combination of proportional representation and an open list means that parties have comparatively limited influence over which candidates stand the best chances of getting elected. In an open list system, voters choose an individual for federal and state deputy and also for municipal councilor. The party presents a lengthy list of names, but the electorate determines the order of the names. Because of this system, getting elected depends not on the candidate's links to the party, but rather upon personal effort and connections. An exceptional individualism and antiparty action result in most campaigns. The primary campaign adversaries of many candidates are *not* people of other parties, but rather other candidates of the same party. It is often easier to invade the electoral turf of a member of the same party than it is to make encroachments upon someone of another party. Finland is the only other democracy that uses an open list system, although Chile used one between 1958 and 1973. Most countries that have proportional representation give the party far greater control over the list. As Richard Katz shows, this is true even in countries that offer preferential voting in proportional elections.[34] In Brazil, the electorate chooses among an immensely long list of individuals; the election functions almost like a simultaneous primary and general election.

In campaigns, there is often intraparty solidarity between people competing for different positions, but a sharp competition prevails among people competing for a similar position (for example, among individuals running for federal deputy). Campaigns are largely financed by individual candidates, the exception being that free television time is allocated for the various parties, which divide their time among the candidates. Occasionally one finds campaign literature promoting candidates of different parties, even when these parties do not have an electoral coalition. Even the television time allocated to the parties largely promotes individual candidates rather than party. (The exceptions here are once again the three leftist parties.) The catch-all parties exercise little control over the programmatic commitments of their candidates. Indeed, they recruit politicians from adversary parties.

Limited party control over political campaigns and who gets elected means that a politician is elected primarily because of his/her own initiative. This factor, in conjunction with others, gives the representative a great deal of autonomy with respect to the party in congress. Politicians of the catch-all parties generally vote according to their own political interests and perceptions; the party has less weight. In a survey I conducted, only 31 percent of PMDB politicians and 13 percent of PFL politicians said that they vote along party lines most of the time when there is a conflict between party interests and regional or state interests.[35]

[34] Richard Katz, "Intraparty Preference Voting" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon, 1986), 85–103. For an extensive discussion of the Finnish electoral system, see Klaus Törnudd, *The Electoral System of Finland* (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968).

[35] I conducted the survey in February 1988. Of 107 total responses, 58 came from the PMDB and 23 from the PFL.

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Electoral legislation does nothing to prevent a politician from switching parties. One unique measure, revised in 1988, actually *required* politicians to switch parties if they wished to retain their mandates. Constitutional Amendment #25, approved in May 1985, stipulated that parties that failed to reach 3 percent of the total vote for the Chamber of Deputies, with at least 2 percent in five states, would not be represented in congress, but that the representatives elected from those parties would maintain their mandates as long as they switched to another party within sixty days.

The ease of switching parties accentuates individual autonomy vis-à-vis parties. It is difficult for parties to extract allegiance on controversial issues when a representative can easily change to another team if the party leadership gets too disagreeable. Although party legislation grants the parties the means of expelling recalcitrant representatives and of imposing party discipline in congressional votes, such measures are virtually unheard of. Party organs rarely meet to discuss major political questions, and even when they do, they hardly ever try to impose a given line on congressional representatives. The party outside congress has virtually no impact on voting behavior. Party programs are absolutely secondary and in any case are not binding.

Another unique characteristic of Brazil's electoral legislation that has contributed to the autonomy of politicians in relation to parties is the *candidato nato* (birthright candidate), by which any representative in a proportional position has the right to be on the ballot for the same position in the next elections. This means that a politician can violate all of the party's programmatic concerns, consistently vote against the party leadership, and still be guaranteed a place on the ballot. Moreover, a representative can change parties, become a member of a new party in any one of the hundreds of municipalities in a given state, and then invoke the right to be on the slate in the new party. Even if the state and national party leadership opposed this representative's membership and candidacy, the only way to bar the person from running would be to expel him/her from the party—a difficult and rare process among the catch-all parties.

Most analyses of electoral systems have focused on the political consequences of electoral laws. This problem is important, to be sure, but exclusive concern with this side of the issue can be misleading. The political roots of electoral laws—that is, the reason why politicians choose some laws rather than others—are as important as their political consequences.[36] In addition to representing interests, politicians have interests of their own. To further these, politicians tend to favor some kinds of electoral arrangements over others. The reason is that electoral arrangements are not neutral. They discriminate against some groups and politicians while favoring others. Electoral systems and electoral reforms may not produce the results they are intended to when they are drawn up. Almost always,

[36] For a similar point, see Dieter Nohlen, *Sistemas electorales del mundo* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1981).

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however, they are intended to help or at least to not hinder the interests of those who promote them. Altruism may exist among politicians debating electoral systems and electoral reforms, but it is not widespread.

Because of this non-neutrality, electoral and party legislation reveals interesting information about politicians' predilections. This is especially the case where electoral and party legislation is frequently revised. Where it is long standing, one might argue that electoral legislation reflects conceptions about parties, politics, and society at the time the legislation was approved, but that it no longer necessarily does so. In these cases, it might be argued that politicians accommodate themselves to electoral legislation more than they shape it. But in Brazil and other countries where electoral legislation has undergone major changes or where a new constitution has precipitated debates about electoral legislation, electoral systems register the ongoing predilections of politicians.

Even though the profoundly antiparty implications of this electoral system have been recognized,[37] the great majority of the political class continues to prefer it. This was evident in the constitutional congress, which debated and rejected alternative models of representation. It was also evident in the survey I conducted among Brazilian politicians. In the four largest parties of the 1987–1988 period (PMDB, PFL, PDS, PDT), among those who preferred proportional representation, sixty representatives preferred an open list, to a mere four who preferred a closed list system.

Why do politicians prefer legislation that enhances their autonomy at the expense of weakening parties? Part of the answer lies in the ongoing importance of regional cleavages in Brazilian politics. Obliged by electoral legislation to belong to parties that are national in scope, Brazilian politicians regionalize the parties in practice by stripping them of power over congressional representatives. Under these circumstances, politicians can belong to *de jure* national parties but represent their regional clientele without interference from the parties.

Progressive factors of the catch-all parties have been complicitous in the generalized antiparty orientations of politicians. On first impression this appears somewhat puzzling, because the individualistic nature of representation has facilitated a pervasive clientelism that helps underpin an archaic and elitist political system. Because they generally do not control the catch-all parties, the progressive factions fear that strengthening party leadership would weaken their own position in the parties. Moreover, it is common for progressives to neglect the organization building that clientelistic politicians have mastered. This is a case where individuality rationality—protecting minority spaces within the party by accepting the extremely loose organization and antiparty electoral legislation—has blocked the emergence of more desirable collective alternatives.

[37] See, for example, Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, "Os Partidos Políticos Nacionais," *Revista Forense* 157 (January-February 1955): 7–20; Bolivar Lamounier, "Partidos Políticos e Sistema Eleitoral," *Textos IDESP* 13 (1986).

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Finally, even though politicians enjoy broad autonomy with respect to their parties, they depend upon the state apparatus for survival and success. The importance of delivering material goods in securing reelection makes it difficult for many politicians to act with autonomy with respect to those who control the state apparatus. Their insistence upon not being tied down by a political party is a reaction against this dependence on the state apparatus. This reaction has a compelling logic to it: holders of executive office often dominate political parties. In a system in which political competition involves access to state favors as much as disputes among leaders with different ideological proposals, party discipline could easily imply loyalty to a regional political boss more than to ideas.

Conclusion

The constitutional congress of 1987–1988 afforded an opportunity to revise some of the historical obstacles to party consolidation and to attempt to create a more modern, fluid political system. In this sense, the new constitution is a disappointment. In the name of combatting authoritarianism, the political class adopted a thoroughly permissive electoral legislation that has led to a highly fragmented party system. The antiparty components of electoral legislation have been reinforced. The difficult combination of presidentialism, a multiparty system, and federalism was consecrated. A highly disproportional system of proportional representation was made even more disproportional; the system overrepresents the backward parts of the country and underrepresents the modern parts.[38] With respect to political structures, the constitutional process made apparent the reluctance of a majority of political elites to effect even minor changes. None of this makes impossible the consolidation of effective parties or of democracy, but it does make it more difficult. Meanwhile, the enormous political, social, and economic costs of a political system in which representative institutions remain underdeveloped continue to increase.

Although this article has focused on barriers to the emergence of parties that more effectively represent civil society, some changes in the society and the political system are propitious to party development and could in the medium run prevail over the negative aspects. Some of the factors that could encourage the creation of a more modern political system with reasonably effective representative institutions are already present in the party system itself. While it is possible to use state resources to control party conventions, it is more difficult to control the electorate in general, especially in urban areas and in southern Brazil, which have a notable tradition of voting against those in power. Parties that challenge the parties of the state are almost certain to grow. Among the parties of civil society that have growth potential are the PT, PSDB, PL, and PDT.

[38] On this point, see Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, "Disigualdades Eleitorais no Brasil," *Revista de Ciência Política* 7 (1973): 22–48.

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The current lethargy in civil society should not be confused with its traditional weakness. Urbanization, industrialization, and new collective associations and movements have markedly changed the character of civil society. Significant parts of the labor movement and the industrial bourgeoisie are calling for a new model of development and politics.

Finally, the huge Brazilian state has become increasingly crisis plagued and inefficient, an obvious fetter to modernization. This crisis of the state may prompt efforts to modernize the political system and thereby help strengthen parties that represent civil society. If a modernization of the state takes place, it will undercut parties of the state, whose existence is predicated upon the balkanization and privatization of the bureaucracy. Whether this modernization will occur is not certain, but one of the indispensable steps toward it has been taken by the constitutional congress, namely, the granting of greater fiscal autonomy to state and local governments.

The auspicious factors that favor party development leave us with a country in which political institutions remain archaic, but in which some powerful political actors are convinced of the need for political modernization. The balance for the 1990s is likely to be negative unless the forces that favor institutional reform succeed. What is clear is that the stakes are high. If the parties of the state prevail, Brazilian democracy will fail, Brazil's egregious inequalities will go untouched, and the economy will continue to falter. If more effective parties emerge, they will not guarantee the success of Brazilian democracy, but they are clearly a necessary ingredient.*

* I am grateful to colleagues at CEDEC, the Federal University of Minas Gerais, IDESP, and IUPERJ for their stimulating comments. I am also grateful to Orjan Olsen of IBOPE, Manuel Antonio Teixeira Mendes of DataFolha, and IDESP for providing information from surveys. Caroline Domingo, Margaret Keck, Guillermo O'Donnell, Timothy Power, Timothy Scully, and J. Samuel Valenzuela provided helpful criticisms.

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Decentralization of Control in U.S. Nuclear Energy Policy

CHRISTIAN JOPPKE

When President Dwight Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace in 1953, he declared that "the atom stands ready to become man's obedient, tireless servant, if man will only allow it."[1] Three decades later, a credible source ranked the civilian U.S. nuclear power program as "the largest managerial disaster in business history."[2]

The failure of American nuclear power to deliver economical and socially accepted energy has found various explanations. David Collingridge stresses the "inflexible" quality of nuclear technology itself, such as long lead times, high capital intensity, and large unit size, which rendered the political control over nuclear development impossible.[3] James Morone and Edward Woodhouse argue that at a critical decision-making juncture in the mid-1960s the dramatic scale-up of reactor sizes and the shift in safety strategy from the containment to the prevention of accidents conjured up the public debate over safety, which then undermined the viability of nuclear power.[4] In a similar historical vein, James Jasper emphasizes that the mindset of "technological enthusiasm" prevailed too long among nuclear power's industrial and political promoters, thus blocking the

[1] "Atoms for Peace," *New York Times*, 9 August 1955.

[2] James Cook, "Nuclear Follies," *Forbes*, 11 February 1985.

[3] David Collingridge, *The Social Control of Technology* (London: Pinter, 1980); Collingridge, *Technology in the Policy Process: Controlling Nuclear Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

[4] James Morone and Edward Woodhouse, *The Demise of Nuclear Energy?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

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timely intervention of economic cost-benefit rationality.[5] In a more structural thrust, John Campbell argues that the institutional fragmentation of the American polity and economy did not allow the comprehensive planning that would have been necessary for the success of the complex technology.[6]

The following analysis combines structural and historical elements, and demonstrates that at a critical juncture the decentralization of political control undermined the stabilization of nuclear power in America. While decentralized control is a structural feature of the American political system, it became a major hindrance to the implementation of nuclear power only after the accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) plant near Harrisburg, PA in 1979. In the wake of TMI, firm leadership in nuclear policy was lastingly foreclosed, public confidence reached a minimum, and electorally accountable local and state governments won more influence on nuclear regulation.

Decentralization of control obstructed the stable environment and the institutional homogeneity needed for the successful implementation of the nuclear program. The three predominant issues of the U.S. nuclear power controversy in the 1980s—emergency planning, utility rate regulation, and waste disposal—are all similar in this regard. In each case, local citizen groups formed effective alliances with local and state authorities in opposition to particular nuclear facilities or federal regulatory agencies. The three issues emerged only at the back end of the nuclear policy cycle, when considerable investments had already been made, and nonanticipated consequences springing from the high risk profile and inflexible structure of nuclear technology became salient.

The previous successes of the U.S. antinuclear movement reinforced the trend toward the decentralization of control. During the Carter administration, the movement won official recognition as a legitimate political actor.[7] President Jimmy Carter appointed many prominent movement leaders to high political offices and his opposition to commercial plutonium reprocessing and the fast breeder reactor project was in line with major movement goals.[8] These successes at the national level, along with the apparent economic decline of the industry, shifted the focus back to the concrete backyard plant at the local level, where the early citizen opposition had started in the late 1960s.[9] The crisis of public

[5] James Jasper, *Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[6] John Campbell, *Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

[7] Christian Joppke, *Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison of Germany and the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), chap. 4.

[8] Michael J. Brenner, *Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Walter Patterson, *The Plutonium Business and the Spread of the Bomb* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1984).

[9] Richard S. Lewis, *The Nuclear-Power Rebellion* (New York: Viking Press, 1972); Steven Ebbin and Raphael Kasper, *Citizen Groups and the Nuclear Power Controversy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974).

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confidence after Three Mile Island made it too costly for electorally accountable local and state authorities to ignore continuous grievances around particular facilities.

Decentralization of control did not alone cause the demise of nuclear power in the United States. Before Three Mile Island, skyrocketing construction costs, shrinking rates of energy demand, and severe political difficulties had stalled the expansion of the nuclear program.[10] But decentralization of control prevented nuclear power's recovery after TMI. In regard to emergency planning, post-TMI rule changes by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) increased the local and state leverage in nuclear regulation. The financial problems of the nuclear utilities after TMI were aggravated by the unwillingness of Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) at the state level to allow rate increases. Finally, in regard to waste disposal, the participatory thrust of the waste policy initiated by the Carter administration first of all invited local and state opposition, which turned into obstruction in the wake of the TMI-induced acceptance crisis.

Decentralization of control explains the paradoxical coincidence of a faltering national protest movement in the 1980s and continuing political difficulties in the implementation of nuclear power. The national antinuclear energy movement withered rapidly after its post-TMI mobilization high. In the early 1980s, in response to the demise of geopolitical détente, public concerns at the national level shifted from the issue of nuclear energy to the issue of nuclear weapons, and in the social movement sector the new antinuclear disarmament movement overshadowed the opposition to civilian nuclear power.[11] Yet nuclear power remained in a state of permanent siege. Alliances between local citizen groups and municipal, county, and state authorities in the fields of emergency planning, utility regulation, and nuclear waste policy wrecked newly completed nuclear plants, increased the financial crisis of nuclear utilities, and prevented the closing of the nuclear fuel cycle.

As I shall argue, the federal fragmentation of authority became both the central barrier to the economic and political recovery of American nuclear power and the nuclear opposition's major opportunity to compensate for the parallel decline of public interest in the energy issue in the 1980s. This analysis contradicts older theories of "interest-group liberalism"[12] and "corporate liberalism,"[13] which saw the American political system dominated by powerful producer interests. The case of nuclear power supports instead the more recent view that countervailing

[10] Irvin C. Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, *Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

[11] Victoria Daubet and Sue Ellen Moran, *Origins, Goals, and Tactics of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Protest Movement* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, Report No. N-2192-SL, 1985); Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, *Minutes to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989); Christian Joppke, "Social Movements During Cycles of Issue-Attention," *British Journal of Sociology* 42 (March 1991): 43–60.

[12] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969).

[13] Fred Block, *Revising State Theory* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).

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consumer and public interests have found a stable institutional representation.[14] Especially during nuclear policy implementation at the local and state levels, the fragmented and decentralized American polity proved highly permeable to nonproducer groups.[15] The fate of the nuclear industry is also a telling example of the power of American democratic institutions to thwart a project that had lost its societal legitimation.

The Impact of Three Mile Island

Some close observers have remarked that the accident at Three Mile Island did for the antinuclear movement what the Tet offensive had done for the anti-Vietnam war protests: cast doubt on the long-standing convictions of the expert proponents, spread skepticism among public supporters, and redouble the efforts of opponents.[16] The burden of proof, which up to then had rested with the nuclear critics, shifted to the promoters of nuclear power.[17] The Kemeny Commission, which President Carter created to investigate the causes of the accident, included members from a wide cross-section of society and several outspoken nuclear critics. The accident posed the fundamental question of public acceptability. "Technological enthusiasm"[18] had previously motivated the nuclear experts to compare the opposition to nuclear power with the luddism and superstitious hysteria that had accompanied the historical introduction of electricity, the power loom, or the automobile.[19] In the long run, according to this view, the deep-seated fear of the lay public would be appeased by simply accustomation or the trickling-down of the expert theory of comparative risk assessment—which states that car driving and cigarette smoking are more dangerous than nuclear power.[20] Three Mile Island made evident that the catastrophic potential of nuclear technology set it apart from other civilian technologies. Twenty years after its commercialization, public opposition to nuclear power had not been quieted; on the contrary, TMI pushed it to new heights.

TMI hit the nuclear industry in the midst of expansion, increasing the economic

[14] Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); James Q. Wilson, ed., *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980); David Vogel, *Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[15] Campbell, *Collapse of an Industry*, 73–91.

[16] J. X. Kasperson et al., "Institutional Responses to Three Mile Island," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 35 (October 1979): 1232–1238.

[17] Irvin C. Bupp, "Nuclear Power: The Promise Melts Away" in Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds. *Energy Future* (New York: Vintage, 1983).

[18] Jasper, *Nuclear Politics.*

[19] See, for instance, Robert Dupont, "The Nuclear Power Phobia," *Business Week*, 7 September 1981, 14–16.

[20] The classic statement is Chauncey Starr, "Social Benefit versus Technological Risk," *Science* 165 (September 1969): 1232–1238.

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and political turmoil in which the industry had been caught since the mid-1970s.[21] American public opinion turned antinuclear, a trend which would increase rather than decrease in the following years.[22] The antinuclear movement reached its all-time mobilization high, with a chain of mass demonstrations throughout the country. After Three Mile Island, firm political support for the faltering nuclear power sector was lastingly foreclosed. Under the attentive eyes of the public, the NRC tightened regulatory controls. No new licenses were granted for more than a year, and the NRC promulgated hundreds of new safety rules to cope with contingencies ranging from earthquakes to missile strikes. Most troublesome for the industry, private investors opted out, and the stocks of nuclear utilities dropped under book-value. The resulting financial impasses forced nuclear utilities to cancel an array of half completed plants in the early 1980s. The Three Mile Island impact of public acceptance crisis, withering political support, and financial drought made the further decline of U.S. nuclear power inevitable.

However, in the face of nuclear's self-inflicted decline, the protest movement also withered rapidly. By 1982, the movement had ceased to exist at the national level. The obvious decline of nuclear power weakened further societal mobilization. But maybe more important, the new Reagan administration's massive nuclear rearmament policy and parallel events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stirred public concerns about nuclear war, thereby marginalizing the nuclear energy issue.[23] The evening of the nuclear age finally seemed to have set; but collective anxieties and survival fears were now directed towards the threat of nuclear war, not the comparably small risk of nuclear reactor explosion. As MIT-physicist Henry Kendall, leader of the Union of Concerned Scientists and a pioneer of expert opposition to civilian nuclear energy, put it: "The dangers of nuclear power are so small compared with nuclear war. It seemed to me like a tangential issue."[24] The cultural motif of angst and survival fears shifted from the issue of nuclear energy to the related yet distinct issue of nuclear weapons.[25] The very notion of antinuclear came to denote the new disarmament movement. Suffering from the loss of its semantic identity and the shift of nuclear discourse from energy to weapons, the nuclear energy opposition disintegrated, and barely three years after TMI it no longer existed as an organized movement.[26]

[21] In March 1979, seventy commercial nuclear power plants were operating, and another ninety-two were in various stages of construction. By the same token, the impact of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 remained minuscule, because by that time the nuclear program was essentially completed, if only at greatly reduced size.

[22] William Freudenburg and Eugene Rosa, eds., *Public Reaction to Nuclear Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Christopher Flavin, *Reassessing Nuclear Power: The Fallout from Chernobyl* (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, Paper 75, 1987), 67.

[23] See the survey data presented by Tom Smith, "The Polls: Nuclear Anxiety," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52 (1988): 557–575.

[24] Quoted in Fox Butterfield, "Anatomy of the Nuclear Protest," *New York Times Magazine*, 11 July 1982.

[25] Spencer Weart, *Nuclear Fear* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

[26] Joppke, "Social Movements During Cycles."

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Citizen-State Alliances in the 1980s

In the early 1980s, energy virtually disappeared as a public concern, while there was rising concern about nuclear war.[27] Parallel to this, the opposition to nuclear power ceased to be a social movement riding on the crest of an eminent public policy conflict. The remnants, which neither joined the disarmament bandwagon nor simply disbanded, gathered under the banner of safe energy. Although nuclear power fell into the shadow of media interest and the moving social struggles of the time, it remained a subject of intense controversy. The focus of conflict only shifted to the local and state levels, where the economic, technological, and sociopolitical infrastructure of already existing nuclear power plants offered multiple targets of attack.

After all, it was concrete communities, counties, and states that had to bear the costs of badly managed, carelessly constructed, or overly expensive nuclear power plants. While the phase of nuclear expansion had come to an end, the completion of old projects became the contested stake of the day. Municipal, county, and state governments advanced as key actors, driven by the pressure of local citizen groups.

The trend toward decentralization of control should have been welcomed by the Reagan administration, which had set out on a crusade for free markets, federal deregulation, and increased state autonomy. However, in the particular case of nuclear power, the administration bracketed its ideological leanings. Besides lifting the ban on commercial reprocessing (which had been imposed by the Carter administration) and pushing for legislation to speed up the licensing of nuclear plants, Ronald Reagan encouraged massive governmental support of nuclear power, especially in the fields of waste disposal and fast breeder development. Ridiculing energy conservation as "hot in the summer and cold in the winter," he practically eliminated federal research and development (R&D) funding for solar and renewable energy sources and conservation, revoking earlier successes of the pro-solar public interest movement.[28]

However, the pro-nuclear stand of the Reagan administration did not prove strong enough to reverse the fate of the ailing industry. The free market approach removed energy questions from the political agenda, and the focus of the minimized energy policy under Reagan was on domestic oil and gas increases, not on nuclear power.[29] Skyrocketing development costs and technical difficulties forced the cancellation of the Clinch River fast breeder project in 1983. As of today, no commercial reprocessing facility is operating, planned, or being constructed; no

[27] Allan Mazur, "Media Influences on Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power" in Freudenburg and Rosa, *Public Reactions*.

[28] Nuclear research increased from 37 percent of the Department of Energy's 1981 R&D budget to 86 percent in the fiscal year 1983. James Everett Katz, *Congress and National Energy Policy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), 163.

[29] Stobaugh and Yergin, *Energy Future*, 287–289.

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incisive regulatory reforms have been enacted;[30] and the search for a high-level nuclear waste dump had to be postponed several times. As the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) adequately summarized the situation of nuclear power in the mid-1980s, "without significant changes in the technology, management, and level of public acceptance, nuclear power in the U.S. is unlikely to be expanded in this century beyond the reactors already under construction."[31]

The trend toward decentralization of regulatory control has been under way since the old nuclear subgovernment of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) were dissolved in the mid-1970s.[32] Besides these changes at the top, the federalist structure of the American polity began to have an effect. Since the late 1970s, local and state governments tried to limit the expansion of nuclear power within their boundaries. Following the example of California, by 1984 eleven states had enacted laws that restricted or prohibited the construction of new nuclear plants as long as certain prerequisites were not fulfilled, most notably the federal installation of a repository for high-level nuclear waste.

This was a serious attack on the doctrine of federal preemption as laid out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which made the federal government alone responsible for the regulation of nuclear power. But a landmark Supreme Court decision of 1983 unanimously upheld the right of states to say no to new plants, provided their objection was based on economic grounds, not radiation hazards. This decision peeled back the blanket of federal protection and exposed nuclear plants to the chillier winds of state and local interests. To be sure, the impact of the Supreme Court ruling was largely symbolic, since it applied only to *new* plants. There had been no new plant orders since 1978, and the nuclear industry rightly considered the rule no threat to the sixty plants then still under construction.[33]

But the push for local and state control did not stop at this point. On the contrary, it extended to the already existing nuclear power sector. For instance, more than thirty states passed what the Reagan administration termed "provincial" laws or regulations restricting the transportation or disposal of nuclear wastes within their borders. Not only in respect to nuclear waste, but also in the crucial areas of economics and safety, the local and state levels offered unexpected points of inroad for the nuclear power opposition. The latter, now sometimes identifying itself as the "safe energy" movement, formed successful alliances with

[30] The recent introduction of the one-step licensing process, which was part of President George Bush's post-Gulf-War energy bill, still leaves a plethora of other regulatory obstacles unremoved. See "Energy Measure Passed by House," *New York Times*, 28 May 1992.

[31] OTA, *Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), xi.

[32] James R. Temples, "The Politics of Nuclear Power: A Subgovernment in Transition," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Summer 1980): 239–260; Barry R. Weingast, "Congress, Regulation, and the Decline of Nuclear Power," *Public Policy* 28 (Spring 1980): 231–255.

[33] *New York Times*, 26 April 1983.

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municipal, county, and state authorities to phase out particular nuclear plants or lay bare the open wounds of the industry's infrastructure.[34] In the following, I will look at citizen-state alliances in emergency planning, utility regulation, and nuclear waste policy.

Emergency Planning

The issue of evacuation and emergency planning is a telling example of previous policy negligence, which became visible so late that remedies had to be extremely costly. In most cases, the siting of nuclear power plants had never been subject to public policy controls. Even though land use and zoning questions were under the formal jurisdiction of state governments, only a few had coherent siting policies. The nuclear industry alone picked the reactor sites. As a result, most nuclear plants were built in the vicinity of major population centers, in order to minimize the costs of electricity transmission. Because the possibility of serious accidents was not really considered then, workable off-site emergency evacuation plans were virtually nonexistent.

The accident at Three Mile Island made emergency planning an issue of high priority. Congress now directed the NRC to make the continuation of operating licenses dependent upon the preparation of emergency evacuation plans. Since 1980, the NRC mandates utilities to develop plans for evacuating all residents living within ten miles of a nuclear plant. This requires the close cooperation of state and local governments, because otherwise traffic control, medical, and other emergency services could not be provided. If the local authorities refused to participate, the NRC was unable to license a plant.

Exactly this happened in a number of prominent cases. For the Indian Point nuclear power plants, located in a densely populated region just twenty-five miles north of New York City, Rockland County (one of the four counties within the ten-mile radius) withdrew its cooperation, because it found the utility-written emergency plan unworkable. In response, the NRC, in a highly publicized move, temporarily threatened to close the plants.[35] Even more striking examples are the Shoreham and Seabrook nuclear power plants. Completed in 1985 and 1986, respectively, both plants were refused operating licenses because of the evacuation issue. In the case of Shoreham, Suffolk County and the State of New York have unequivocally stated that no evacuation plan would ever work for this (also in financial regard) troubled facility on Long Island, not far from New York City. In the case of Seabrook, located in New Hampshire near the Massachusetts border, the governor of Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis, categorically refused to participate in emergency planning procedures, thus preventing the completed plant from going on line.

[34] Joseph Kriesberg, *Shutdown Strategies: Citizen Efforts to Close Nuclear Power Plants* (Washington, DC: Critical Mass Energy Project, 1987).

[35] *New York Times*, 6 May 1983.

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The list could be easily extended. The opposition to nuclear power had found its snail darter:[36] the refusal of bus drivers, volunteer firemen, and emergency workers to take part in the required emergency planning procedures caused more than a handful of newly completed $4 billion plants to lie idle, costing their owners sometimes more than $1 million each day of nonoperation. By mid-1983, only thirty-seven of the nation's fifty-three nuclear plant sites had formally approved evacuation plans, indicating that the issue had suddenly gained national significance. State and local governments won a powerful means of indirect regulatory control.[37] Also, the nuclear opponents had found a weak point within the regulatory framework, and they vigorously pressed local authorities to use the loophole.

As Kai Erikson argues, the nuclear evacuation issue (if strongly interpreted) poses an incorrigible safety impediment.[38] First, in case of an accident, panic is likely to break out, inducing many more residents than necessary to leave the area and thus inevitably causing the collapse of the local transportation system. Second, emergency personnel, driven by conflicting obligations, may feel a compelling need to evacuate their relatives and families first and to abandon their public responsibilities. Taken together, both points indicate that evacuation is a generic dilemma that provided the nuclear opposition with a surprising new argument to phase out already existing nuclear plants.

To be sure, as of today the NRC has never lastingly revoked an operating license because of lacking evacuation precautions, and a rule change in 1988 allowed the federal government to draft emergency plans if local officials refused. But the issue ignited new and still ongoing efforts to enhance the rights of states in the safety-related regulation of nuclear power, which in the past had been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government.

Utility Regulation

Because energy as a single issue could no longer attract public attention, it became important for the remaining nuclear opposition to link the energy issue with more pressing concerns. The cost explosion of nuclear power opened up the possibility to build alliances between nuclear opponents and consumer groups at the state level. Antinuclear movement leader Ralph Nader had emphasized early on that the "joint action by environmental and consumer groups fighting for utility rate reform . . . is essential if either is to succeed."[39]

The rates charged by private electric utilities in the United States are determined

[36] The snail darter is the famous little fish that held up the construction of the Tellico Dam in Tennessee for years until courts decided that the fish was not threatened.

[37] In many cases, local governments used the evacuation issue only to squeeze public funds in return for participating. See *New York Times*, 12 May 1983.

[38] Kai Erikson, "Nuclear Evacuation," *New York Times*, 23 April 1983.

[39] *Critical Mass Newsletter*, April 1975.

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by state regulatory commissions (often called Public Utility Commissions or PUCs). Accordingly, the direct impact of rising nuclear power costs is mainly felt at the state level, where PUCs usually pass on higher operating and capital costs to consumers in the form of higher electricity bills. The rates charged to consumers include two components: the first category is for everyday operating and maintenance expenses, which are transferred to consumers without profit; the second category involves capital investments that are included in the utility's rate base. The second category is decisive, since the utility may earn a fixed profit (usually 12 to 16 percent) only on its rate base. Consequently, the larger the rate base, the larger the profits.

The PUCs are exposed to the countervailing pressures by electric utilities to increase the rates to be charged consumers, and by consumers to keep these rates as low as possible. In the 1960s, the triangular relationship between PUCs, utilities, and consumers was unproblematic.[40] Economies of scale, short lead-times for the construction of central power stations, and low fuel costs even brought a 40 percent drop in real electricity prices for industrial and residential consumers between 1960 and 1970.[41]

The benign era of utility rate regulation abruptly ended in late 1973, when the Arab oil embargo turned the positive-sum into a zero-sum constellation. Skyrocketing fuel prices caused huge increases in electricity rates. In response, irate consumers crowded into the once-sleepy public hearing rooms of PUCs to voice their opposition against further rate increases. In the era of seemingly unlimited resources, planning and pricing decisions were largely made by the industry itself and only rubberstamped by the state regulators. In the post-energy crisis era, the role of state utility commissions became suddenly politicized. Caught in the double bind of consumer protests and industry demands, the state regulators were forced to make independent and adverse decisions. Consumer and antinuclear groups aimed at reversing the utility rate structure, which had previously benefited commercial and industrial users through decreasing unit prices for high consumption (the so-called declining block structure). As the introduction of alternative "lifeline" rates in California and "peak-load pricing" in New York demonstrates, these reform efforts often succeeded.[42] These measures subsidize low-level energy consumption and impose higher rates during hours of peak use.

The second round of the conflict over utility rate regulation opened up in response to the capital cost explosion and the post-TMI financial impasses of the nuclear utilities.[43] In most states, nuclear utilities may include in their profit-

[40] Leonard Hyman and Ernst Habicht, "State Electric Utility Regulation: Financial Issues, Influences, and Trends," *Annual Review of Energy* 11 (1986): 163–185.

[41] John C. Moorhouse, ed., *Electric Power. Deregulation and the Public Interest* (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1986), 4.

[42] Douglas Anderson, "State Regulation of Electric Utilities" in Wilson, *Politics of Regulation.*

[43] Richard Rudolph and Scott Ridley, *Power Struggle* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).

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generating rate base only those plants completed and producing electricity.[44] Since the cost overruns for many plants completed during the early to mid-1980s were often 1,000 percent or more, 35 million private households in twenty-five states were suddenly confronted with electric rate increases of 25 to 50 percent—a phenomenon aptly described as "rate shock."[45] Arguing that construction cost overruns mostly resulted from bad utility management and, moreover, that cheaper energy alternatives in the form of conservation, solar, or coal were available, safe energy and consumer groups urged the state utility commissions to disallow rate increases.

Beleaguered by well-organized consumer/safe energy coalitions and an angry public, state utility regulators now took a tough stand toward industry pleas for rate increases. No longer could utilities expect to be granted generous Construction Work in Progress allowances or to pass on to consumers the full construction costs of new nuclear power plants. For instance, the New York PUC disallowed $1.4 billion of the more than $4.7 billion cost of Long Island Lighting Co.'s (Lilco) Shoreham plant to be included in the utility's rate base, reproaching the company with severe construction mismanagement.[46] State Governor Mario Cuomo himself orchestrated a relentless anti-Shoreham campaign: "Lilco rips off the people of Long Island." Cuomo articulated the region's populist distemper, "Now we are coming after you."[47] Repeated refusals to grant rate increases brought Lilco to the edge of bankruptcy, and in 1989 the besieged utility saw itself forced to hand over its completed nuclear plant to the state of New York, which has vowed to scrap and dismantle the state-of-the-art facility. In the case of the Seabrook plant, the refusal of an emergency rate increase for its partial owner, the Public Service Company of New Hampshire, led to the company's bankruptcy in early 1988—the first private utility bankruptcy since the Great Depression.[48]

The adverse posture of the state utility commissions fueled the economic crisis of the American nuclear power industry. Between 1982 and 1984 alone, thirty-two plants under construction were scrapped, some of them more than 50 percent completed, but their owners were without cash to proceed with construction. By 1988, about $30 billion had been wasted on nuclear plants abandoned before they were ready to operate; the costs for plants finished at excessive cost totalled another $70 billion.[49] Reactors coming on line during the 1980s cost between

[44] To ease the financial problems of the nuclear utilities, some states allow the inclusion of so-called Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) costs into the rate base. CWIP means that consumers pay through their monthly electricity bills for nuclear power plants still under construction.

[45] Allan Nogee, *Rate Shock: Confronting the Cost of Nuclear Power* (Washington, DC: Environmental Action Foundation, 1984).

[46] *Wall Street Journal*, 2 October 1986.

[47] David McCaffrey, *The Politics of Nuclear Power: A History of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991), 224.

[48] *New York Times*, 29 January 1988.

[49] "Nuclear Plant Drain Put At $100 billion for U.S.," *New York Times*, 1 February 1988. In

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$1,100 and $3,500 or more per kW in 1983 dollars, compared with the average of $600 per kW for the fifty-seven reactors completed before 1981.[50]

To protect consumers from paying the nuclear power bill, and to offer a viable alternative, safe energy groups (such as Ralph Nader's Critical Mass) increasingly promoted the strategy of least-cost energy planning.[51] Least-cost rules, which can be adopted either through legislation or regulation at the state level, require utilities to meet electricity demand by using the cheapest resources available. If least-cost rules are effective, utilities must develop resource plans that fully examine all energy sources, including conservation, renewable energy, and small power facilities. Utilities are then required to invest in the cheapest options first, and state regulators in the PUCs maintain oversight to ensure that all investments conform to each utility's resource plan.

By the late 1980s, ten states, including California, Wisconsin, and Nevada, adopted least-cost planning rules. As in the case of California, least-cost rules can cause a dramatic shift toward conservation and renewable energy sources. The latter now supply over 20 percent of the state's power, completely extinguishing the need for new central power stations (coal or nuclear) in the next decades.[52] With the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), state regulators disposed of an effective tool to move away from central power to renewables, conservation, and cogeneration. This allowed regulated utilities to discover the economic virtues of "flexible specialization,"[53] while evading the political heat that had obstructed efficient management and business operation in the past.[54]

Nuclear Waste Policy

In addition to the safety related issue of emergency planning and the cost related issue of utility regulation, nuclear waste disposal is the third major stake of U.S. nuclear power struggles since Three Mile Island. As in the previous two cases, local authorities and states are pitted against the federal government, demanding in unison with citizen groups more autonomy in the regulation of nuclear power. Similar to emergency evacuation and utility regulation, the problem of waste

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comparison, the costs of the space program and the Vietnam war totalled $100 billion and $111 billion, respectively.

[50] Alvin Weinberg et al., *The Second Nuclear Era* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 6.

[51] Critical Mass Energy Project, *Least-Cost Electrical Planning Compendium* (Washington, DC: Critical Mass, 1987).

[52] Christopher Flavin, "A Moratorium That Has Paid Its Way," *New York Times*, 31 July 1983; Stanley Hulett, "Promoting Independent Power: The California Experience," *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, 16 February 1989, 13–17.

[53] Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[54] Matthew Wald, "Utility's Strategy for Life in a Nonnuclear Age," *New York Times*, 11 September 1992.

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disposal emerged at the back end of the nuclear policy cycle, consigning the costs of the technology's precarious infrastructure to concrete localities and states.

When President Carter announced the nation's first comprehensive radioactive waste management program in February 1980, he stressed the pivotal importance of public participation: "It is essential that all aspects of the waste management program be conducted with the fullest possible disclosure to and participation by the public and the technical community."[55] Nuclear power's credibility melt-down after Three Mile Island turned participation into obstruction, since the gap between localized costs and diffuse national benefits widened ever more. A survey in 1986 found that 67 percent of the American public was "very concerned" about nuclear waste disposal,[56] and by 1991 89 percent considered this a "very serious" issue.[57] With the gates for participation wide open, nuclear power in a credibility crisis since TMI, and public sensitivity to nuclear waste issues particularly high, local and state-wide not-in-my-backyard campaigns spread like wildfire.

The federal waste program of 1980 had two components—the disposal of low- and high-level nuclear waste. The disposal of low-level waste became an acute problem after Three Mile Island, when the previous host states of Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington no longer accepted waste shipments from other states. In response, Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in 1980, which made each state responsible for the disposal of its low-level waste and urged the formation of regional interstate compacts. The result was political warfare between states. States with high waste quantities—such as California and New York—were effectively denied membership in any of the new interstate compacts. Instead of balancing regional risks, the paradoxical outcome of the delegation of low-level waste responsibilities to the states seemed to be the hazardous proliferation of dump sites throughout the nation, an outcome particularly problematic in the heavily populated and geologically unsuited Northeast.[58] However, by 1992 not a single prospective dump site in the United States could escape the specter of legal gridlock. Typical is the case of California's Ward Valley project, which until 1991 seemed to be the only low-level waste dump poised for opening according to schedule,[59] but which then succumbed to fierce citizen resentment and subsequent legal obstruction by state agencies bowing to public pressure. Citizen-state alliances such as the one in California have effectively stalemated the implementation of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act, with no solution currently in sight.[60]

[55] Jimmy Carter, "Presidential Message of February 12, 1980" in William Colglazier, ed., *The Politics of Nuclear Waste* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).

[56] Michael Kraft, "Evaluating Technology Through Public Participation: The Nuclear Waste Disposal Controversy" in Michael Kraft and Norman Vig., eds., *Technology and Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988).

[57] "Time to Choose," *Time*, 29 April 1991, 60.

[58] Donald Barlett and James Steele, *Forevermore: Nuclear Waste in America* (New York: Norton, 1985), 196-249.

[59] "Only California is on Track for Nuclear Dump," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 May 1991.

[60] "Temporary Nuclear Waste Storage May be Expanded," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 January 1992.

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While most experts agree today that the disposal of high-level nuclear waste poses no unsolvable technical difficulties, its main impediment arises from concerns of political equity and societal acceptability—quite similar to the issue of low-level waste, yet on a magnified scale. In a time when the clear majority of the public is opposed to nuclear power, no electorally accountable state government is willing to host a repository for the nation's high-level nuclear waste. The three major state concerns arise from the inherent costs and risks of high-level waste, which has to be isolated from the ecosphere for hundreds of generations; the fear of unfairness in siting decisions which would impose a disproportional share of the waste disposal burden on certain states; and low credibility of the federal government, which in previous nuclear waste decisions did not live up to its promise to respect state autonomy.[61] By 1982, more than twenty states had passed restrictive legislation banning various types of federal waste management activities on their territories, and more than forty municipalities had imposed bans on radioactive waste transports.[62]

In the early 1960s, David Lilienthal, one of the major architects (and early critics) of U.S. nuclear power, had emphasized that the future of nuclear power depended on the safe handling of radioactive waste.[63] Over the next fifteen years, this early warning remained unheard. Federal research attention focused almost exclusively on reactor development, neglecting the less glamorous back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.[64] Not until 1972 did waste management exist as a distinct bureaucratic entity with its own independent budget, and not until fiscal year 1977 did the program receive substantial funding, when President Carter formed the Interagency Review Group that would prepare the first comprehensive waste disposal program of 1980.

In reaction to the reprocessing ban under Carter, which forced on-site storage of burned nuclear fuel-rods, and in response to several state moratoria on new nuclear constructions pending a solution to the waste problem, the industry pushed hard for the installation of a high-level waste dump—a task for which the federal government was legally responsible. The result was the High-Level Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. It took more than two years to complete the act, because Congress became locked in a controversy over the state demand for a veto right. This veto right was finally granted, to be overturned only by an unlikely majority in both Houses of Congress. As a Democratic legislator gloomily predicted the likely impact of the state veto provision, "we will never see the day in which a permanent repository is built."[65]

[61] OTA, *Managing Commercial High-Level Waste* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 34–36.

[62] Edward Woodhouse, "The Politics of Nuclear Waste Management" in Charles A. Walker et al., eds., *Too Hot to Handle?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

[63] David Lilienthal, *Change, Hope, and the Bomb* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 137.

[64] Carroll Wilson, "Nuclear Energy: What Went Wrong," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 35 (June 1979): 13–17.

[65] Quoted in Barlett and Steele, *Forevermore*, 168.

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The act originally required the Department of Energy (DOE) to build a first permanent high-level waste repository by 1998 and to begin the preliminary search for a second one.[66] Political difficulties in the implementation of the act soon forced the Department of Energy to postpone the expected opening date of the first repository well into the next century. In principle, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act called for "consultation and cooperation" between the Department of Energy and the potential host states. In fact, each of the thirteen states at one point or another considered a possible choice has mounted its decided resistance, from spontaneous citizen outrage to state-initiated legal intervention.

To secure political equity, the first repository was to be built in the West (which is less populated but geologically better suited), whereas the second repository should be in the East (which has more nuclear power plants and therefore produces more high-level waste). To save time and money, and beleaguered by wide-spread protests from citizen groups and state governments especially in the Northeast,[67] the Department of Energy made a momentous decision. In May 1986, it narrowed down the list of candidate sites for the first repository to three states in the West (Texas, Nevada, Washington), and indefinitely postponed the site screening for a second repository in the East. This was a serious attack on the delicate balance and political equity reached between the West and the East, and all three western states subsequently filed law suites challenging the decision. When Congress finally picked Nevada as the only disposal site, the choice fell to the state with the least political clout at the federal level. The state governor called the decision a "monstrous injustice," chiding the lack of fairness toward "the country's nuclear wasteland."[68]

The first high-level waste repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is now scheduled to open for business in 2010. But continuous expert controversy over the geological suitability of the site and constant legal maneuvering by Nevada's state government suggest further delays, if not the eventual cancellation of the project.[69]

Conclusion

In his seminal assessment of the state of the nuclear enterprise, Alvin Weinberg lamented that "the absence of positive leadership has allowed the technology to drift into an uneconomic mode, turning off the future growth of the industry,"

[66] Luther J. Carter, *Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust: Dealing with Radioactive Waste* (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1987).

[67] See, for instance, Laura Haight, "Waking Up to High Level Waste," *The Waste Paper* (New York) 8 (1985): 10–12.

[68] *Las Vegas Review Journal*, 19 September 1987.

[69] William Broad, "A Mountain of Trouble," *New York Times Magazine*, 18 November 1990, 37ff.

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adding that "overall leadership must come from the government."[70] In a similar vein, Irvin Bupp described the nuclear policy stalemate after Three Mile Island as a "breakdown of the American democratic political process."[71]

This analysis suggests that the TMI-induced crisis of societal acceptance prohibited firm leadership in nuclear policy and reinforced an unescapable trend toward the decentralization of control, which undermined the political and economic recovery of American nuclear power. While this outcome may be dysfunctional in terms of delaying the closing of the nuclear fuel cycle and thwarting the future of an industry, this may also be a necessary price paid for American democratic institutions at work. From this angle, the demise of nuclear power reflects not the *breakdown* but the very *functioning* of the democratic process. As James Madison planned, the conflict was internalized within the federal system. The protest movement skillfully intensified the fragmentation of authority between the federal and state levels, thus undermining the institutional homogeneity required for the successful implementation of a highly inflexible and complex technology. As a movement leader pointed out, "from our perspective it is Westinghouse and their allies versus local interest and our friends, mainly state legislators and attorneys general."[72]

Obviously the implementation of nuclear power depends on a broad consensus that is not easily provided by polities in which conflict is the reigning principle. Not by accident, the nuclear enterprise succeeded only in political systems characterized by centralized control, most notably France, Japan, and South Korea, while it became embroiled in continuous controversy in federally fragmented political systems, such as the United States or West Germany.[73]

The conflicts over emergency planning, utility rate regulation, and waste disposal reflect the three major stakes in the overall U.S. nuclear controversy: safety, economics, and the distribution of externalities. These conflicts emerged only at the back end of the nuclear policy cycle, when irreversible investments had already been made and previously ignored key aspects of the infrastructure of nuclear power became problematic, distributing the costs to concrete localities and states. The outcome of these conflicts indicates that the complexity of nuclear technology is at odds with the fluidity and fragmentation of authority in the American polity. The crisis of acceptance after Three Mile Island and the belated recognition of certain consequences of this large-scale technology, such as the necessity of emergency precautions or the safe disposal of waste, activated the vertical division of authority in the American political system, thus undermining the stabilization of nuclear power in the 1980s.

More than a decade after Three Mile Island, the 108 nuclear power plants

[70] Weinberg, *Second Nuclear Era*, 80, 83.

[71] Irvin Bupp, *Nuclear Power*, 162.

[72] Marvin Resnikoff, "When Does Consultation Become Co-Optation?" in William Colglazier, *Politics of Nuclear Waste*, 190.

[73] Joppke, *Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy*.

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now operating in the United States produce about 20 percent of the nation's electricity—a far cry from the 1,000 plants projected by the old Atomic Energy Commission in the early 1970s. Few new plants are still expected to be completed, and the current glut of inexpensive alternate fuels makes it unlikely that utilities will order new reactors in the near future. The most recent trend is to send relatively young and fully operable nuclear plants into early retirement, because cheaper energy alternatives exist.[74] To be sure, the current debates over acid rain, greenhouse effect, and air pollution have given increasing leverage to the plea for a "second nuclear era," which is supposed to be based on a smaller, more flexible, and "inherently safe" reactor design.[75] It remains to be seen if this will rejuvenate the nuclear option in America.*

[74] Matthew Wald, "Cheap and Abundant Power May Shut Some Nuclear Plants," *New York Times*, 14 April 1992.

[75] Weinberg, *Second Nuclear Era*.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco, California.

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Deregulating Defense Acquisition

FRED THOMPSON

The Department of Defense (DOD) buys more merchandise than all the rest of the public sector of the United States put together. More than 30,000 firms provision the DOD; 15,000 are prime contractors. These firms employ hundreds of thousands of production workers, engineers, and scientists and tens of thousands of accountants, lawyers, and lobbyists as well—altogether over three million employees.[1] The acquisition process also enlists the efforts of legions of DOD personnel, both uniformed and civilian (over 580 thousand according to the expansive DOD definition of acquisition,[2] including 26,000 auditors), as well as prodigious numbers of legislators and their helpers.

I estimate that the DOD's inventory of arms and equipment has a net replacement value of about $.7 trillion, equal to one-fifth of the nation's business investment in plant and equipment. Given that the average half-life of the DOD's equipment is approximately ten years, this means that the DOD must buy $80 billion worth of arms and equipment each year just to stay even. Sustaining a technological edge costs $40 billion for military research and development, and operating and maintaining the inventory at current readiness levels costs $85 billion more. In 1990 the DOD purchased about $220 billion worth of goods and services from a variety of outside suppliers, which put it somewhat ahead of the game.

[1] "Facts and Figures on Defense Procurement," Harvard Business School, HBS Case No. 9-190-060: rev. 28 February 1990.

[2] Broadly defined to include research, development, procurement, logistics, distribution, and related maintenance activities. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, *Defense Management Report* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1989), 12.

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There is only one way to cut these outlays without crippling America's armed forces and its defense industrial base: reducing force structure and overheads. Fortunately, the end of the cold war means that America's military budget can be cut. From this vantage point it looks as if it might be possible to reduce force structure by nearly half over the next five to ten years: for example, reducing the army from eighteen active and twelve reserve divisions to seven and ten, the navy from thirteen carrier groups and three marine divisions to six and two, and the air force from twenty-five active and twenty-four reserve wings to thirteen and twelve.[3] These reductions would allow the active defense inventory to fall to about $.4 trillion net, which suggests that it might be possible to reduce the defense budget from about 5 percent of GNP to 3 or 4 percent and still maintain the armed forces' technological edge.

This inference reflects the following reasoning. Given a half-life of about fifteen years on average, replacement and upgrading of the total active military capital stock will cost roughly $50 billion in constant dollars. Operations and maintenance will cost $40 to $60 billion more, depending upon the readiness levels sought. Research and development (R&D) spending is harder to estimate, but analysts often assume that for every $2 the United States spends on equipment, it must spend another $1 on R&D. According to this rule of thumb, it would be possible to cut the R&D budget from $37 billion this year to $25 billion. In other words, it *might* be possible to reduce purchases from the private sector from $240 billion per year to less than $140 billion in 1990 dollars and reduce total military purchases from $300 billion to less than $185 billion.

Even so, that is a lot of money. Obviously, military acquisition still matters, perhaps more than ever, since it will be necessary to spend fewer dollars more wisely.

The Conventional Wisdom

According to the conventional wisdom, the basic problem with the DOD's acquisition system is that it is riddled with fraud and abuse on the part of both contractors and acquisition personnel in the DOD. These evils take the form of overcharging and double-charging for materials and services, payroll padding,[4] misappropriation of government property, bribery, kickbacks,[5] and conflicts of interest.[6] The conventional wisdom further holds that corruption and favoritism are the root causes of most of the failings of the acquisition system, including cost overruns,

[3] George J. Church, "How Much Is Too Much?" *Time*, 12 February 1990, 19.

[4] Federal Acquisitions Regulations (hereafter FAR) 31 & 52 (cost mischarging); 10 United States Code (hereafter USC) § 2306 (inaccurate cost or pricing data submitted to government); 18 USC § 287 (submission of false claims to a government agency), § 371 (conspiracy), § 1001 (submission of false statements to a government agency); §§ 1341, 1343 (mail fraud).

[5] 18 USC § 201; 41 USC §§ 51-54 (bribery, kickbacks, influence peddling).

[6] 18 USC § 207; 18 USC § 281.

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schedule slippages, and weapon systems that don't work or are simply too expensive.[7] The complement to these beliefs is that greatly increased regulation and oversight are needed to fix the system.

Consequently, Congress has added an assortment of new laws aimed at further disciplining DOD acquisitions to the existing 1,150 feet of legislation and case law governing procurement.[8] In 1988 alone, Congress added eight new laws with over fifty provisions governing defense acquisitions.[9]

Perhaps the most far-reaching of the new laws is the 1986 qui tam[10] section of the False Claims Act, which combines hostility to defense contractors with skepticism about government.[11] The qui tam provisions were designed to lure whistle-blowers out of the woodwork by handsomely rewarding them (and their lawyers) for taking private action against contracting abuses. They empower anyone who discovers someone defrauding the government to sue the wrongdoer on its behalf. If they win in court, plaintiffs can pocket 15 to 25 percent (30 percent if the government chooses not to join the case) of total penalties (which include triple damages and fines of up to $10,000 per false claim), plus attorney fees and costs. This law also subjects employers that punish or fire whistle-blowers to heavy penalties. It is particularly far reaching because almost every failure to acknowledge or report a violation of federal regulations constitutes statutory fraud. Furthermore, "knowingly" making a false claim also comprehends "should have known." Proof of actual knowledge or specific intent to defraud is not required.[12]

The qui tam provisions come on top of other recent acquisition "reforms," including the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, which called for contracts—and subcontracts—to be let on the basis of "technically acceptable, low bid" auctions, small-business set-asides, spare parts breakout, labor cost and work breakdown estimates, random drug testing, and more rigorous product testing.[13] To the list of recent reforms should be added revolving-door legislation,

[7] Danielle Brian-Bland and Dina Rasor, "Lies, Half-Truths, and Misrepresentations: How the Military Gets its Money," *Yale Law & Policy Review* 5 (Fall/Winter 1986): 106.

[8] William E. Kovacic, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Public Regulation of the Weapons Acquisition Process" in Robert H. Higgs, ed., *Arms, Politics, and the Economy* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), 105. See also Bill Blum and Gina Lobaco, "Following the Money," *California Lawyer* 7 (May 1987): 63–64, 71; Jennifer B. Smith and Mark E. Beck, "Representing Government Contractors Accused of Misconduct," *California Lawyer* 7 (May 1987): 55–58.

[9] Kovacic, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," 105.

[10] The term "qui tam" comes from the dog Latin expression *Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se in hoc parte sequitur*, which means "who brings action for the king as well as for himself."

[11] 31 USC §§ 3729–31.

[12] See Steve France, "The Private War on Pentagon Fraud," *ABA Journal* 76 (March 1990): 46–49; also see Mark Thompson, "Stealth Law," *California Lawyer* 8 (October 1988): 33–37, 121. Readers wishing to contact a member of the false claims bar should call 1-800-2-FRAUD-2 or 1-800-6-FRAUD-6 in California.

[13] Public Law 98-369; 10 USC § 2301(a)(5); see also Public Law 99-145, 10 USC § 2438(b)(1), which bars the DOD from beginning a full-scale weapon development project until it has filed an acquisition strategy with Congress, and Public Law 99-591, 10 USC § 2365(a), which requires

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which prohibits senior DOD acquisition personnel, including political appointees, from taking positions with defense firms for two years after they leave government.[14]

To enforce these requirements, Congress and the DOD have added thousands more checkers and auditors, doubled the size of the Department of Justice's defense procurement fraud unit, and through the qui tam program added literally hundreds of private attorneys general. Moreover, both defense contractors and DOD acquisition managers have been subjected to increased congressional and press scrutiny.

An Alternative View

There is an alternative to the conventional wisdom. Instead of calling for more rules and tighter controls to govern defense acquisition, this view calls for the deregulation of defense acquisition. This view has been affirmed by a succession of blue ribbon commissions and endorsed by several serious students of the acquisition process who have recently published book-length studies of the difficulties faced by the DOD in getting value for money when it buys modern weapon systems.[15] These experts are in general agreement about what it will take to improve defense procurement—and what hurts it. They reject the notion that fraud and abuse significantly increase acquisition costs, *except insofar as efforts to stop these evils have seriously degraded the efficiency and effectiveness of the process*. They argue that fighting fraud and abuse has led to excessive reporting requirements, detailed contractual specifications, duplicative reviews, intrusive oversight—in short, excessive formalism and red tape—which has in turn delayed systems development and deployment and greatly increased weapons systems costs. As Steven Kelman of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government eloquently explains:

> . . . the government often fails to get the most it can from its vendors. In contrast to the conventional view, however, I believe that the system of competition as it is typically envisioned and the controls against favoritism and corruption as they typically occur are more often the source of the problem than the solution to it. The problem with the current system is that public officials cannot use common sense and good judgment in

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competitive prototyping for major projects and which is repealed by Public Law 100-456. Kovacic, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice." 114, 127–28.

[14] Public Law 99-145, 10 USC § 2438.

[15] J. Ronald Fox with James L. Field, *The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988); William H. Gregory, *The Defense Procurement Mess* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1989); Steven Kelman, *Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1990); Thomas L. McNaugher, *New Weapons Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Muddle* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989); see also Jacques S. Gansler, *Affording Defense* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989); and Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman Augustine, *The Defense Revolution* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990), especially chaps. five and six.

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ways that would promote better vendor performance. I believe the system should be significantly deregulated to allow public officials greater discretion. I believe that the ability to exercise discretion would allow government to gain greater value from procurement.[16]

The deregulatory perspective reflects an awareness that there is only one way for the United States to reduce significantly the costs of the weapon systems it buys: to increase the efficiency of the processes by which they are developed, manufactured, and purchased. This can be accomplished by:

- increasing investment in new plant and equipment to enhance manufacturing productivity;
- reducing contractors' overheads and indirect costs;
- improving the quality and remuneration of DOD's acquisitions personnel and reducing their number;
- redesigning the DOD's organizational structure to increase the personal authority and responsibility of acquisition personnel;
- simplifying and streamlining the processes through which contractors are selected and projects managed by the DOD.

Laws aimed at preventing fraud and abuse are among the principal obstacles to these needed reforms. In some cases—for example, greater delegation of authority and organizational streamlining—they directly prohibit steps called for by the experts. In others, they serve as more oblique barriers to reform. For example, the individuals who represent the DOD in the contracting process are often overmatched by their counterparts in defense firms, who are on average brighter, better paid, and more experienced.[17] Consequently, it is necessary to increase the skills and the experience of DOD's acquisition personnel. Of course, the best place to find the experienced acquisitions personnel the DOD needs to improve defense procurement is private industry, but the revolving-door statutes have largely closed off the defense industry as a source of senior executives.

No Panaceas

Deregulation alone is not a panacea; there are no simple panaceas. Unfortunately, the acquisition of technologically advanced weapons systems is an inherently risky business. These risks can be reduced by sound project conceptualization, their consequences can be minimized by skillful management, but they cannot be made to vanish entirely, at least not at an economical cost.[18] Large-scale development projects seem inevitably to produce surprises, and most are unpleasant. Few if any complex systems initially work precisely the way they are

[16] Kelman, *Procurement and Public Management*, 1.

[17] Kovacic, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," 112–13.

[18] Information is costly. One can avoid surprises, but only at a cost. Efficiency is a matter of minimizing the sum of the costs associated with surprise and the costs of avoiding surprise.

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supposed to; some never do. Under the best of circumstances, unpredictable problems cause some development projects to fall behind schedule or to exceed cost targets.

There is absolutely nothing new about this phenomenon, nor is it a problem that is unique to the DOD. In 1794 Congress authorized construction of six frigates. To "spread the work among the states as equitably as possible and with the greatest political advantage," six private yards were leased to carry out this task. Unfortunately, the project soon fell behind schedule. The six keels were not laid until the end of 1795, seventeen months after construction had been authorized. Subsequently, mismanagement, delays, and cost overruns resulted in a cutback to three frigates.[19] A few years later, Eli Whitney contracted with the war department to make 10,000 muskets using an untried new manufacturing system based upon extensive division of labor, interchangeability of parts, and final manufacture by assembly rather than hand finishing. While the manufacturing system Whitney devised laid the foundations of American mass production, his contract called for completion of the full production run in two years. It took him nearly ten.[20]

In fact, the evidence suggests that nowadays the DOD's development projects experience on average fewer schedule delays, and smaller cost overruns than similar large-scale, high-complexity projects carried out by either government or business. Moreover, the DOD has steadily improved its ability to avoid unpleasant surprises. Between 1960 and the mid-1980s, cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance failures all significantly decreased.[21] These improvements are due in part to its use of sophisticated should-cost and design-to-cost models to negotiate target prices and to enforce productivity standards during the execution of contracts.

Two Cheers For Cheaper, Simpler Weapons

One way to reduce the risks associated with the acquisition of technologically advanced weapons systems is to buy simpler, more specialized weapons. During the 1970s and early 1980s, one frequently heard that simpler weapons are easier to operate and maintain than complex, high-tech weapons, as well as cheaper to buy, and that simpler weapons are, therefore, better weapons. This view was persuasively expressed by Pierre Sprey[22] and Charles Spinney,[23] popularized in

[19] Marshall Smelser, *The Congress Founds the Navy* (West Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 73.

[20] Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1956), 52.

[21] Michael Rich and Edmund Dews, *Improving the Military Acquisition Process—Lessons from Rand Research*, R-3373-AF/RC (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1986).

[22] See Jack Merritt and Pierre Sprey, "Negative Marginal Returns in Weapons Acquisition" in R. G. Head and E. J. Rokke, eds., *American Defense Policy*, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 486–95.

[23] Spinney, a civilian analyst with the DOD, is known primarily for his briefing "Defense Facts

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a brilliantly argued book by James Fallows,[24] and forcefully advocated in Congress by Senator Gary Hart and other members of the military reform caucus.

The case for weapons reform was based on three critical assertions. The first was that complex, technologically sophisticated weapons are inherently unreliable: even when they work the way they are supposed to, which according to the weapons reformers is rarely, they don't work because they are broken. Obviously, other things being equal, increasing a system's complexity tends to degrade its reliability. For example, consider the following calculation: given that there are 100 tanks, each tank has twenty components, and each component has a .01 probability of failure in 1,000 hours of operation; after 1,000 hours of operation about 82 of the tanks would be working. If, however, each of the tanks had 200 components, and each of the components had the same .01 probability of failure, after 1000 hours, only 13 would still be running. Assuming further that the military can afford only half as many of the more sophisticated tanks because they cost twice as much to buy, deploy, maintain, and support as the simpler ones, this calculation leaves only 6 tanks at the end of 1000 hours. This calculation illustrates "Riccioni's Law," which states that "The number of weapons systems that can be employed in battle varies inversely as the *square* of the level of sophistication."[25]

It is also obvious that the technological sophistication and operational complexity of the weapons (and other) systems deployed by the DOD have greatly increased in the last twenty years. The 70-ton high-tech M-1A1 Abrams main battle tank with its target-stabilized turret, laser range finder, huge 120 mm smooth-bore gun, steel-ceramic composite armor, and turbine engine is only one manifestation of a pervasive phenomenon. Recoilless rifles have been replaced by complicated rockets; towed artillery by self-propelled multi-rocket launch systems (MRLS); radio direction finders by computerized signals-intelligence equipment; and human eyes by infrared imaging devices.

The second critical assertion was that the unreliability of America's high-tech weaponry imposes an intolerable logistical-support burden on the armed forces—thereby fatally increasing the ratio of tail to tooth. This is a serious claim, and it too deserved to be taken seriously. Logistics are the Achilles heel of every army. Erwin Rommel spent as much time in North Africa in World War II looking for fuel as he did attacking the British. George Patton was stopped more frequently by logistical breakdowns than by the Germans. The multinational force in the Arabian desert was successful only because its logistics were sorted out before the shooting started. Moreover, the reliability and maintainability of military hardware is directly relevant to the quantity of supplies needed to support operations and to the size, location, and composition of buffer stocks. It is common

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of Life." Copies of the overheads used in this briefing are available from the Public Affairs Office, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301.

[24] James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981).

[25] Quoted by Fallows, *National Defense*, 43. (Emphasis in the original.)

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knowledge that the Russians replaced the T-64 tank with the retrograde T-72 primarily because the T-64 was too expensive to buy and too complicated to maintain in the field; it is not unlikely that their failure to deploy the T-80 in substantial numbers reflects similar considerations.[26]

Moreover, the complexity of modern weapons has clearly had a profound effect upon the design of military organizations. Of the 1.85 million enlisted men and women in the American armed forces in 1988, 550 thousand were repair technicians, an additional 166 thousand were supply and other service personnel, and only 283 thousand had combat jobs. One of the starker manifestations of technology's effect on combat strength was the experimental 9th High-Tech Division, a highly agile formation designed for ease in air transportability. Unfortunately, the High-Tech needed so many people to operate and maintain its equipment that it had few left over to put in foxholes—648, or 4.5 percent of its total personnel, as compared with the 82nd Airborne Division's foxhole strength of over 5,000. In the mid-1980s the High-Tech was reorganized as the 9th Mechanized Division, with a foxhole strength of about 5,000.[27]

The third critical assertion was that training realism is directly related to technological complexity and the higher operating and maintenance costs that complexity induces. Other things being equal, complex weapons require greater skill to use effectively than simple weapons. Skill requires practice, but practicing with modern, high-tech weapons is prohibitively expensive. Consequently, the reformers concluded that even if they weren't broken, the armed forces wouldn't know how to use their modern weapons. Furthermore, the performance of the American armed forces relative to their NATO allies in various competitions during the 1970s—the Canadian Army Tank Gunnery Competition, the Boeslager Challenge Cup (an infantry competition), the World Helicopter Championships, the Tiger Meet (a tactical-fighter competition), the World Reconnaissance Air Meet—and in early Reforger exercises strongly suggested that they really were the "gang that couldn't shoot straight." In 1979, for example, the United States was an also-ran in the air force competitions, dead last in two of the ground forces competitions, and it couldn't even field a team for the third.

What Happened to Weapons Reform?

Serious as these concerns were, they have largely disappeared from recent discussions of the acquisitions process. There are two reasons for this. First, the Pentagon adopted some of the weapons reforms. For example, the Air Force's F-16

[26] See S. F. Zaloga, "Soviet Tank Development Revealed," *Armed Forces Journal International* (December 1990): 24.

[27] J. F. Dunnigan and A. A. Nofi, *Dirty Little Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1990), 235–67. See J. M. Epstein, *Measuring Military Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985) for a fascinating quantitative picture of the organizational and logistical implications of modern weapons and a comparison between Soviet and Western solutions to the problems they raise.

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broke the cycle of rising acquisition costs by stripping itself of many of the nice-to-have gadgets. It is both relatively inexpensive to buy and reliable to operate, yet it is widely regarded as the best fighter in the world today. The A-10 reflects a similar philosophy. Its designers set out to build a simple, sturdy, and cheap tankbuster. The fighting in the Gulf war shows that they were successful. Second, the Pentagon took the symptoms identified by the weapons reformers very seriously, even when it rejected both their diagnosis and the proposed cure, and took drastic steps to improve the maintainability of the weapons it deploys and the training of the personnel using them.

Using Technology to Fix Technology

One of the solutions adopted by the DOD is to use technology to fix technology. The first generation of high-tech weapons systems were in fact excessively unreliable—a point made with great vigor by Sprey, Spinney, and Fallows. To deal with this problem, the military departments made two adaptations in the high-tech systems they use. First, they rely to a far greater degree on redundancy. If, for example, each of the components of the more complex tanks described in the previous illustrative calculation had a backup and if the probability of component failure were unchanged, the probability that both the original component and its backup would fail would drop to .0001. In that case, after 1000 hours of operation, 98 percent would still be working. Second, the military now use solid-state circuits in their electronic components instead of wires, transistors, and tubes, which has greatly increased systems reliability.

The DOD has also put considerable effort into the design and development of systems that are easy to operate and maintain, using sophisticated technology to make it easier for combat troops to become skilled in the use of their weapons and for maintenance and logistical personnel to become skilled in servicing them. For example, road wheel damage to an M-1 tank can be fixed in about three hours, using a simple procedure requiring no special tools; similar damage on other tanks requires highly specialized training and expensive equipment.

I should mention two key innovations here. The first is widespread use of electronic diagnostic and test devices. These make it possible for moderately skilled technicians to identify the cause of most mechanical and electronic problems quickly and reliably. The second is modularization. This permits the entire complex of components containing the problem to be pulled and expeditiously replaced by a module "off the shelf." The M-1, for example, has roughly 200 of these modules. Even the M-1's 1,500 horsepower gas turbine engine is designed to be rapidly replaced in the field.

Of course, these innovations have in turn created problems of their own. In the first place, their implementation has necessitated greater specialization of maintenance personnel and increased centralization of the maintenance func-

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tion.[28] This has increased the time it takes to fix some breakdowns. Much of this time is spent getting replacement parts. Because of the cost of replacement modules (and their infrequent failure), they are not held in inventory at the point of use, at least not in peacetime. Rather, the DOD relies on its version of Just-in-Time inventory supply. It holds stocks of repair modules in central depots in the United States and air-ships them to users when ordered. The broken module is then exchanged for a spare and returned to the central depot for repair. According to optimal inventory models, this makes a great deal of sense in peacetime when the units requiring replacement parts are dispersed all over the globe, breakdowns are relatively infrequent, and the opportunity costs of outages are low. In wartime, when forces are concentrated in a single theater of operations, breakdowns are more frequent (due to enemy action as well as higher levels of operational intensity), and the costs of outages are high, inventory models call for the location of large buffer stocks near the point of use. Consequently, the Gulf war saw the DOD shift temporarily from a demand pull to a supply push system of parts replacement.

Redundancy and modularization are expensive. Moreover, because component failures are rarer, information on mean time to failure is sometimes lacking. This means that surprises are fairly common, especially when systems are pushed to the limit in operations. Despite these problems, however, contemporary weapons appear on balance to be far easier to maintain and use than their immediate predecessors.

The M-1 tank illustrates the point about second generation high-tech weapons systems. Despite its great complexity, it is highly reliable. According to official sources, its mean operating time to failure exceeds that of any of its post-World War II predecessors (surprises are now relatively rare; after all there are about 10,000 M-1s in use by the United States and its allies, and the army has had over ten years operational experience in which to debug it). In peacetime operations, even high-intensity ones, the percentage of tanks that are fully ready for combat is higher in United States Army units equipped with M-1s than in army and marine units that still use the older M-60.[29] In the Gulf war, M-1 operational rates exceeded 90 percent.[30]

[28] According to Chris Demchuk, this has had the effect of greatly reducing the robustness against surprise, redundancy, and adaptability of the army's maintenance/logistical organization and, therefore, of reducing its capability to carry out its assigned missions. Hence, she concludes that the Pentagon's technological fix has not eliminated operational unreliability; it merely shifted its locus from its hardware to the organization. Chris C. Demchuk, *Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Forces* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). Perhaps – but I remain skeptical.

[29] M. Chalmers and L. Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap?" *International Security* 13 (Summer 1988): 5-49; McNaugher, *New Weapons Old Politics*, esp. 73-74; and D. Swales, "The M-1 Tank" in Fen Hampson, ed., *Unguided Missiles: How America Buys its Weapons* (New York: Norton, 1989), 134-98.

[30] J. G. Roos and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Desert Storm Bares 'Roundout' Flaw but Validates Army Modernization Goals," *Armed Forces Journal International* (April 1991): 35.

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Competitive Strategies

The Pentagon has also tried to figure out how to use technology in a smarter way—taking advantage of America's technological edge to defeat the Soviet Union's numerically stronger forces. The basic idea behind this effort was to identify critical weaknesses that American technology—combined with appropriate operational concepts, doctrine, and tactics—could exploit to disrupt Soviet combat operations and then to invest the Pentagon's scarce resources in those technologies. War gaming identified its highly centralized system of command and control as the critical weakness in the Soviet Union's war-fighting doctrine and demonstrated that it could be thrown into disarray by the clever use of systems then under development or in some cases already deployed. These include gee-whiz intelligence gathering and distribution systems, stealth aircraft, large mobile conventional missiles (such as the MLRS and the army's new MLRS-fired ATACMS), scatterable mines (both smart and dumb), and smart munitions to insure that once a target is located it can be killed.[31]

Most of these ideas were implemented in time to be used in the Gulf. Because the Iraqi military forces were organized along Soviet lines, that experience generally confirmed the thinking behind the competitive strategies initiative. The combined application of stealthy aircraft and highly accurate stand-off weapons linked to modern intelligence and control systems left Iraqi forces in shambles. Of course, to say that Iraq organized its forces along Soviet lines is not to say that they were anywhere near as good as the Soviets. Nevertheless the lesson seems to be that quality intelligently employed can overcome quantity.

Better Training

Even more important, the Pentagon has taken to heart the lesson that the principal determinant of combat success is not weapons, but the skill and determination of its personnel. It has made a profound commitment to high levels of realistic combat training. This includes authentic war-play against tested adversaries, most notably at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Mention should also be made of the Navy's Top Gun and the Air Force's Aggressor programs. In both, highly skilled opponents fly aircraft that perform similarly to those of the Soviet Union. Their function is to expose the pilots undergoing training to the closest possible imitation of actual warfare.

Here too, the DOD has used technology to fix technology. Combat personnel now get reality in large doses from lifelike electronic combat simulators and training systems. Flight simulators used to train pilots have been around for some time. Similar electronic scoring and recording devices are now also used to prepare tankers, artillery crews, and ground attack pilots for combat. By the late 1980s

[31] J. G. Roos and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Revolution in NATO's Conventional Defense Looms from 'Competitive Strategies' Initiative," *Armed Forces Journal International* (October 1988): 114-21.

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these devices were organized into area networks such as SIMNET, permitting entire military units to get ready for the real thing by participating in realistic combat simulations.[32] Simulators are not cheap to buy. The new F-15E fighter-bomber simulators cost the air force more than $45 million each, as much as an actual F-15. But they are a lot cheaper to use. Each F-15E simulator provides six or seven times as many training hours as an actual F-15, at an operating cost of $2,000 an hour—one-fifth of what it costs to fly an F-15.[33]

As a consequence of all of these efforts, the combat skills of the armed forces have markedly improved. In recent years, American teams have been overwhelming in NATO maneuvers[34] and have completely dominated international competitions, most recently taking the top six places in the 1990 Tiger Meet—not to mention first place in the Gulf. During the Gulf war, we heard on CNN airmen and tankers, who had achieved remarkable feats of arms, say over and over again that "It was easy—it was just like in training."

Simpler Weapons Are Not Necessarily Better; They Might Not Even Be Cheaper

Eliot Cohen has eloquently, perhaps even grandiloquently, explained the valid considerations that cause American defense planners to prefer flashy, multipurpose and, therefore, more expensive weapons:

> It is the essence of America's geopolitical problem that her planners cannot know what kind of wars are ahead, or rather, that they must prepare for many different kinds of wars. . . . Because of the enormous diversity of possible enemies, climate, and terrain that its troops might have to cope with, the United States must strive to create an armed forces that can operate in all kinds of conditions. Small wonder that our military equipment is built to extraordinary and costly specifications, for who can tell whether a manpack radio set will be used in a steamy Asian rice paddy, in an Arabian sandstorm, or a Norwegian blizzard? Small wonder, too, that we build extremely capable but expensive weapons such as the F-15 fighter-bomber. The United States will probably have to fight the opening battles of a campaign at the end of a long logistical line: What weapons it can deploy had best be far more capable, pound for pound, than those of its enemies.[35]

Cohen's point is amply demonstrated by the example of the F-16, one of the weapons reformers' favorite planes. Instead of the simple, austere, pure fighter it was originally planned to be, the air force made it into a dual purpose aircraft, used to attack ground targets as well as a dog-fighter. This increased its price 75

[32] Robert R. Ropelewski, "Simulation Advances Permit New Training Opportunities," *Armed Forces Journal International* (November 1988): 64.

[33] Glenn W. Goodman, "F-15E Simulator Designed for Complex Training," *Armed Forces Journal International* (November 1988): 68.

[34] Ralph Peters, "The Age of Fatal Visibility," *Military Review* 68 (August 1988): 50–54.

[35] E. A. Cohen, "War as a Whole," *The Public Interest* 68 (Summer 1982): 124.

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percent and increased its weight from ten tons to over twelve, with a proportional reduction in acceleration. It also increased the plane's complexity, owing to the installation of additional avionics, radar, and electronic countermeasures, with proportional reductions in reliability and maintainability. As a result of these changes Fallows concluded that while the F-16 remains a fine weapon, it is also "so much less than it might have been."[36]

What Fallows's conclusion overlooks is that every dual-purpose F-16 can replace two single-purpose aircraft: a pure air superiority fighter *and* a dedicated ground-attack aircraft. This means that even if the F-16 cost 75 percent more to acquire, operate, and maintain than the single-purpose alternative, a fixed budget could still be stretched 12.5 percent further in terms of mission capabilities by buying it instead. Since the true life-cycle costs of the F-16 are only about 30 to 40 percent higher than those of dedicated ground-attack aircraft like the A-10 or the A-7, the actual payoff in terms of increased cost effectiveness from the air force's decision to make a multipurpose aircraft out of the F-16 is probably at least 30 to 35 percent.

In the real world, however, utility depends upon the jobs that actually have to be done. From this standpoint, the air force's decision to make a multipurpose aircraft out of the F-16 was a clear winner. F-16s assigned a ground attack role performed yeoman service in the Gulf; those assigned a pure fighter role turned out to be superfluous. If, on the other hand, American forces had been required to fight the Soviet Union rather than Iraq, the air force's decision might have looked different. The point is that DOD must prepare to fight a variety of different wars.

The Pentagon's problem lies not in trying to use one platform for multiple purposes, but in its propensity to carry this practice to extreme. According to John McNaugher this often causes the Pentagon to "produce systems that are flashy but not cost-effective and systems that perform so many functions they perform none well." As an example of the former he cites the F-15's top speed of Mach 2.5. Its extra Mach probably increased total life cycle cost 10 to 15 percent without significantly improving combat effectiveness. As an example of the latter, he cites the Bradley fighting vehicle, which costs nearly twice as much as the armored personnel carrier it replaced and is asked to do so many things that it apparently does none very well.[37]

Too Many Cooks Spoil The Broth

Why does the DOD have trouble making trade-offs? Why does it often try to build extravagant weapons that do, if not all things for all purposes, too many things at too high a price? According to the acquisitions experts, this question

[36] Fallows, *National Defense*, 106.
[37] McNaugher, *New Weapons Old Politics*, 128–29.

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has several answers, but most boil down to organizational bloat. Some of the bloat is due to congressional micromanagement, but most is self-inflicted. McNaugher, for example, provides a finely nuanced discussion of how the DOD's oversized and overcomplicated acquisition organization induces "pressures for consensus [that] create a systematic tendency toward so-called gold plate."[38] Of course, decision making by consensus is frequently inimical to performance. Consensus requires avoiding hard choices; getting things done requires clear choices and firm priorities.

The pressures inhibiting hard choices about trade-offs are hardest to control during the project definition phase of the acquisition process in which the need for a new system is demonstrated in terms of specific operational requirements; cost-effectiveness is justified; and goals, timetables, and project milestones are established. In other words, when all the key elements of a development project are tied together into a single plan or budget that defines for both DOD and industry what is wanted, how it is to be designed and built, how it is to be used, what it will cost, and which procurement strategy will be used to manage the project. No one suggests that there is anything inherently wrong-headed about putting together a comprehensive project plan before initiating full-scale development. Quite the contrary, it would be rash of the DOD to do otherwise where large endeavors are concerned. However, each of the elements of such a plan are potentially controversial, especially those aspects having to do with military requirements.

The structure of the military departments' systems commands—the agencies with first-line responsibility for project definition and, subsequently, supervision of project acquisition—guarantees that the definition phase will generate conflict over operational requirements. This is because their structures parallel the functional components of the systems they develop, which insures that each command will house a substantial number of factions—each with its own doctrines, concerns, and interests. The size of the system commands helps to guarantee that these conflicts will be resolved by consensus and papered over. Unfortunately, conflict is all too easily avoided by accommodating every faction or interest, which leads to the elaboration of extravagant operational requirements.

The systems commands are huge. In 1984, the largest of them, the Air Force Systems Command, had a staff of 26,000, including 10,500 officers and thirty-four generals. Its central headquarters at Andrews Air Force Base was divided into sixty-eight directorates, which reported to the commander, a full general; the vice commander, a major general; and eleven deputy chiefs of staff, mostly brigadier generals. The actual work of the Systems Command was carried out by four operating divisions, each headed by a lieutenant general—space equipment in Los Angeles, electronics at Hanscom Field in Massachusetts, aircraft at Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio, and armaments at Eglin AFB in Florida. Of

[38] Ibid., 128.

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course, each of these divisions had its own headquarters. In addition, there were eight other lesser divisions and centers under the System Command, including the Contract Management Division at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico.[39]

Moreover, their personnel are chronically underemployed. Between 1965 and 1984, the Aeronautical Division at Wright-Patterson, for example, developed only two bombers, three fighters, a transport, and a trainer. As Edward Luttwak explains:

> It is the . . . natural tendency of a chronically underemployed research and development bureaucracy to welcome exacting specifications that impose the need for a research-and-development program every time the Air Force needs some product or another. Finally it is also the natural tendency of an equally overstaffed supervising bureaucracy to impose all sorts of controls on manufacturers and to demand mountains of paper work.[40]

Chronic underemployment also means that the myriad factions that comprise the systems command can afford to participate at each of the multiple sites within government where a project can be vetoed. These include not only those sites within the systems commands themselves, but also the offices of the military department's assistant secretary for research and development and the undersecretary of defense for research and development, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) department of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the office of the assistant secretary—comptroller, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and of course more than ninety committees and subcommittees of Congress.

Since disaffected interests within the systems commands cannot be excluded from these sites and since their opposition could seriously damage a project's prospects, it is hardly surprising that project managers prefer to keep criticism from their nominal allies within the systems development community. The easiest way to get the potential participants on board is to give each of them a piece of the action by including their concerns in the operational requirements of the proposed system. Of course, the greater the number of participants, the greater the number of military requirements that must be accommodated.

The F-15 is a classic example of how this process works. According to McNaugher, the Air Force Systems Command was dominated by two competing parties, each with its own theory of air-to-air combat. Rather than deciding between these theories, producing a clear winner and a clear loser, the F-15's operational requirements reflected a consensus of both. As a consequence, the F-15 had all of the possible attributes of the ideal fighter-bomber, except that it wasn't small and it wasn't cheap and it was far less reliable than it could have been.

[39] Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 166–74.

[40] Ibid., 170.

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This problem of gold plating resulting from consensus building during the requirements process is exacerbated by layers of oversight. The complexity of the program approval process and the turbulence caused by the proliferation of program hurdles reinforce the propensity to build consensus. If there were fewer bodies with the power to kill or maim programs, program managers probably wouldn't have to defer to so many special interests during the design phase of program development. Moreover, at one time, if trade-offs had to be made, the project managers were more or less free to make them during project execution. Nowadays, unfortunately, congressional and press scrutiny tends to deny project managers the discretion to make trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance characteristics.

Nevertheless, the military departments themselves must take primary responsibility for the bloat that infects the acquisition process. According to Luttwak:

> Any Air Force systems we might have, indeed any government buying outfit, would suffer from the same tendencies. But it is the great surplus of middle-ranking officers that has led to the luxuriant growth of the Systems Command bureaucracy we actually have, and then in turn to its grotesque overmanagement, which drives those natural tendencies to extremes.[41]

Like many of the excesses burdening the DOD, the officer surplus is a legacy of the postwar era. It is one that should not be permitted to survive the end of the cold war.

Solutions?

According to the experts cited earlier, the systems acquisition process should be a fun-house mirror image of the existing process—similar in form and content, but much slimmer and more streamlined. Most believe that the existing federal acquisitions regulations are fundamentally sound. The existing regulations prescribe the following actions prior to the award of a development contract:

- Define the problem.
- Clarify the user's basic need.
- Establish operational requirements.
- Based upon user interaction, flesh out the specifications.
- Perform should-cost analysis and determine availability of funds.
- Develop a procurement strategy (sole source or competitive, invitation to bid or request for proposals, flexible-price or fixed-price, step-by-step or total-package procurement) that reflects the attributes of the product sought and the capabilities of both potential suppliers and the skills of the acquisition team.
- Schedule the acquisition.
- Confirm with user the work schedule and the system's requirement.

[41] Ibid.

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- If the strategy calls for competition, develop evaluation criteria to be used in selecting one or more suppliers.
- If the acquisition is not simply a low-bid auction, prepare, review, and release request for proposals, otherwise issue invitation to bid.
- Establish evaluation team.
- Conduct technical evaluation.
- Determine competitive range and negotiate with contractors who are in the competitive range.
- Review revised proposals including best and final offers.
- Finally, award contract(s) and debrief nonselected contractors.[42]

Each of these steps makes sense. Procedures should be in place to ensure that each is carried out properly. The system fails not because these steps are overlooked or because acquisition officials are incompetent or corrupt, but because the individuals responsible for carrying them out are denied the discretion they need to do their jobs. Each of the required steps calls for the exercise of a high order of judgment, including making some choices that may be more or less arbitrary. This is equally true in the execution of contracts, especially flexible-price contracts. Where a controversial decision has been made to rely on fixed-price contracts, it is true of fixed-price contracts as well.

A combination of three circumstances hampers the exercise of discretion on the part of the DOD's acquisition officers. I have already mentioned the numbing effect induced by the overexpansion of the system commands and the numerous layers of review they impose between program managers and top DOD officials. In addition, program managers are forced to share their authority with contract officers and auditors, with a subsequent loss of needed control.

There is also the propensity of nearly everyone concerned with the acquisitions process at each step in the contracting process to second guess the program manager's judgments. Consequently, every one of the program manager's judgments may have to be explained and defended at each of the many sites where the project could be vetoed. One result of the proliferation of review layers is that many program officers spend a lot more time explaining, justifying, and defending their programs than they do managing them. Furthermore, the acquisitions officer's interlocutors frequently question the content of judgments and not just the procedures followed in making them or their consequences, as would be proper.

Serious as these circumstances are, however, there is a third, which is even more fatal to the exercise of judgment: the statutes and internal DOD policies that expressly limit the proper exercise of the acquisitions officer's discretion. At several of the steps in the contracting process, Congress, the OMB, the OSD, or

[42] John J. Crowley, *Program Managers Course* (Washington, DC: CIA, Directorate of Science and Technology, 1984), III-1-20.

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the civilian secretariats of the military departments have prescribed the choices that they want the acquisitions officer to make.

While the existing acquisition regulations grant the acquisitions officer the nominal authority to overrule these choices, they impose upon him or her the burden of showing the preferred alternative to be impractical or inappropriate. For example, in the selection of an acquisition strategy, existing regulations permit negotiations with a sole source; they also permit source selection to be based on factors other than price, but the acquisition officer must first prove on the record that his decision is justified. Not only is this requirement out of step with reality, it often forces the acquisitions officer to tip his hand in negotiations carried out prior to and during the execution of a contract.

Most acquisition experts call for the elimination of the statutes that limit the proper exercise of the acquisition officer's discretion. They all call for a substantial reduction in the size and scope of the systems commands, systems specifications, evaluation teams, and in the number of criteria the evaluation teams consider in the source selection process. Most call for clear command channels, limited reporting requirements, and project teams with small high-quality staffs. In order to curb goldplating and to elicit leaner responses to proposals from contractors—a step that would immediately reduce overhead—most would also like to see a return to the kind of selective attention that characterized Congress's relationship with the DOD during the 1947-1965 era. In addition, nearly all acknowledge that America has too many military plants to modernize, let alone keep. Significant rationalization is called for, as is the use of advanced technology—both product and process technology—to design and manufacture lower cost products. As Jacques S. Gansler puts it:

> In general the US must move toward a greatly consolidated defense industrial base, one which is far more integrated between the civilian and military sectors. . . . This will require making defense a more attractive business: this means less regulation, fewer product specifications, more business-like procurement practices, more stability, and more rewards for quality performance.[43]

What is not known is exactly how to get from here to there.

Organizational Structure

According to Harvard Business School's J. Ronald Fox, the DOD's acquisition management structure should have the following elements:

- A single, well defined procurement chain of authority within DOD.
- Program managers with clear authority to override other interested parties within the DOD (the user, functional specialists, advocates of competition, small business, and other socioeconomic programs).
- A single, well-defined monitoring and auditing authority.

[43] Gansler, *Affording Defense*, 52.

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- A single, well-defined channel for congressional inquiry and oversight.
- To address the problem of organizational proliferation and the diffusion of responsibility it engenders, DOD should identify each organizational unit influencing the acquisition process by name and define its role in unambiguous language.[44]

Several of these organizational changes have been adopted by OSD as part of Defense Management Report initiatives. In addition, the DOD has designated acquisitions executives and established program executive officers with nominal authority over the various organizational layers that influence the acquisition process.

Despite these initiatives, flabby organization continues to be a major impediment to improving the effectiveness of the defense acquisitions process. Clearly the problems posed by the proliferation of interested parties have not been corrected by these initiatives. As one senior official in the Navy Department remarked, "everybody is still falling all over everybody else; I just don't see any real changes." Moreover, the new acquisition executive officers still have limited authority regarding assignment and promotions of personnel, especially those not directly assigned to the program staff. In the mean time, the DOD has broadened the definition of acquisition to cover almost any function that has to do with a weapon system or piece of equipment, not just their procurement, production, contracting, and R&D management.

Organizational Development and Staffing

Fox wants to give acquisition managers greater discretion and managerial authority. At the same time, he worries that they won't know how to use greater authority if they get it. Consequently, he stresses the importance of improving the quality and training of acquisition managers and the processes by which they are selected and groomed to perform their roles. In addition, he argues that rigid pay scales and seniority-based promotion standards of civil service preclude the employment of the best people in the government acquisition system. In its place he would substitute a personnel system that would provide far greater flexibility in status, pay, and qualifications, particularly at the senior level. The model for the system he has in mind is the so-called China Lake project, in which employees—scientists and engineers, clerical personnel, and senior professional, administrative, and technical specialists—of the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California, and at the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego received pay incentives and promotions based upon performance under a radically decentralized personnel system.[45]

[44] Fox, *The Defense Management Challenge*, 306.

[45] Ibid., 260–61, 314. James Q. Wilson provides an excellent short description of this experiment. See Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 146–48.

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Fox argues that in addition to requiring both technical training and business skills the DOD must provide a focused lifetime career path that progresses from technical work to assignments at laboratories, program offices, plant representative offices, to full management responsibility for small programs, and ultimately large ones, if it is to develop fully qualified acquisition managers.

> The challenge of managing the defense acquisition process effectively and efficiently requires a delicate balance between the adversarial role and the pure partnership role. . . . Achieving that balance requires years of training and experience to learn to cope with the complexities of the process, the day-to-day negotiations, and the marketing tactics within government, within industry, and between government and industry. What is needed is . . . a business . . . partnership . . . characterized by rigorous bargaining, accompanied by tenacious regard for the best interests of one's own side.[46]

With a lifetime of schooling and practice as his yardstick, Fox concludes that the DOD's current acquisitions cadres are inadequately prepared to perform their proper duties. Moreover, he is skeptical that their scrimpy preparation can be meaningfully remedied by a twenty-week course at the Defense Systems Management College.

Using less exacting but more realistic standards, one would still have to conclude that many of DOD's program managers lack the technical proficiency and bargaining savvy they need to do their jobs. Over the last several years I have talked with dozens of DOD financial, program, and contract managers, and budget and cost analysts, both in uniform and out. While I have often been highly impressed by their dedication and commitment and far more often than not by their intelligence, I have also frequently been amazed by the disparity between their actual theoretical and practical know-how and the expertise required of them by their assignments.

Fortunately, this is one area where the DOD is making rapid progress. The air force has gone farthest in its development of an acquisition career program, but the other services are not far behind. And all three services have evidently accepted the idea that developing adequate military program managers leaves candidates no time to become experts in a military operational specialty as well. Furthermore, the DOD is committed to providing the rank needed to secure and retain top-notch acquisition specialists.

Will Deregulation Work?

Will the reforms proposed by the acquisitions experts work to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the acquisitions process? Management theory says they will. Furthermore, clear command channels, limited reporting requirements, and small high-quality project teams are characteristics of successful private-

[46] Fox, *The Defense Management Challenge*, 303.

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sector project management efforts.[47] However, the best evidence for the efficacy of the proposed reforms is the success of acquisitions programs such as the Polaris, the SR-71, and the F-16, which were shielded from bureaucratic oversight and the scrutiny of Congress. These show what can be done when red tape is cut, authority and responsibility are coupled, and organization is decentralized to the working level. The successful and (for its time) highly sophisticated Polaris was completed as an operational weapon in about three and a half years, well ahead of schedule. Vice Admiral W. F. Raborn was given absolute discretion to manage this program and the full support of the navy and the DOD.[48] The SR-71 Blackbird, successor to the scandalous U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, was a secret project funded by the air force and the Central Intelligence Agency. With stable funding, full authority and responsibility, and a high degree of autonomy, Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson of Lockheed's famed Skunk Works was twice able to produce world-beating planes—in the U-2 and the SR-71—under budget and ahead of schedule.[49]

The Polaris and the SR-71 were top secret programs. The authority given their program managers, the streamlining of the acquisitions process, and their small high-quality project teams were primarily by-products of the decision to restrict access to the the project to those who had "a need to know." As a consequence of this restriction, program managers were just that. They ran projects, made decisions, sold them to a limited hierarchy, and rose or fell with the results. There was no second guessing the content of their judgments, no multiple layers of review. Project audits were few; audit teams had to be kept small and cost measurements simple. Their exploration of requirements had to be restricted to a small circle of users. Requirements were therefore kept to a minimum, as were the teams that evaluated them. Nonselected contractors couldn't complain to program managers' bosses or to Congress—at least not loudly—and program managers were entirely free from press scrutiny. The managers of secret programs had to be guided by the armed service's procurement regulations, but the nominal discretion accorded program managers by those regulations was for them a reality.

Most people I have talked with who have worked on both secret programs and those conducted in the open believe that the secret programs were better managed. Instead of being compelled to rely on the adversarial way of buying—with suppliers held at arms length, frequent bidding contests, and orders shifted among suppliers chosen simply on price—managers of secret programs were free to follow businesslike practices and establish close working partnerships based on

[47] See Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons form America's Best-Run Companies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

[48] Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow-Down at the Pentagon," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (January 1965): 270.

[49] James Kitfield, "Black Programs: Too Big to Hide?" *Military Forum* 26 (April 1989): 25–28; Gregory, *The Defense Procurement Mess*, 167.

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long-term mutual dependence, to nurture suppliers, and to fire them if they failed to produce.

In recent years, however, secret programs have been subjected to increased bureaucratic and congressional scrutiny. The GAO now audits secret programs and those programs generally have to follow the same rules as those that are conducted in the open.

> Added layers of oversight have slowed even the formerly streamlined Skunk Works process down . . . the size of the government's program office at the Skunk Works has increased tenfold since 1965, and the subsequent number of military specifications and required reports have thus shown similar increases. Yet in 1987 the plant produced one-third the number of aircraft it did in 1965.[50]

As a result of these changes, secret programs are probably managed no better or worse than the DOD's other acquisitions. According to Jeffrey Phillips, a GAO analyst, "The kinds of problems we're now seeing in special-access programs are the same types of problems we've been seeing in similar, high-risk unclassified programs."[51]

Regrettably, the case for deregulation is based primarily on experience with a few programs, most of them secret. Evidence that secret programs were on average more efficient and effective than other programs when they were burdened with fewer bureaucratic gatekeepers and less congressional scrutiny and micromanagement would be extremely useful. But we don't really know that they were. Neither do we know for certain that they have become less efficient on average because their management has become more bureaucratized. All we have to go on is hearsay. Indeed, most of what we think we know about acquisitions is based upon anecdotal evidence from case studies. However, there is a case to prove nearly every point and for every case there is a counterexample. The fact is that case studies are rarely conclusive.

The Need for Information

What the DOD really needs is a careful program of experimentation to determine how costs vary with policies and whether short lines of communication, clear responsibility, accelerated schedules, and a modicum of congressional neglect will produce the benefits touted by the experts. Not only is this information needed by program managers, it is also needed to help persuade Congress to back away from its direct supervision of the systems acquisition process, something that neither theory nor hearsay can accomplish. Congressional intervention is too deep for that.

[50] Kitfield, "Black Programs," 27.

[51] Quoted by Kitfield, "Black Programs," 25. See also David C. Morrison, "Pentagon's Top Secret 'Black' Budget Has Skyrocketed During Reagan Years," *National Journal*, 3 January 1986, 498–512.

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Would better information matter? Many students of congressional micromanagement say no: they claim that the procurement process is staggeringly Byzantine not by accident but by design and that procurement reforms are inevitably destined to fail, because they leave in place the political institutions that created the problems in the first place.[52] These claims remind me of arguments that were often made by academics during the struggles of the late 1970s to deregulate transportation. At that time there was much talk about iron triangles, about the demand for and the supply of regulation, and about how despite the strength of the theoretical case for deregulation regulatory reform was not politically feasible. In fact, those concepts were never more widely accepted or endorsed than at the moment Congress acted.[53]

It is my impression that congressional micromanagement of the DOD is very much like transportation regulation in that it too is the product of an implicit alliance between pork-barrel politics and the public interest. While it was not possible for regulatory reformers to change votes that were in the hip pockets of the truckers or the Teamsters, there was a large majority in Congress that was concerned about serious public policy issues—rates, transportation safety, and efficiency. It probably won't be possible for procurement reformers to change votes that are primarily motivated by military pork. But it seems to me that there is a potential majority in Congress that cares more about military efficiency and effectiveness and questions of waste, fraud, and abuse than they do about who gets defense dollars or where they are spent. Those votes could be changed if their holders were persuaded that the acquisition strategies advocated by the experts really would work.

There is one dramatic difference between the case for deregulation of transportation and the case for deregulation of defense procurement. In addition to theory, the advocates of deregulation clearly had facts on their side—cold, hard facts that showed that fares were lower under deregulation than under regulation. Those who now advocate deregulating defense offer little such evidence.

[52] These claims have two versions: one stresses the parochial self-interest of members of Congress, defense contractors, and the procurement bureaucracy; the other stresses good intentions gone awry, combined with an inability to limit participation in decision making for defense. The first is mostly wrong; see F. Thompson "Why America's Military Base Structure Can't be Reduced," *Public Administration Review* 48 (January-February 1988): 557–63. The second is ably expounded by McNaugher, *New Weapons Old Politics*.

[53] This discussion of transportation deregulation is based primarily on L. R. Jones and Fred Thompson, "Taking Risks for Efficiency: The Political Economy of Uncertainty," *Academy of Management Review* 9 (October 1984): 746–56. See also Dorothy Robyn, *Braking The Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and the Politics of Reform* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

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Book Reviews

We the People: Foundations *by Bruce Ackerman. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1991. 369 pp. $24.95.*

This well constructed and compellingly argued work is the first of a three-volume effort to provide a broad reinterpretation of the first two centuries of American national higher lawmaking experience. Contending that Americans have developed a distinctive form of constitutional democracy, Ackerman laments the "Europeanization of constitutional theory" (p. 4) among students of the American constitutional system and persuasively contends that American constitutional development cannot be understood in terms of borrowed European categories. Instead of the models provided by either the monistic democracy of European parliamentary systems in which plenary lawmaking powers are held by the winners of the last election or the historicists who emphasize the slow accretion of precedent over time, Ackerman proposes a new dualist democracy model that, he contends, more accurately reflects the constitutional experience of the country.

This model rests upon a distinction between two sorts of fundamentally different politics that, according to Ackerman, have characterized American public life: normal politics, in which, to quote the dust jacket, "organized interest groups try to influence democratically elected representatives," and "constitutional politics, in which the mass of citizens mobilize to debate matters of fundamental principle." By this distinction, Ackerman intends to focus attention upon those periods when American have "successfully repudiated large chunks of their past and transformed their higher law to express deep changes in their political identity" (p. 19).

These periods of repudiation and creativity do not include the "Jeffersonian and Jacksonian experiments with the plebiscitarian Presidency," which merely reinforced "the Founding vision of an assembly-dominated and federalistic lawmaking process" (p. 78). They do include the founding era in the late 1780s; reconstruction, which "legitimated an unprecedented penetration of the federal courts into areas where the states had previously been free to decide on their own authority" (p. 82); and the New Deal, which saw an enormous expansion of the role of the federal government. Together, in Ackerman's view, developments during these three widely separated episodes have provided the United States with its own special "constitutional tradition of revolutionary reform" (p. 24).

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With impressive historical erudition, Ackerman correctly locates the roots of this revolutionary tradition in the founding era. Although he recognizes that the Founders had limited social and economic goals, he insists that they "elaborated a revolutionary language and practice" that "allowed future Americans to take to the higher lawmaking track to challenge many of the verities held by the Founders themselves" (pp. 220–21), including during the New Deal even "the *property-oriented substance*" of the Founders' own "particular social vision" (p. 228).

This volume represents an admirable beginning to a project that promises to recast our understanding of the character and substance of American constitutional experience.

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Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward *by David Bachman. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 262 pp. $42.50.*

The Great Leap Forward of 1958 is often seen as springing from Mao Zedong's head, the disastrous embodiment of his vision of communism. David Bachman shows that the policy elements Mao combined in the Leap had been drafted and field-tested by a coalition of economic planners and heavy-industry leaders. They were reacting against a crisis in the agricultural sector and against the proposals for dealing with it put forward by a rival bureaucratic group, which Bachman labels the financial coalition.

In revising the history of the Leap's origins, Bachman provides a compelling institutional model of economic policy making in China. Although he does not use this term, he provides the most articulate statement of the bureaucratic interest group approach, which serves as an alternative to factional and leader-centered models of the Chinese policy process.

What Bachman calls the financial coalition favored balanced, steady growth with allowance for modest increases in consumption to provide incentives for increased agricultural output. The planning and heavy industry coalition advocated breakthrough development through enormous investment in state-owned, large-scale heavy industry. In keeping with the expectations of the institutionalist approach, Bachman shows how each coalition advocated a position that it believed in, that served the interests of its constituencies, and that called for more state investment for units it controlled.

Bachman uses these insights to decode the policy debates of the mid-1950s. Although behind-the-scenes details remain scarce, Bachman squeezes remarkable specificity out of the documents on the public record. What became Maoism had its origins in these debates. Bachman unveils how the seemingly contradictory

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elements of heavy industry, local economic self-reliance, small and medium-sized factories, decentralization, and industrial aid for agriculture worked together in the planning coalition's scheme to make Maoism in some ways even more Stalinist than Stalinism. He thus deconstructs the myth of Maoist economics as pro-peasant and antitechnocratic. He also demythologizes the chief alternative to Maoism, which was not a market system that favored entrepreneurs and peasants, but another version of Stalinism stressing slower, steadier growth, balanced budgets, and permission for small-scale economic activity outside the scope of the plan.

Since the two coalitions have been permanent features of the Chinese landscape, Bachman's argument also applies well to later cycles in the Chinese economy. The leaps favored by the planning coalition prevailed until the resulting efficiency crisis brought the financial coalition to the fore for a dose of recovery. To some extent the same institutional dynamics still operate in the current policy disputes between Deng Xiaoping and his rival Chen Yun. Ironically, in the 1950s Chen was the representative of the financial coalition; today he is the spokesman of the conservative faction representing heavy industry. Both times he has been on the losing side.

In correcting earlier leader-centered interpretations, Bachman may overemphasize the role of the bureaucracy. If the bureaucrats' options constrained Mao, the bureaucrats in turn were constrained by the economic system Mao had shaped, and they framed their proposals in anticipation of Mao's policy preferences. Mao chose among and altered their proposals, creating policy combinations that made victims of many of the bureaucrats and their constituencies in both coalitions. At a higher level of abstraction, both Mao and the bureaucrats were limited by Chinese economic reality. Given the shared goal of rapidly industrializing a poor peasant country in a hostile international environment, the proposals of the financial coalition were doomed to rejection because they accepted too slow a rate of industrial growth.

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Bureacracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China *edited by Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992. 379 pp. $45.00.*

Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from 1989 *edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1992. 300 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $19.50.*

The sporadic efforts by the field of Chinese politics to bring itself into alignment with contemporary political science were apparently knocked for a loop by the Chinese protest movement of spring 1989 that culminated in the Tiananmen

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massacre. Scholars who thought that a decade of reform had promoted institutionalization and stability were mystified by the nation-wide upsurge of political protest. Those who perceived China as ripe for political transformation were perplexed by the triumph of the communist old guard in China on the very eve of the collapse of European communism. Individual and collective soul-searching—the union dues of China specialists—again became the order of the day.

These two excellent books deal respectively with bureaucracy and popular protest—the Yin and the Yang whose complementary interaction generates the dynamics of modern Chinese politics. The Lieberthal-Lampton volume, the product of a June 1988 American Council of Learned Societies/Social Science Research Council [ACLS/SSRC] conference on the "Structure of Authority and Bureaucratic Behavior in China" significantly advanced our understanding of Chinese bureaucracy. Taking as their general point of departure a "fragmented authoritarianism" model of Chinese politics presented by Lieberthal in a particularly stimulating introductory essay, the eleven contributors examine a broad range of bureaucratic behavior at various levels and in different functional areas of the Chinese political system. It is a rare pleasure to report that all of the contributions are well grounded in empirical research, methodologically solid, and consistently interesting. The chapters by David M. Lampton, Susan L. Shirk, Carol Lee Hamrin, and Nina P. Halpern—because they deal with national issues and with the center of the political system—will probably be of greater interest to comparativists. But the chapters by Jonathan D. Pollack, Lynn Paine, Melanie Manion, Barry Naughton, Paul E. Schroeder, Andrew G. Walder, and David Zweig are equally well crafted and collectively demonstrate a new maturity and sophistication in the field of Chinese political studies.

A recurrent conclusion in the volume is that the political changes of the reform decade of the 1980s were at best partial and uneven. Instead of producing a Weberian rationalization of the Chinese bureaucracy, ever more complex patterns of personalistic networks and bargaining relations have developed as new actors competing for new resources have proliferated in post-Mao China. Lieberthal notes, the "system lacks clear rules and a stable distribution of authority" (p. 20). Pollack observes in his study of the Chinese military system, "military command arrangements still seem an uneasy mix of personalistic and professional considerations" (p. 169). Many of the changes enhance the centrifugal tendency of the system, pointing toward greater decentralization and further fragmentation of authority. But Halpern suggests that the center's concentration of specialized information and new communications technologies has had an opposite effect. What is quite clear is that even though "old patterns of authority have not decreased or changed as much as one might have predicted" (Zweig, p. 335), because the entire system is in a state of considerable flux, the studies present a picture of the whole that needs to be constantly reexamined and revised. Fortunately, the scholarly personnel and resources are now available in the China field to do just that.

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The Lieberthal-Lampton volume deliberately eschews political culture as a variable for explaining Chinese bureaucratic behavior, but the Wasserstrom-Perry volume explicitly engages this concept in new and extremely fruitful ways. In her concise and insightful introduction to this collection of eleven papers—most of which previously appeared in journals—Perry disputes what she sees as an overly static concept of Chinese political culture associated with Lucian Pye and Richard Solomon. In its place, she offers a definition of Chinese political culture as complex and variable, as an arena of conflict as well as an enclosure of consensus.

The chapters in this book are much more uneven in quality. Certainly the most stimulating is Joseph W. Esherick's and Wasserstrom's study of the spring 1989 protest as a species of political theatre analyzed in terms of the symbols of traditional Chinese repertoires of protest. As they note correctly, "we will understand the protestors' actions better if we focus on their symbolic meanings and intended effects than if we scrutinize their words in search of some coherent political program" (p. 40). Several of the chapters contribute to the China field's dialogue over the relevance of the concept of civil society to Chinese reality. In this connection, James L. Watson's stress on orthopraxy as the core of Chinese identity and Timothy Cheek's careful analysis of how patriotism, patronage, and paternalism bind Chinese intellectuals to the state are worth noting. (Cheek's view of Chinese intellectuals is implicitly challenged by Perry Link in an important new book *Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China's Predicament.*)

Although all of the contributors are sympathetic to the spirit and goals of the 1989 protestors, Perry, in a superb essay, accuses Chinese intellectuals of "complicity in despotism" (p. 148) by contemptuously rejecting joint political action with the workers, farmers, and urban entrepreneurs who manifested great sympathy with the protest movement. If intellectual snobbery were not enough, Lee Feigon shows the dominance of patriarchal attitudes among the protestors despite the prominence of a few women such as Chai Ling among the leadership. In his thoughtful afterword to the volume, Wasserstrom examines western and Chinese studies of the protest movement as types of romantic and tragic narratives, fruitfully employing literary theory to understand how the events were depicted.

If, as John Israel reminds us, "student protest has become a central and enduring feature of contemporary Chinese political culture" (p. 107), bureaucracy, which is even more deeply rooted in Chinese history, is the core dimension of the political system. The choice of whether one studies one or the other dimension of Chinese politics reflects the temperament of the individual scholar, but an understanding of both is necessary if we are ever to understand the complex realities of China.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
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Ko-ops: The Rebirth of Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union *by Anthony Jones and William Moskoff. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1991. 176 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $12.95.*

This study of the development of the cooperative movement in the Soviet Union provides useful insight into the dynamics of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system. Rather than assuming that marketization will follow a similar pattern in postcommunist societies as observed in the noncommunist developing world, Jones and Moskoff provide a detailed study of the first stage of the marketization process in the USSR and focus on those factors that make the Soviet case distinctive. Thus their analysis highlights the political, economic, and social context in which the first steps toward the creation of private enterprise were taken in the USSR and how this environment shaped new entrepreneurial activities.

In the opening chapters, Jones and Moskoff provide an overview of the emergence of independent economic activities during the 1986–1990 period, with particular emphasis on the use of cooperatives as a vehicle for introducing private enterprise into the Soviet system. They argue that the choice of cooperatives to stimulate the economy during the early *perestroika* period reflected an evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach to economic reform, as well as a desire to maintain at least the appearance of a continuing commitment to socialist forms of economic organization.

Chapter Three focuses on those structural factors that shaped the profile of the cooperatives that emerged. The authors argue that because of the unusual environment in which the cooperatives were formed, the majority were strongly linked to state structures, and only a small percentage could be considered to represent genuine private enterprises. The dominance of these quasi-state cooperatives is traced to the state's near monopoly control over scarce resources, supplies, equipment, facilities, and financial credits during the 1986–1990 period.

Chapter Four highlights the legal and bureaucratic obstacles confronting these new entrepreneurs. The fifth chapter is an in-depth look at the corruption that permeated every aspect of state-cooperative relations and relations between cooperatives. Both chapters are filled with anecdotal evidence of the difficulties in creating and maintaining a profitable cooperative in the corrupt and fluid environment that characterized the last days of the Soviet Union. As such, they provide an unusual view into a world few of us have seen and create a fascinating picture of corruption, arbitrary intervention, bribery, and scandal.

The final three chapters provide an assessment of the place of the cooperative movement in society, politics, and the economy, respectively. In Chapter Six, Jones and Moskoff use Soviet survey data to demonstrate the lack of support for cooperative forms of activity among the bulk of society and to probe which aspects of the cooperative movement appeal or offend various sectors of society. The following chapter discusses the political mobilization of these new entrepreneurs and their formation of interest groups and political associations. Finally,

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Jones and Moskoff close with an assessment of the role of cooperatives in the economic reform program and their prospects for the future. The analysis of the political and economic roles of the cooperatives in the closing chapters, however, suffers in its brevity. The study would have benefited from a deeper analysis of these questions.

In its objective of providing a detailed account of one critical aspect of the transition to a market-oriented economy, however, *Ko-ops* succeeds admirably. By focusing on this single element in the transition process, Jones and Moskoff provide much needed empirical evidence of the distinctive features inherent in the transformation of centrally planned economies. Their conclusions also provide a strong hint about the difficulties likely to be encountered as the territories of the former Soviet Union attempt to move on to the next stage of the marketization process.

JANE I. DAWSON
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The Future of the Arab Nation: Challenges and Options *by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies. New York, Routledge, 1992. 520 pp. $95.00.*

The idea of a unified Arab nation has been consigned to the trash bin of history by some influential western Orientalists, but to many in the Arab world—including some of its most distinguished intellectuals—the concept not only lives on but has acquired new life because of the region's current disarray. A large team of these intellectuals, including political scientists, economists, and sociologists, has brought together in this book the fruits of a decade-long study in which they issue an impassioned new appeal for a unified approach to the political and developmental crises so pervasive among the Arabs today. Scarcely more than a decade after the Arab world seemed poised on a golden age of development, fueled by the oil boom, these Arab experts see a depressing number of powder kegs: bloody civil and inter-Arab conflicts, tensions resulting from the collapse of the oil boom, crises in development, structural unemployment, escapism and depression among the youth, growing income inequality, and ongoing humiliation by the West, among other things.

The organizers of this project set themselves an ambitious task. They have sought to distill all the relevant historical, economic, political and international data into what they call a "prospective analysis" of the Arab future. The resulting core product is three scenarios for the period 1990–2015: "division," "coordination and cooperation," and "Arab unity." The first scenario is basically an extrapolation of what the authors see as the present situation. They do not conceal their distress over what it may entail: further fragmentation, greater dependency on outside powers, and even "the disappearance of the Arab national identity in general, and some country identities in particular" (p. 279). Scenario number

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two, depicting "intermediate forms of cooperation and coordination," is based on an assumption that the alarming present situation "will prompt two or more ruling elites either to form regional groupings or to favour joint Arab coordination in certain fields." (p. 295). Interests more than shared sentiments drive this scenario, but the authors caution that country decision makers could still be prone to short-term and short-sighted policies. Yet they remain hopeful that in the economic sphere at least a functional spillover process could develop, paving the way for their third and preferred scenairo—Arab unity.

The Arab unity scenario spelled out by these social scientists is a far more sober and well thought out account than the romantic visions of earlier generations of Arab nationalists, such as the Ba'thists. Instead of complete fusion into a single state, this scenario insists on a federal form. Instead of unity being entrusted to a charismatic neopatriarchal leader, it must be achieved and nurtured through democratic participation. Instead of celebrating a monolithic Arabism, the federal Arab state will guarantee ethnic and religious pluralism. Perhaps the most compelling feature of the unity scenario is the economic benefits that the authors persuasively contend would result from its achievement. Mindful of existing class and political divisions, they envisage two possible forms of unity: one guided by a ruling elite interested in "furthering the interests of the wealthy social upper classes" (p. 394) and in keeping the Arab economy closely linked to (dependent on) the international economy; and the other representing "the interests of the popular masses." The authors clearly prefer the latter variant, seeing it as offering the best chance for "the new project for Arab revival" (p. 490) that could reverse the present slide. While expressing brave optimism about the feasibility of such a project, they are realistic enough to recognize the numerous "powder kegs" that could thwart its achievement.

This book represents a serious attempt by respected Arab intellectuals to grapple with the formidable problems gripping the Arab world today; as such it must be considered an important source for all students of Arab politics, integration, international relations, and economic development. The economic analyses are particularly valuable. It is perhaps inevitable with a futuristic project of this scope that there is much to criticize on substantive grounds. The organizing assumption of the project—that Arab unity (or the lack of it) is the basic cause of most present ills and the basic cure for them as well—is of course debatable; but the authors have presented their case well. Some may find too much blame being cast on the outside world—Israel, neocolonialism, the international system. The greater the counterfactual departure from what we take to be current realities, the weaker the plausibility of the scenario: thus, the Arab unity scenario seems vague in its depiction of socio-political structures in comparison with the scenarios of division and coordination. Nevertheless, the authors should be commended for their bold attempt to elucidate alternative Arab futures. More of this kind of thinking could improve the quality of governance and policy making throughout the Arab world.

I must regretfully add that the product is badly flawed in several respects. The

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most glaring—but to my mind the least troubling—fault is that the Arab world and the world in general have changed much faster than these Arab social scientists (and, in fairness, most of the rest of us) could have predicted. With the collapse of the Soviet Union a great deal of their analysis is now irrelevant. Their assumption of Israeli monolithic inflexibility blinds them to changes occurring within the Jewish state and their implications for the Arab future. Another surprise, the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and Gulf war, has sharply reordered the Arab balance of power and thus rendered some of their prognostications uninteresting. Yet that turn of events validates the logic of their scenario of division. But these weaknesses are thought-provoking: they are the kind of mistakes from which one can learn. Less forgivable, however, is the structure and methodology of this project. It has all the worst features of a committee report. The organizing concept of a prospective approach is vacuous and undiscriminating. Much of the writing is stupefyingly ponderous. I would advise readers to skip everything before Chapter 4; the meat of the study is in Part III (the three scenarios) and the concluding chapter. The quantitative data need fuller identification and citation, and the projections are insufficiently explained.

Notwithstanding the several frustrating aspects of this study, it is a significant addition to the literature on Arab politics and development, especially welcome for its boldness and originality, and for its attempt at empirical analysis, not simply ideological speculation.

MICHAEL C. HUDSON
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U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran *by Mark J. Gasiorowski. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1991. 242 pp. $35.00.*

"Cliency relationships have figured prominently in most of the major superpower confrontations of the Post-World War II era . . ." (p. 1). This, the second sentence of Mark Gasiorowski's study of Iran as a U.S. client state, cannot but prompt the reader to ask whether client state formation of the type explored here was peculiar to a now ended cold war era. If so, Gasiorowski's portrayal of cliency as an indispensable tool of international political influence that tends fatally to undermine the regimes it is designed to strengthen might be a springboard to future inquiries into the role of cliency in bringing the cold war to an end. Did failing clients induce their patrons to overextend themselves? Did client tails wag patron dogs in ways that were injurious to the dogs' health? Gasiorowski does not address these questions, either because he believes cliency will continue to play a crucial role in world affairs or because his manuscript was completed, or its ideas irrevocably set, before the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. He concludes the book with four policy options designed, with varying degrees of plausibility, to minimize the type of client state disaster that occurred in Iran.

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Since the emphasis in this book is on the dysfunctional aspects of client state policies, there is little about U.S. foreign policy making beyond the opening premise or about the balance sheet of cliency in Iran from a cold war point of view. Most of the book is devoted to a superb depiction of the rise of royal dictatorship in Iran and of the U.S. role in it. After a theoretically oriented first chapter on cliency and a serviceable second chapter on the background of foreign interference in Iranian affairs before 1951, Gasiorowski embarks on a fascinating account of U.S. efforts to manipulate Iran during the Mossadeq era from 1951 to 1953. Using both attributable and nonattributable sources from several intelligence and diplomatic services, Gasiorowski gives for the first time a detailed and precise account of the U.S. role in overthrowing Mohammad Mossadeq.

Following his main theoretical theme that cliency disastrously increases regime autonomy by substituting patron resources and dependency for support from internal political forces, Gasiorowski argues that after Mossadeq's fall, the shah progressively ignored, isolated, alienated, or suppressed all internal groups pressing for political participation. He did this not just because of an authoritarian predilection or megalomania, but also because of American economic, diplomatic, military, and police support. This support was understood as an inevitable part of superpower client state policies of the time. The upshot, he argues, was a hyperautonomous regime that was easy prey for a religiously oriented revolution. He concludes that the Iranian revolution developed not just because of the shah or because of U.S. deeds and misdeeds in the late 1970s but also because of a decades-long client state relationship that contained within it the seeds of its own destruction.

Critics of U.S. cold war politics can read this book as a case study of folly masquerading as hard-nosed foreign policy, but there is nothing polemical about the style of argument. Gasiorowski has made an important contribution to our knowledge of Iranian politics between World War II and the Iranian revolution, and he has done so within a theoretical framework that will assist other scholars in understanding the conduct of the cold war in the Third World. He leaves in abeyance, however, any consideration of how this history might contribute to Third World international relations in a post-cold war world.

RICHARD W. BULLIET
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Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating the Soviet Withdrawal *by Riaz M. Khan. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1991. 402 pp. $42.95.*

The civil war in Afghanistan, once the cause celebre of western cold warriors and journalists, has been generally forgotten following the Red Army's departure in February 1989. Fortunately, Riaz Khan has preserved an important component of the historic record in this book. Khan, Pakistan's director general for Afghanistan

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affairs, was involved throughout the eight-year diplomatic effort. Despite his official position, Khan presents a largely objective and detailed insider's account of the negotiations that culminated in the 1988 Geneva Accords.

Like most works of diplomatic history, in parts this book is dull reading. However, Khan does a solid job of juxtaposing the rather dry record of negotiations with the more intriguing military and political developments inside Afghanistan and among the regional and global actors. He observes that the negotiations themselves had a minimal impact on influencing the actual Soviet decision to withdraw. From Mikhael Gorbachev's perspective, "the draft agreements . . . provided a convenient, face-saving vehicle to extricate the Soviet Union from the Afghan quagmire, and thereby free his far-reaching domestic and global initiatives from this debilitating inheritance from the Brezhnev era" (p. 1). Despite the conclusion that Gorbachev ended Soviet involvement for political expediency, Khan believes the process leading to the final Geneva Accords, if not the actual agreement itself, was significant for a number of reasons.

First, the Geneva negotiations were important because of the added legitimacy and prestige they imparted upon the UN as an effective instrument of diplomacy and conflict resolution. Following the conclusion of the Afghan negotiations, the UN quickly concluded agreements for a cease fire in the Iraq-Iran war, the independence of Namibia, and made significant progress on the Cambodian conflict. Second, these positive developments considerably strengthened the office of the secretary general as an effective locale for negotiation, an arena previously monopolized by member states of the Security Council. The impartial and determined patience of UN envoy Diego Cordovez produced a sequence of agreements that "developed an intrinsic logic that sustained the negotiating process through heavy weather and gradually made an impact on the thinking and positions of the participants" (p. 291). Third, the negotiating process substantially dispelled the myth that the Afghan war, like many other Third-World conflicts, was solely an extension of East-West antagonism. Local and regional actors are seen by Khan as being significant players in their own right. Pakistan clearly pursued its own objectives, with Washington generally following Islamabad's policy initiatives. Likewise, Khan describes the Afghan leaders as disobedient clients whose negotiating positions betrayed differences between Moscow and Kabul.

Of these three points, the second and third are the most contentious. Clearly, the UN has gained prominence and legitimacy in recent years, as witnessed by its expanded role in the Gulf War and multiple new peace-keeping operations. However, Khan's judgment that the negotiating process influenced the actual thinking of the participants and that both Pakistan and Afghanistan acted with varying degrees of autonomy, seem to be moot points at best. As the author points out, Gorbachev's decision to withdraw had nothing to do with the negotiations, and the Geneva Accords were only signed after the Soviets threatened to withdraw unilaterally. Pakistan and Afghanistan may have pursued independent

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negotiating positions at Geneva; however, the conduct of the war itself was contingent on the material support provided by the superpowers.

The author finishes with a discussion of post-Soviet Afghanistan, concluding "the Geneva Accords have thus brought little relief to Pakistan and carry little meaning for Pakistani-Afghan relations until an internal political settlement materializes" (p. 301). In April-May 1992 this political settlement began with the downfall of Mohammed Najibullah's government. Therefore, Khan's timely book should be required reading for policy makers involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It fills a conspicuous gap in the meager literature on the Soviet war in Afghanistan and is a valuable book for students of conflict resolution, diplomatic history, Soviet foreign policy, and South Asian politics.

DOUGLAS A. BORER
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Africa in World Politics *edited by John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 341 pp. Cloth, $52.00; paper, $19.95.*

This volume, like the international currents it examines, occupies an uncomfortable niche between the old world dominated by the cold war and the newer international order, which may require years to emerge. Originally presented as conference papers in 1989, many of the individual essays in this work have been outrun by events. Nonetheless, this collection is worth reading and assigning to students in undergraduate courses in African international relations, for the editors have assembled a series of thoughtful, cogent, and occasionally stimulating analyses. Some of them, especially those dealing with historical patterns, political structures, and economic policies will still serve as useful introductions to problems that will not disappear quickly, regardless of how the international system may change in the future.

Harbeson and Rothchild nicely introduce the essays, situating the succeeding chapters in a comprehensible context. They are most concerned with Africa's increasing peripheralization and whether the changes afoot in the international environment are likely to accelerate this trend. They see four issues as critical in influencing Africa's role in whatever new international arrangements might emerge: the nature and role of the African state; the struggle between the international financial institutions (IFIs) and African states over structural adjustment; social and humanitarian issues; and Africa's cultural autonomy—or lack of it.

A tension exists in the book that many students of African politics currently share. As a group we are torn between our almost certainly unrealistic normative hopes that the new international configurations will increase both Africa's importance and viability on the one hand, and our more realistic empirical assessments of what is likely to be Africa's rapidly increasing political and economic marginalization in world affairs on the other. Harbeson and Rothchild speculatively give

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voice to these two divergent strands of thought. On the optimistic side, they state that ". . . the foreign policy agendas of the Western countries may shift in such a manner as to give Africa enhanced standing in world affairs" (p. 2). On the pessimistic side, they observe correctly, "Notable among these relationships that are not easily amenable to transformation is that of Africa's peripheral political and economic status in the contemporary world order" (pp. 3–4). This tension appears in many of the remaining chapters, with authors falling closer to one side or the other depending on their subject matter.

The remaining essays are, for the most part, quite good. Deserving special mention, however, is Thomas Callaghy's stimulating chapter on Africa's role in the world economy. He sees Africa's currently bleak situation as the combined result of its economic insignificance and the end of the cold war. He describes a "new neocolonialism" characterized by a heavy burden of external debt, the consequent need for foreign exchange, and the insistence of the IFIs on policy conditionality. When combined, these factors result in increased dependency. Africa, Callaghy argues, is "lost between state and market. It wanders between an ineffective state and weak markets" (p. 44).

Also worthy of note are John Ravenhill's piece on Europe and Africa; the very fine overview of both the constant and changing aspects of Africa's relations with the Middle East by Naomi Chazan and Victor LeVine; and John Harbeson's admirable attempt to grapple with the complexities of politics in the Horn of Africa as they relate to contemporary theories of international relations.

While this collection can chart definitively neither Africa's course through international waters over the next decade nor the effects of the changing international configuration on Africa's prospects for economic development and political change, it nevertheless provides a competent and useful introduction to the changing face of Africa's international relations.

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The Institutional Presidency *by John P. Burke. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 288 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $14.95.*

John Burke, associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont, has produced a useful description of the White House staff and the executive agencies of the president. Using an historical approach, Burke first describes the emergence of the institutional presidency in the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. By using what he refers to as the "organizational lens" and the "managerial lens," Burke describes the management styles of Roosevelt's successors, showing how the formal agencies and the informal leadership styles of each president intersect. He offers detailed descriptions of the inner workings of the White House during the Carter and Reagan presidencies and concludes with some observations about the Bush presidency.

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The theme of the book is the problem faced by each president: how to make the White House staff and executive office agencies work effectively and work for the president. Burke consciously tries to avoid generalizations based on the idiosyncrasies of each Oval Office occupant. He clearly aligns himself with those who believe that the presidency has been institutionalized, modernized, and professionalized (like Fred Greenstein and Hugh Heclo), rather than those (like Richard Neustadt and David Barber) who believe that the White House agencies are personalized and politicized anew by each president.

In his first chapter, Burke provides a useful introduction to White House staffing. He runs through staffing arrangements prior to Roosevelt, describes and assesses the work of the Brownlow Committee, provides a brief overview of the White House Office since 1941, and concludes with brief sketches of the agencies of the executive office of the president. Having established a descriptive foundation, he moves in his second chapter to more interesting material, treating the question of whether or not the White House staff can be considered an institution. For this proposition, he offers as evidence the increasing professionalization of middle-level aides and their divorce from party politics. Burke considers the possibility that the staff has become deinstitutionalized, but draws on the work of John Kessel and Margaret Wyszomirski to conclude that certain common elements remain from one administration to the next. Burke's third chapter considers the White House through the managerial lens, using the models developed by Richard Tanner and others to describe formalistic and collegial management styles. In his fourth chapter, using the organizational lens, he considers issues involving formal and informal channels of information, cabinet politics, multiple advocacy systems, and chiefs of staff and national security advisers who play the custodian-manager role. He then applies these concepts in three descriptive chapters to the Carter, Reagan and Bush presidencies.

Because Burke focuses on institutionalization, he omits material that calls his institutionalization thesis into question. There is no discussion of the new regulatory clearance mechanisms developed by the Office of Management and Budget and later used by Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, nor of the friction these clearance mechanisms generated with cabinet secretaries and career officials, not to mention with congressional committees. There is almost no discussion of Iran-contra or Watergate, though the White House staff operations were deeply affected by these scandals (and some argue that staff patterns were to blame for them). There are eight references to H. R. Haldeman, but no discussion of Watergate. There are several references to Alexander Haig, but no discussion of his role as chief of staff for Nixon, nor his role in the transition to the Ford administration. There are two references to Howard Baker, but the reader isn't told that Baker came in to clean up the debris following the Iran-contra scandal.

There is little discussion of the periodic scandals (political and personal) that make the chief-of-staff position such a liability for most presidents. The political liabilities of Roosevelt's and Truman's top aides are not discussed. There are

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seven references to Sherman Adams, but there is no discussion of the incident that led to his resignation. There are no references to Lyndon Johnson's aide Walter Jenkins and the sex scandal that forced him from the administration. There is not a single reference to Bert Lance and therefore no analysis of the bumpy start of the Carter administration. There is no discussion of the oft-times tense relationships that exist between the First Family and the senior White House aides, though there are brief references to the spat between Nancy Reagan and Don Regan.

Most important of all, Burke provides little discussion of the political roles played by the senior aides. The impression one gets from his book is that senior staffers spend most of their time on policy and process. Yet any serious account of the inner workings of the White House by those who participated almost always puts the major emphasis on politics: getting ready for the next elections, appeasing important constituencies (especially in Congress) by intervening with the bureaucracy, fashioning and protecting the president's image. Why else did Bush put Samuel Skinner out and James Baker in, if not for political purposes? Surely it was not to manage the domestic policy process. We ought to read more of the press secretary and the other image makers; if anything has become institutionalized, it is their role.

Burke offers a useful synthesis of the knowledge that presidency-watchers have gleaned about the formal operations of the White House. His organization of material is straightforward and his presentation is clear. His models involve intelligent packaging of concepts with which most political scientists who study the presidency and bureaucracy are already familiar, and he makes these concepts quite accessible to the novice as well as the professional. The book is ideally suited for use as a supplementary text in presidency and bureaucracy courses, especially those that emphasize policy rather than politics or prerogative. It should also be must reading for a future president interested in domestic policy; understanding its contents would help an incumbent so inclined to master the machinery of presidential government.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
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The Emergence of a Senate Leader: Pete Domenici and the Reagan Budget *by Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1991. 250 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $15.95.*

What makes Richard F. Fenno's books so readable and influential? They are marked by keen political insights and a superb blend of sharply refined variables supported by impressive empirical data. Moreover, Fenno's books have almost always been characterized by new theoretical paradigms, which force other scholars to rethink and expand their understanding and thus contribute to an ever widening accumulative knowledge about Congress.

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The Emergence of a Senate Leader: Pete Domenici and the Reagan Budget is the third monograph in a series of thematic studies of contemporary senators, their goal orientations, work patterns, and six-year election cycles. Its predecessors, *The Making of a Senator, Dan Quayle* (1989) and *The Presidential Odyssey of John Glenn* (1990) dealt respectively, with "how a bill becomes a law" (Quayle) and the temptations that many senators have to seek higher office (Glenn). In this reviewer's judgment, the Domenici book is the best so far. (A fourth book: *Learning to Legislate: The Senate Education of Arlen Specter* [1991] was fresh off the press just as the Pennsylvania Republican was achieving national notoriety for his grilling of Anita Hill in the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings.) A fifth and final book treating the reelection trials and governing experiences of North Dakota moderate Republican Senator Mark Andrews will be published by CQ Press in 1992. This will be the last book in this uniformly excellent series.

Congressional scholars will recognize the strong imprint of Fenno's now classic *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (1978) on these Senate books. In 1978, Fenno shifted his research away from the House and began following a half dozen or more senators, observing their legislative activities on Capitol Hill and accompanying them in their home states during campaign years. As with *Home Style*, Fenno's methodology depends upon in-depth observation over time and intensive interviewing of members of Congress and the supportive staff around them—what he has termed "soaking and poking."

Fenno accompanied Domenici in New Mexico in 1978, 1980, 1981, and 1984 and observed him in Washington in 1981 and 1982. The focus is on the changing experiences of a midcareer Senate committee leader from his reelection to a second term in 1976 to a six-year span (1981–1986) as Senate Budget Committee chairman. Fenno also provides a keen interpretive analysis of Demenici's abortive bid for the position of Senate majority leader in 1984. Domenici came in next to last but with a solid ten votes; Bob Dole of Kansas eventually edged Ted Stevens of Alaska 28–25 on the fourth ballot. The book ends as Dominici completes his seventh budget cycle during the Reagan presidency. This book is rich in substance and revealing of Domenici's cautious but maturing leadership style. Linking with Fenno's *Power of the Purse,* the Domenici book also contains a set of tables in an appendix that meticulously set forth budget resolutions and their dispositions for 1981–1986. We come to know and admire Domenici's personality and skills at developing budget resolution coalitions and winning in committee, on the floor, and in conference committees. We also find out how he converts a marginal seat into a 72 percent-plus majority in his second reelection bid in 1984.

As with his studies of Senators Quayle, Glenn, and Specter, Fenno builds on a new analytical paradigm based on the senatorial election cycle. He convincingly demonstrates for each senator that, "the campaigning—governing—campaigning sequence is the controlling sequence of every legislator's life" (p. xii). In the House, of course, this sequential life is built around a more frenzied two-year cycle—strong motivation for House members to run for the Senate.

All of us—congressional scholars and students, journalists, and public-minded

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citizens, many of whom support their own congresspersons even as they distrust Congress as an institution—are deeply indebeted to Fenno and his prodigious contributions since 1959.

Despite the generally empathetic research efforts of an entire generation of congressional scholars from 1960 to the present and a resulting increase in our understanding of how members seek goals, this has not been translated into favorable public approval for this complex institution. (Favorable approval bordered on 20 percent in 1991.) Redistricting of a higher percentage of open seats than usual and the turmoil surrounding the 1992 elections may well put some of the most cherished findings about incumbency return rates in jeopardy. But in the Senate, Pete Domenici (who incidentally lost out in another bid for internal leadership in 1980) remains a key player in budget politics, a critical moderate swing member, and for the reasons Fenno sets forth in his book almost unbeatable as he seeks a third term in 1992.

ROBERT L. PEABODY
Johns Hopkins University

Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States *by Margaret Weir. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992. 288 pp. $29.95.*

Why, Margaret Weir asks in this fine book, have the employment policies of the United States, a nation at least rhetorically committed to work and the values of independence and self-help, been so haphazard and ungenerous? In explaining this paradox, Weir helps us understand why the idea of full employment has been continually thwarted in the United States.

Weir answers her question by closely studying the development of two key policy areas: Keynesian macroeconomic policy and labor market policy. She finds in both cases a pattern of innovation and failure that has been shaped by a distinctive American conjuncture of ideas, institutions, political actors, experts, and interests. Because this book examines the boundaries of employment policy, the author establishes a conceptual framework for understanding how the domains of ideas and ideology interact with the worlds of politics and public policy to create a pattern of "bounded innovation" hostile to comprehensive thinking about employment policy. In this way *Politics and Jobs* adds another chapter to the story of American exceptionalism—a sophisticated and undogmatic one in which the author correctly rejects an overly deterministic view of the role of public opinion, the presumed American preference for limited government, and the influence of business and its perceived interest in weak employment policies. Weir offers one of the first genuinely theoretical overviews of the fate of jobs policies, at the same time capturing with the authority of first-hand historical research the immediacy of those critical moments when genuine efforts have been made to bring content to the idea of full employment.

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Weir's central chapters tell how the range of salient economic ideas, the linkage of employment policy to issues of race and poverty in the 1960s, the limited institution building capacity of the executive, and the nakedly partisan policies of the Nixon administration ultimately undermined the viability of broad American labor market policies. These chapters demonstrate how a policy sequence, which began with the idea of full employment in the 1940s, became sidetracked in the 1960s with the poverty programs of the War on Poverty. These programs began to crumble in the 1970s with the failures of public service employment and the wretched metamorphosis of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, and finally ended absurdly in the Reagan administration with the consolidation of the idea that government interference with the market made economic problems worse, not better.

In particular, Weir gives shape to our understanding of a somewhat inchoate period and phenomenon: the loss of certainty about economic formulas in the 1970s. She also recounts well the tale of Nixon's unsuccessful efforts to control the bureaucracy and the devolution of government responsibility for employment policy from federal to state levels under Nixon's New Federalism. This story takes on even greater importance now that the Nixon era has gained another hallmark of history—in addition to infamy, it has achieved distance in time.

Later, according to Weir, President Jimmy Carter was guilty of more than being an ineffectual and indecisive president. Through his exercise of antigovernment ideology and rhetoric, he helped to pave the way for the wholesale assault on liberalism and strong government ushered in by the Reagan administration. The rise of the ideology of privatization, unfettered markets, and monetarist economics were all aided by Carter's antigovernment rhetoric.

Although brief, Weir's conclusions on the future prospects for employment policy are sound and worth heeding. The potential for an enhanced role for broader labor market policies lies in connecting such policy ideas to the growing general concerns about America's competitive position in the international economy, dissatisfaction with American public education, and apprehension about the so-called underclass.

As Weir tells it, American employment policy is a story of continual frustration. One caveat, however, is that such analyses of great failures often seem to assume that more comprehensive sets of policy ideas were somehow more viable in the United States under different circumstances. Similar perspectives on the incomplete welfare state have been offered by state-centered theorists like Theda Skocpol. But were such ideas ever really viable in the United States? Short-term enthusiasm for policy ideas is characteristic of the United States, and it is unlikely any realistic set of circumstances could open the way for a genuinely comprehensive European-style social welfare state. This is not necessarily bad news for the prospects of liberal social welfare policies, but it does suggest the irony of liberal arguments that vitiate the appeal of targeted social welfare policies. In the end, targeted policies may be the most viable route to helping the unemployed and the poor in the United States, whatever their race.

In this and her other first-rate contributions to our knowledge of the peculiar

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dynamics of the American welfare state, Weir has made readers think deeply about alternative paths to public policy and the role of ideas and institutions in its determination.

JUDITH RUSSELL
Barnard College

Mayors and Money: Fiscal Policy in New York and Chicago *by Ester R. Fuchs. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. 361 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

Over the last two decades, every big city in America has undergone at least one bout of fiscal stress, and many have been on the brink of fiscal crisis. Since 1980, nearly every major urban government has seen its flow of federal funds slow while crime, homelessness, drug abuse, and other local problems have mounted. Still, some cities have coped more successfully than others.

In Ester R. Fuchs's magnificent *Mayors and Money,* we learn why some cities have endured periods of economic scarcity without serious fiscal problems, while other cities have not. We learn a much broader lesson as well: despite the profound contemporary limits on city governments, urban politics still matters.

For Fuchs, however, urban politics is not reducible to what a particular mayor, even a Fiorello LaGuardia or a Richard Daley, has done. While important urban policy outcomes cannot be explained simply by reference to political, economic, or other influences that transcend city limits, neither can they be explained simply by reference to the savvy (or incompetence) of those at the helms within city halls.

Instead, Fuchs offers what one might label an institutional understanding of urban politics in which "the mayor's decisions are affected by the interaction between past budgetary decisions, the local party organization, interest group expectations, intergovernmental relations, and the formal-legal arrangements of city government" (p. 278). Through a masterfully rigorous comparative historical analysis of fiscal policy in New York and Chicago, she shows how urban political structures mediate fiscal conditions, and "how local fiscal policy processes can make a difference in cities' fiscal conditions even during periods of economic scarcity," (p. 279).

In both New York and Chicago, recent fiscal stresses have replaced the politics of "who gets what?" with the politics of "who gets cut?" (p. 2). The fiscal policy process that evolved in New York from LaGuardia through Edward Koch made the city's policy makers and administrators unable to cope effectively with economic pressures. For example, as Fuchs argues in chapter six, when it came to coping with federal cutbacks, Chicago stumbled but did not fall because the centralized fiscal policy process that had evolved over the years permitted the mayor to make the necessary cutbacks in a timely fashion and facilitated long-term planning. In contrast, New York's response was hobbled by a "formal fragmentation of budgetary authority," (p. 226) especially between the mayor and the Board of Estimate.

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Fuchs understands that "(c)ities are not simply limited in their ability to provide redistributive services; they no longer have the revenue base to keep their infrastructure intact or to provide basic housekeeping services effectively" (p. 288). But her analysis reveals that by modifying its fiscal policy process, a city can tip the odds in favor of fiscal survival and maybe even flourish. Thus, she suggests that if New York City officials take advantage of recent changes in their fiscal process such as the abolition of the Board of Estimate, the city's fiscal house may well come to order for the first time since 1975. She also offers insightful practical advice to other cities that remain very much on the fiscal ropes.

Ultimately, however, the book's main contributions are intellectual, not prescriptive. With this superb book, Fuchs has done much to rescue urban politics from the dustbin of political science history. *Mayors and Money* should help to revitalize urban political studies as a subfield and to remove any doubts as to whether the politics of our cities is worth exploring in all its richness.

JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR.
Princeton University

Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House *by David W. Rhode. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 244 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $13.95.*

This book is a well written, lively, and carefully documented study of the resurgence of partisanship in the House of Representatives during the 1980s. The book is ideal for teaching. Rhode provides extensive background information about Congress, and he self-consciously borrows from and builds upon existing research and theory. To cite just two examples, Rhode neatly summarizes the scholarship on floor voting, and he clearly articulates differing perspectives on what constitutes strong legislative leadership.

Rhode argues that the reforms of the 1970s, combined with greater homogeneity in both parties in the House, contributed to the realization of "conditional party government" in the 1980s. Rhode distinguishes conditional party government from the discipline of parliamentary parties by the direction of influence. Under conditional party government, leaders are responsible to the members, rather than the reverse. Conditional party government replaces the "Boss" model of legislative leadership with leaders-as-agents of the party caucus.

A key building block to Rhode's thesis is his reexamination of the motivations of reformers in the 1970s. He argues effectively that "a major impetus for launching the reform effort in the House, as well as a basis on which the reforms were 'sold' to members, was the potential to change policy outcomes" (p. 19). The reforms were an effort "to enhance the collective control of power" by the majority party in the House (p. 27). In other words, liberal Democrats sought to create a lean, mean, fighting machine. According to Rhode, they succeeded.

In *Parties and Leaders* Rhode adroitly combines three levels of legislative

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analysis: environmental, institutional, and individual. Conditional party government, he argues, results from the conjunction of three causes: more ideologically homogeneous party memberships; institutional structures and rules designed to facilitate majority rule; and leaders willing to exercise authority as the instruments of their party caucus. According to Rhode, the speakership of Jim Wright during the 100th Congress marks the zenith of conditional party government.

This last observation, however, raises interesting questions about the book's thesis. The strong speakership of Jim Wright coincided with the lame duck status of a president weakened by Iran-contra. Would House Democrats have been as successful furthering, or defending, their agenda under less propitious conditions? Indeed, Speaker Wright was eventually forced to resign. The haste with which House Democrats abandoned Wright calls into question their commitment to "strong" leadership.

Finally, if conditional party government occurred naturally, why did we have increased partisanship within the House in an era of candidate-centered elections with weak parties in the electorate? House Democrats may have found a way to shortcircuit the nexus between partisanship in Congress and among voters. The effective management of the agenda and manipulation of floor procedures may have enabled Democrats to augment their consensus. Michael Malbin's forthcoming *Political Parties Across the Separation of Powers* addresses many of these issues, and thus provides a fitting companion reading to *Parties and Leaders.*

Rhode has a good chapter on "Republican Reactions" to conditional party government, although relegating House Republicans to a single chapter exacerbates a common slight in recent scholarship on the House of Representatives. While this tendency among scholars is somewhat understandable given how marginalized this permanent minority party has become in the House, nevertheless it remains a defect in the literature. On closer inspection, House Republicans may not be as homogeneous as often presumed. Rhode's conclusion that political parties matter is important; his book provides solid evidence to that effect. *Parties and Leaders,* a thoughtful and debate-provoking book, should be read by all students of Congress.

WILLIAM F. CONNELLY, JR.
Washington and Lee University

Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies *by Joseph F. Bouchard. New York, Columbia University Press, 1991. 325 pp. $45.00.*

Rather dry and bulky, but still a splendid book. Bouchard presents a careful and systematic study of the danger that inadvertent crisis escalation might result from decoupling of political and tactical interactions, focusing on U.S. naval operations in four cases: the Taiwan Straits (1958), blockade of Cuba (1962), Six-Day Arab-Israeli War (1967), and Middle East War (1973). His analysis,

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though ponderously schematic and repetitive in presentation, is novel; and it challenges some academic conventional wisdom.

Of course, many are likely now to say "so what?" about ideas on superpower crisis management, given the end of the cold war—a problem that afflicts most recent research on strategic matters. But anyone still concerned with theories or evidence about crisis stability, the security dilemma, or accidental war should digest this book thoroughly. Although the author accepts in principle that the risk of inadvertent escalation is one of the most important concerns in managing a confrontation, his analysis underwrites a view of the problem that is more relaxed or optimistic than the one that dominates the literature on civil-military relations in crises.

Bouchard frames his cases within established theories of crisis management and marshals untapped declassified evidence (including operational military data and communications) along with other voluminous material. He manages, amazingly, to say much that is new and important about the Cuban crisis, as well as the other cases. A few examples: He shows that the potential for accidental combat between U.S. and Soviet ships was actually much less in 1962 than academics who study the crisis have assumed, and much more in 1973 than anyone outside the navy realized. He demonstrates convincingly that other analysts have been mistaken in claiming that the navy conducted more provocative antisubmarine operations than civilian leaders knew about or wanted in 1962. Indeed, it turns out that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara deliberately initiated special procedures that were more aggressive than normal peacetime navy policy allowed! In 1973 leaders in the White House did not see the confrontation in as dangerous a light as the earlier missile crisis, yet for purposes of diplomatic signaling to Moscow they ordered the fleet in the Mediterranean to maneuver in a way that actually led both sides' ships to prepare for preemptive firing—the stereotypical "hair trigger" scenario for accidental war.

Bouchard makes a generally powerful case that unified interaction (direct control of tactical operations by political leaders) is ideal but improbable; relying on indirect mechanisms of control (such as standing orders, mission orders, rules of engagement) is safer and wiser than one would believe from works in the genre of Graham Allison, John Steinbruner, or Paul Bracken; and there are strong inherent tendencies toward *de*escalation in crisis military operations, even when engagements unsanctioned by political authorities occur.

Some might suspect that these conclusions are self-serving, because Bouchard is a naval officer and the analysis does not contradict the ethos or interests of his service. His argument is quite well developed, however, and persuasive on its merits, and he does not claim too much for it. He does not base his case on claims to turf (in contrast to many military professionals, he accepts that tight control of operations by civilian leadership would be desirable if it were practical), but on intrinsic limits of communication systems, reaction times, and scope of attention, and on incentives for caution and responsibility embedded in the self-interest of commanders in the field. The book is a useful caution against two extremes

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in theorizing about crisis management—excessive confidence in the ability to orchestrate military forces for subtle political signaling and excessive anxiety that parochial commanders are likely to precipitate war independently.

RICHARD K. BETTS
Columbia University

The Governors and the New Federalism *by Marshall Kaplan and Sue O'Brien. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 136 pp. Paper, $21.50.*

What's a governor to do: if the national government cuts its spending for social programs traditionally delivered through the states and localities; if it studies the education system, declares it to be in crisis, sets goals, then spends less money on education; if it says it will deregulate, providing greater discretion and lowering administrative costs at the subnational level, but really doesn't; and if it cuts localities out of the action, giving states a bigger role, just when there is less to work with?

All this happened, of course, during the Reagan years. This book is a look at the responses in eight states to this latest incarnation of the "new federalism" in three policy areas—health, education, and welfare. Eight governors contribute to the book: Lee Dreyfus (Wisconsin), John Evans (Idaho), William Jacklow (North Dakota), Richard Lamm (Colorado), Richard Snelling (Vermont), William Winter (Mississippi), Michael Dukakis (Massachusetts), and Mark White (Texas). The book's goal is to contribute to better understanding of the bounds of gubernatorial power in the contemporary American intergovernmental environment. Its format is straight-forward. A brief contextual introduction is followed by eight small case studies and two chapters summarizing the lessons learned.

What are some of these lessons? Formal powers or no formal powers, governors can get what they really want, if they want it badly enough, and go after it. Bill Jacklow wanted to consolidate rural schools, and he bent federal rules regarding welfare. But such a governor must focus down, invest lots of energy, and may, in Jacklow's terms, "lose sight of the big picture."

Federal cutbacks sometimes offer governors opportunities to pursue their own agenda, by getting the credit for continuing programs with state funds, or, if powerful, blaming someone else for it. The scarcity caused by federal cutbacks and a national recession allowed Lee Dreyfus to reorganize state government in Wisconsin.

Social policy change is often best sold in the states as economic development, and it doesn't hurt if you can get a star in the business community to do the selling. Mark White got Ross Perot to chair his "crusade" to reform public education in Texas.

It helps to have a legislature controlled by your own party, but legislative

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recalcitrance can be overcome with courage, determination, focused grassroots organizing, and a little luck. Bill Winters demonstrated this by achieving a $100 million tax increase for education reform in Mississippi.

But most of these lessons were known before this book was written: leadership style matters, power matters, timing matters, and context matters. And so do energy, political intelligence, good friends, and hard work.

The authors do not tell us how or why their cases were selected, or whether they think the eight are representative. Their focus and method leave out much that is worth knowing about the gubernatorial careers and administrations they briefly sketch. They attribute diverse results in the states to diverse leadership styles. James M. Burns's categorization of these styles seem to be used as a framework without much explicit discussion of this paradigm and why it was selected.

In sum, though an informed and intelligent primer, Kaplan and O'Brien's discussion of the use of gubernatorial power in the modern American federal system adds little to what was known about the subject before this volume was written.

GERALD BENJAMIN
Rockefeller Institute of Government

The Search for Rational Drug Control *by Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 219 pp. $24.95.*

Zimring and Hawkins make an important contribution to a clearer understanding of the drug control issue. The authors' central strategy is to systematically examine the premises underlying the current administration's legalist approach, as encapsulated in the 1989 *National Drug Control Strategy* document. Zimring and Hawkins also turn a skeptical eye toward the other salient approaches to drug control, including the public health perspective and that of the school advocating decriminalization. In doing so, the authors thoroughly and nonpolemically cover both historical territory as well as current public policy issues. The cornerstone of their argument is the assertion that the debate over decriminalization versus prohibition is misguided, for it obscures the most vital issue—a rational and nonideological evaluation of specific criminal controls and their relative marginal utility. The resulting analysis is valuable and indeed essential reading for anyone interested in the contemporary American war on drugs.

Zimring and Hawkins's approach deserves to be taken seriously, irrespective of one's predilection for any given school of drug control. Chapters are devoted to the development of such issues as the relationship between drugs and crime, evidence stemming from four historical periods of prohibition in America, and the federal (in contrast to state and local) role in combatting and controlling drugs. By paying attention to and carefully analyzing the marginal costs and

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benefits of a myriad of current drug policies, Zimring and Hawkins bring clarity to discussions of selective resource allocation. In the volume's final chapter, written as a memorandum to a future drug czar, the authors conclude that a rigorous analysis of marginal cases is an essential precondition for an effective public policy. In contrast, they convincingly argue, drug control in the United States today is stagnating in an either/or mentality: the debate bounces back and forth among alternative approaches in their broadest formulation. As a result, insufficient attention is being directed to evaluations of choices within the existing framework.

President George Bush made drug control a key issue. In his inaugural address, Bush vowed to end "this scourge" of drug abuse, and he devoted his first prime time television address to drug control, termed "the toughest domestic challenge we've faced in decades." In the last four years, however, the federal drug control budget has doubled to just under $12 billion in fiscal year 1992, with two thirds of that sum being devoted to enforcement. Yet, in the first three quarters of 1991 (the latest data available at press time) one reliable index of drug abuse has continued to rise: emergency room incidence of cocaine rose 25 percent; heroin rose 7 percent. With ever-shrinking budgets and a continuing drug crisis, the critical analysis presented in Zimring and Hawkins's book is long overdue.

SANYA POPOVIC
Barnard College

As Far as Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond *edited by William A. Schambra. Washington, DC, AEI Press, 1992. 405 pp. $34.95.*

The twentieth has been a difficult century for the American republic's Founders, more so in some respects than their own eighteenth, when they might respond in person to detractors and critics. Martin Diamond sought in his writing and teaching above all to rescue the Framers from "the frenzied criticism" (p. 387) of the present and provide instead a "sympathetic consideration of the American regime" (p. 281), especially its founding generation.

How well did Diamond succeed? This collection of essays provides a fine opportunity to revisit his attempt, fifteen years after his death and over thirty since the earliest of the included works appeared. William A. Schambra contributes a longish, hagiographic introduction and otherwise edits with a judiciously light hand. He conveniently divides the book into five sections, the first two featuring ten of Diamond's reflections on federalist theory and other aspects of the founding.

These opening essays will be more familiar to readers, and along with the concluding piece are the cream of the book. Rereading "*The Federalist*'s View of Federalism" or "Democracy and *The Federalist*: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent" one is reminded of the considerable debt that political scientists

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owe to Diamond. His influence on period scholarship is still felt both in terms of methodology (who else in the discipline, apart perhaps from Robert Dahl, was in the 1950s and early 1960s subjecting *The Federalist* to such thorough and insightful attempts to understand its authors on their own terms?) and of substantive argument. Diamond's perspective on the large/small state debate at the Convention, on the Founders' wariness of direct popular rule, or on James Madison's deft harnessing of self-interest to the republic's better ends, to take but three examples, remain fresh and even provocative interpretations.

Diamond's insight falters when he progresses beyond the founding era, however. In "The Declaration and the Constitution: Liberty, Democracy, and the Founders," Progressive historians receive a drubbing for their attempts to ground the Constitution in the political and social realities of its time. This is historicism, to Diamond—and, more lamentably, a leading source of present-day "political alienation, of distrust in our fundamental institutions" (p. 228). (The essay originally appeared months after Richard Nixon's resignation.) But rather than the "amazing hegemony" (ibid.) allegedly wielded by Charles Beard, Vernon Parrington, and J. Allen Smith, their economic interpretation was long buried by the time Diamond wrote. And, in no small irony, their insistence on recognizing the Ur-texts of American democracy as original and significant in their own right was renewed by Diamond himself in his influential argument that the founding represented a decisive break with the classical politics of the past and ushered in a "new science of politics" (p. 232 and passim).

Diamond's observations on contemporary American higher education and society will be familiar to anyone who has read the antimodernity polemics of other Straussians, most notably Allan Bloom. The "fact-value distinction" underlying "modern [behavioral] political science" (pp. 309–318 and passim.), "militant politicization" of the academy by "Left critics" (pp. 296–298), "disbelieving relativis[m]" (p. 212), "Utopian egalitarianism" (p. 328), and "mind-expanding drugs" (p. 329)—whatever one makes of these phenomena, Diamond's response is anachronistic and misleading. He would "give to the [American] polity and its constitutive [that is, founding] opinions a central and respected place" (p. 305) in political teaching. Most political scientists and historians would agree and further would readily affirm with Diamond that much was "politically healthy" (p. 306) in the Founders' political thought and practice. But to advise merely and repeatedly a "return" to or "restoration" of "founding principles" is to write off wrongly the decades of judicial, legislative, and popular modification of those principles and practices since the founding —some for ill, certainly, but some equally for the better.

Diamond's essay on "The Revolution of Sober Expectations" is apropos. Here Abraham Lincoln "was obliged to look back upon the origins of the American republic" to "save the Union" (p. 209). But as Bruce Ackerman and James McPherson have most recently reminded us, Lincoln presided over not a return to first principles but a radical reinterpretation and novel application of these—a Second American Revolution. Rather than "free ourselves from two centuries of

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obscuring usage" (p. 214), adequate understanding of the American polity can only come through devotion to its rich postfounding history as well. Diamond remains a bright lantern where the political theory of the founding is concerned; as a guide to developments since, these essays shine more dimly.

ROGAN KERSH
Yale University

The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America's Unique Conservatism *by Patricia Cayo Sexton. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991. 325 pp. $24.95.*

In this ambitious history of American labor, Patricia Cayo Sexton attributes both the lack of a labor party in the United States and the dramatic decline in union density in recent decades to the unique hostility and repressive tactics of American business toward unions. Her explanation is not only an alternative to cultural explanations of American exceptionalism or structural or cyclical explanations of recent union decline, but also to internal explanations that often blame labor or its leaders for strategic blunders or ideological naivete. An implication of the argument is that no structural changes have doomed American labor to continued decline. "The labor left is not caught in the iron grip of history" (p. 4). Labor can revive, just as it did after the lean years of the 1920s, if subjective factors change and it gains the initiative.

Sexton's analysis of the contemporary union decline in the United States is particularly incisive. Using comparative data with Canada, she isolates to the public sector the bulk of the divergence in union density between the two countries and then shows that Canadian laws encourage public sector unionism, whereas American laws do not. Sexton is undoubtedly correct. The divergence is not due to any continental divide of culture. A cultural explanation is too blunt an instrument to dissect the similarity in the countries' private sector versus their dissimilarity in the public sector. Moreover, she points out that public confidence in unions is actually lower in Canada than in the United States.

The author finds it necessary to include the role of law, government, and the media in repressing labor, while retaining her thesis that it is the war by capitalists on labor that explains America's conservatism. This leads the author to espouse a theory of the state that looks very much like a ruling-class instrumentalism in which capitalists influence law, government, and the media to a greater extent than pluralists or state theorists would find plausible. See, for instance, the portrayal of an oligarchy in chapter 15.

One weakness in the argument that capitalist repression explains the absence of a labor party is the author's discussion of the effect of America's not having a parliamentary system with proportional representation. One suspects that with such a system a labor party would have emerged in the 1930s, at the latest. The author herself points out that Australian labor had a party by 1917, despite

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sharing with American labor many of the supposed disadvantages of operating in a New World democracy, because Australia had a parliamentary system. In turn, the ongoing lack of a labor party may lead to a conservative, anti-union mood during the normal times when there is no social upheaval that causes spontaneous radicalness. Sexton, though, attempts to subsume this political explanation under her thesis by attributing the lack of a parliamentary system to dominance of the political rules of the game by labor's adversaries, going all the way back to the Constitutional Convention. It will seem more natural to most readers to see the political explanation and the war-on-labor explanation as competing.

The tone of the work is at times stridently left-wing (although perhaps no more strident than some of the consensus theory of a generation ago on this topic). This may distract readers who are more conservative in their politics or their scholarly style. The distractions, however, are worth setting aside, because the substance of this book is important and provocative. It fills a void in the field and pushes us in a new direction.

ROD MALPERT
Cornell University

The Color-Blind Constitution *by Andrew Kull. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992. 301 pp. $35.00.*

Perhaps the most famous sentences in a dissenting opinion of a United States Supreme Court justice were written almost one hundred years ago in a case that upheld the right of a state to impose racial segregation in public transportation. The justice was John Marshall Harlan, the case *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896). In rejecting the majority's adoption of the separate but equal doctrine, Justice Harlan declared: "There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."

Few students of constitutional law know the origins of this constitutional doctrine. Kull's research locates its beginnings in a petition prepared in December 1839 by the Lynn, Massachusetts Women's Anti-Slavery Society and addressed to the state legislature. It asked that the legislature immediately ". . . repeal all laws in this State, which make any distinction among its inhabitants on account of COLOR."

In the years before the advent of the Civil War, there were others who propounded the same doctrine. Some were obscure figures, such as the Boston merchant Edmund Jackson. But the idea of a color-blind government also had the support of two of the most prominent abolitionists of the period, Wendell Phillips and Charles Sumner.

While the idea of a government blind to the color of its people may appeal to our better nature, it has rarely been accepted as the legal principle governing race

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relations in this nation. During the debate in the post-Civil War Thirty-ninth Congress over a civil rights amendment to the Constitution, the legislature rejected language that would have incorporated a color blind rule into the measure. Instead, it adopted the equal protection language proposed by Senator John Bingham, which ultimately became part of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This rule of nondiscrimination became the law of the land, not government blindness toward the race of Americans.

The decision of the Thirty-ninth Congress in 1867 has had great consequences for this country. The doctrine of equal protection was vague enough so that it could be interpreted in different ways. In the *Plessy* case the Supreme Court found that separate but equal met the requirements of the equal protection clause. Several generations later in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), the Court held that public schools that segregated by race were inherently unequal.

The color-blind principle had a brief period of support during the mid-1960s. Senator Hubert Humphrey, for example, endorsed it during the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But it was not long before governments, especially courts and administrative agencies, began to use race as a factor in establishing policies. Governments at all levels adopted affirmative action programs; courts ordered school districts to create racially balanced schools; and administrative agencies formulated rules to guarantee rights to racial minorities. Had Kull completed his book somewhat later, he could have cited the 1992 pattern of redistricting seats for the House of Representatives as another example of race-based public policy. The Justice Department interpreted the nation's voting rights laws as mandating the creation of districts that would elect Afro-American and Hispanic legislators.

Kull has produced a book that is both an important contribution to scholarship and to public discussion of the direction of this nation's legal policies regarding race. For almost a century Justice Harlan's call for a color-blind constitution served as a beacon for public policy regarding race. But political forces in recent years have moved this nation steadily away from this ideal. Kull's book should provide a catalyst for greater public discussion of this nation's growing use of racial standards in formulating public policies.

WALTER E. VOLKOMER
Hunter College

The Presidency in Mexican Politics *by George Philip. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992. 213 pp. $59.95.*

George Philip provides a well written and insightful analysis of Mexican presidential politics and policy making during four administrations from 1964 to 1988. He views the growth of an exceptionally powerful presidential institution as a reaction to the chaos and violence of the Mexican revolution and the product of a "Hobbesian bargain" (p. 13) between the state and key social groups, whereby

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the state committed itself to providing stability and prosperity in exchange for near dictatorial powers.

Over time, however, the bargain eroded. The naked use of presidential power to massacre hundreds of demonstrating students in 1968 provided a painful lesson in the need to limit executive authority a la John Locke. Ironically, the very success of the Hobbesian state threatened its long-term survival. Rapid economic growth made possible by the restoration of political order after 1940 fueled the rise of a politically sophisticated urban middle class and a business community that constrained the policy-making autonomy of the presidency. Attempts by the president to impose his policies by fiat could now have disastrous consequences, such as the runaway capital flight that occurred during the 1981–1982 crisis. Increasingly, Mexican presidents would find themselves in the position of having to woo independent groups by making political concessions that weakened the presidency.

Philip argues that the weakening of the presidency is not an unmitigated blessing, even from the perspective of democratization. He believes that only a strong president can force vested interests within the system to accept democracy; pressure from below is also necessary but not sufficient to accomplish this task. Recent events in Mexican politics do lend some support to this contention. President Carlos Salinas, for example, has used presidential power to ensure recognition of electoral victories by the opposition National Action Party (PAN), despite resistance from his own party. Yet, Philip's point needs qualification. Presidential power is, after all, a double-edged sword that can be used both to hinder or advance democracy depending on the personal preferences and policy compulsions of the occupant of the office at a given moment. Nor should one overlook the fact that the presidency as the centerpiece of a relatively closed political system has a vested interest in limiting the extent of democratic change.

One major limitation of Philip's book is his failure to develop a formal set of criteria to assess and compare the ebb and flow of presidential power across administrations and issue areas. In addition, Philip's main explanation for the decline of presidential autonomy is socioeconomic change, but his discussion of the issue is surprisingly superficial and does not adequately consider competing hypotheses. One can also quarrel with his view that local business support of the PAN "largely accounted for its renewed strength" (p. 145). Empirical evidence, including this writer's own research, suggest that the PAN received considerable support from women, popular colony residents, and urban workers as well. Nor can one attribute the PAN's victories in the gubernatorial elections of Baja California Norte in 1989 and Chihuahua in 1992 to business support in view of the rapport between the business community and the Salinas regime.

Despite its flaws, this book stimulates, informs, and even entertains the reader. Philip's analysis of how presidential personality and psychology affected decision making is particularly good. His use of rarely cited reports from the foreign diplomatic community provides a fascinating window onto American and British

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perceptions of Mexican politics. Philip's book is a useful contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of presidential politics in Mexico.

VIKRAM K. CHAND
Harvard University

Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968–89 *by Laurie P. Salitan. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992. 180 pp. $49.95.*

This slim volume (106 pages of text) with a fat price is a comprehensive, succinct history of the evolution of Soviet policy toward the emigration of Jews and Germans, and an attempt to explain that policy. The history is a fine synthesis of what is known; the explanation is often persuasive, sometimes silly, and occasionally outrageous. Salitan's thesis is that domestic, not foreign, affairs determined Soviet emigration policy and that the barometer thesis, which explained emigration policy as a function of Soviet-American and Soviet-German relations, is not only wrong but "reflects an 'Americo-centric' worldview, a certain hubris whereby U.S. analysts attribute all [sic] Soviet decisions to the mood and expected response of America" (p. 105).

Explicitly eschewing models of Soviet decision making, Salitan uses "a mode of interpretation based on a low level of causality," which allows her to "identify and develop signposts that illuminated relevant issues and policy areas" (p. 3). What this means precisely and whether this amounts to a method, is not altogether clear.

Nevertheless, Salitan persuasively argues that Soviet motivation in allowing Jewish emigration in the early 1970s was to get rid of Zionists and other troublemakers; that after 1974 the policy became contradictory, as it simultaneously allowed emigration and repressed many would-be emigrants. In the 1980s "the goal became ending emigration altogether" (p. 47); and the great emigration of 1989 and after is a function of the general liberalization of the Soviet system. Her evidence is neither new information on decision-making processes nor memoirs of decision makers or interviews with them. Rather it is careful and well reasoned deduction from policy outcomes placed in broad domestic and focused international contexts. There are a few minor errors (for example, on the Bund (p. 13); on Soviet Germans (p. 72); on U.S. refugee policy after 1989 (p. 103). However, in general, the details are accurate, relevant, and very well presented.

Moreover, Salitan's emphasis on domestic determinants on emigration policy is reasonable. She argues that emigration began before détente became a significant factor in U.S.–Soviet relations, though its dimensions grew significantly in the era of détente. She points out that the barometer thesis does not account for the surge in emigration in 1976–1979 when, as she sees it, U.S.–Soviet relations deteriorated. Salitan suggests that the earlier decline in emigration in the mid-1970s was due to a decline in applications caused by difficult economic times in

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Israel and the United States. In the 1970s, furthermore, "While US–Soviet relations deteriorated, Jewish emigration increased [but] while German–Soviet relations grew warmer, German emigration was reduced. These trends suggest that the international climate was not a primary factor determining the flow of emigration" (p. 91). Demographic considerations, such as the expansion of the Kazakh population, led the authorities to curb German emigration from that republic, though as Salitan herself points out, Germans constituted only 6 percent of the republic's population and keeping them there would hardly reduce Kazakh influence. Of course, whether one accepts her arguments or not depends on one's view of American–Soviet relations in 1976–1979 or the plausibility of Salitan's arguments compared with others, because ultimately there is no *direct* information available about the calculations that went into the making of Soviet emigration policy.

What is disturbing about this book is that attempting to debunk what she sees as the conventional wisdom, the author has been captured by a counterthesis that explains nearly everything and, worse, carcicatures and distorts the thesis she does not accept. She admits that "an anti-emigration policy was not inconsistent with the progressive deterioration of US–Soviet relations." But not unreasonably she insists that "the primary mechanism driving emigration policy was the maturing of several domestic problems of the 1970s into full blown-crises [sic] in the 1980s" (pp. 95–96). But to say that those who believe that the emphasis ought to be on foreign policy considerations saw the Soviet state as one "that makes policy only on the basis of external considerations, a state with no domestic concerns," is silly. Salitan cites not a single statement to that effect—she simply asserts that this is what others believed. Her conclusion is that the barometer thesis reflects "a consistent, almost willful, ignorance of Soviet domestic politics (other than an obsession with Kremlinology)" which characterizes "U.S. analysts." A glance at some shelves might reveal hundreds of volumes by U.S. analysts on Soviet domestic politics: interest groups, political participation, public administration, the Communist Party, civil-military relations, economic policy and administration, law, nationality policy, the role of the media, womens' roles, etc. Salitan herself cites a dozen western studies of domestic policy. The irony is that ultimately this book tells us little about Soviet domestic politics. Who were the actors in formulating emigration policy? Who opposed it and who favored it? How were decisions taken and by whom? The reader will not find the answers to these questions in this book, though it is a good survey of the twists and turns in Soviet emigration policy.

ZVI GITELMAN
The University of Michigan

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Advances in Policy Studies Since 1950, Policy Studies Review Annual Volume 10 *edited by William N. Dunn and Rita Mae Kelly. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1992. 542 pp. $59.95.*

The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development *edited by Peter H. Sand. Cambridge, England, Grotius Publications Limited, 1992. 539 pp. $80.00.*

Encyclopedia of the American Left *edited by Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and Dan Georgakas. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1992. 928 pp. Paper, $29.95.*

The Handbook of Political Science Research on Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends from the 1960s to the 1990s *edited by Mark W. DeLancey. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1992. 423 pp. $75.00.*

Handbook of Political Science Research on the USSR and Eastern Europe: Trends from the 1950s to the 1990s *edited by Raymond C. Taras. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1992. 341 pp. $79.50.*

Warren G. Harding: A Bibliography *compiled by Richard G. Frederick. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1992. 386 pp. $59.95.*

Human Development Report *published for the United Nations Development Program. New York, Oxford University Press, 1992. 216 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $16.95.*

Hunger 1993: Uprooted People, Third Annual Report on the State of World Hunger *edited by Marc J. Cohen. Washington, DC, Bread for the World Institute on Hunger and Development, 1992. 204 pp. $12.95.*

The Legislative Drafter's Desk Reference *by Lawrence E. Filson. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1992. 450 pp. $85.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Volume 67, 1920–1922 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992. 650 pp. $57.50.*

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Transition to Palestinian Self-Government: Practical Steps Toward Israeli-Palestinian Peace *by Ann Mosely Lesch. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992. 160 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $10.95.*

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When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification *edited by Harold James and Marla Stone. New York, Routledge, 1992. 351 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $17.95.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Since Leon Gordenker and his work has been such an inspiration in the past, I greatly appreciate his review of my book *Sheathing the Sword: The UN Secretary-General and the Prevention of Conflict* (PSQ 106 [Winter 1991–92] 728–729). Yet, since the review misquotes the book, and thus misconstrues one of its main themes, I would like to offer some brief corrections and clarifications concerning Lee's remarks.

The review states that I believe that the secretary-general's preventive role "should be supported by a global system of conflict identification and telecommunications." Omitted in the review is the word "analysis," which should be added between "conflict identification" and telecommunications (p. 6). This is a crucial oversight since Lee later states, after discussing my proposals for enhancing UN telecommunications, that: "Even more useful would be the genuinely systematic and analysis of much argumented information by skilled civil servants." Yet, this is *precisely* the major theme of several chapters and sections in Part II of *Sheathing the Sword.* For instance, in Chapter 6, the preventive role of the secretary-general is divided into three stages: conflict identification, conflict analysis, and conflict resolution (p. 106). A later section of Chapter 6 as well as all of Chapter 9 deals with this "analysis/intervention" stage of the secretary-general's preventive role. In short, the prospect of improving in-house UN analysis is a major theme of the book.

THOMAS E. BOUDREAU

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Political Science Quarterly

Volume 107
1992

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and international affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

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

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

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

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